What a Persecuted Donald Trump Would Do as President?

M A Hossain,

Entire world is looking into November – the day of presidential election in the United States, as for many countries, result of this election shall bear significant importance, while for many governments, Donald Trump’s victory would blow severe consequence. Meanwhile, as the election approaches, misinformation, disinformation, bogus or ridiculous analysis and propaganda stunt regarding political stances and potential foreign policies is on the rise. In particular, certain social media influencers – with kindergarten-grade knowledge on geopolitics, are disseminating misguided perceptions or forecasts of Donald Trump’s potential actions as president. With little genuine insight into complex foreign affairs, these influencers risk leading the public astray. This trend is not only misleading but also harmful to informed political discourse. Given that Trump’s chances of winning seem increasingly plausible, with Kamala Harris and her team’s strategies potentially falling short, a key question arises: will Trump, as president, shift from Biden’s stance, particularly regarding Bangladesh and its strategic allies? Understanding the fundamental differences between US foreign policy and its strategies can shed light on these questions, challenging the simplistic narratives being shared online.

Many analysts contend that US foreign policy remains rigid or unchanged, regardless of who occupies the White House. While there is some truth to this, it is an oversimplification. Those content creators often fail to recognize the nuanced difference between policy and strategy. While foreign policy- the overarching principles guiding international relations – remains largely bipartisan, strategies vary significantly depending on the administration in power.

A pertinent example is US-Iran relations, where Presidents Barack Obama and Joe Biden have both displayed diplomatic outreach, in contrast to Trump’s staunch opposition to Iranian regime and determination of putting multiple pressure on Tehran. Meanwhile, the policy on Israel has remained steadfast across administrations, symbolizing how certain pillars of US foreign policy transcend individual leadership styles or party lines.

A deeper exploration into US foreign policy reveals a structured, bipartisan approach that sets the broad objectives of the country’s global stance. Policies are established by Congress and rooted in alliances, interests, and values, which include key elements like the US commitment to Jewish interests, a general stance against communism, Islam, and a well-documented history of protecting US economic interests. These are constants in the US foreign policy, rarely influenced by shifts in presidential power.

However, while the policies are static, strategies are crafted to adapt to the global stage and shift according to the priorities of the president and his administration. The implementation of these policies relies on the administration’s strategy, which may involve different alliances, diplomatic tones, or military engagements. Take the US stance on the Muslim world; while there has been an overarching policy approach over the years, the strategy varies. Presidents like George W. Bush and Bill Clinton adopted more hardline, confrontational strategies, whereas Obama and Biden pursued diplomatic engagements. This illustrates that while the policy remains unchanged, the strategy – how it is executed – reflects the administration’s objectives and style.

Some influencers are quick to assert that, should Trump return to office, there would be no shift in the US stance on individuals such as Professor Muhammad Yunus in Bangladesh, based on comparisons with past administrations like those of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. This perspective fails to account for significant changes in the global power landscape since the Cold War. During that era, Bangladesh’s significance to the US was minimal due to the geopolitical context: China was economically nascent, and India was struggling to establish itself. Today, the situation is markedly different, with China now an economic superpower and India an emerging regional power. US strategy, therefore, is more likely to align with current global realities than with Cold War-era approaches.

This distinction between eras is particularly relevant when considering the approach to Bangladesh and individuals like Professor Yunus, who maintains deeper ties with the Democratic Party. Trump’s prior administration saw a drastic shift in strategy regarding international affairs, notably ending US involvement in the Afghan war, where Obama had maintained engagement. Thus, it’s not only possible but probable that Trump would enact stark changes that distinguish him from Biden and his predecessors. In light of today’s geopolitical climate, a more nuanced strategy would likely consider Bangladesh’s evolving importance in the Indo-Pacific arena.

With regards to Bangladesh, several factors come into play. Professor Yunus, known as an ally of the Democratic Party, holds a prominent position within the region’s political landscape, especially through his connections to Democrat-friendly networks. The Biden administration has shown a preference for individuals affiliated with the Democratic Party internationally, evident in its distance from leaders like Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi due to her Republican ties. The tension between the Democratic Party and Trump, who has faced persistent judicial repression, only adds to the likelihood that a second Trump term would entail dramatic changes, potentially targeting Democratic affiliates in strategic regions like Bangladesh. Definitely, Donald Trump will showcase Biden’s decisions as failure globally.

Under Trump, there would likely be significant global shifts, including an accelerated resolution to the Ukraine conflict, which he claims he can conclude within 24 hours. His administration could also push for a resolution to the Israel-Palestine conflict, likely supporting a Two-State solution that satisfies longstanding US policy objectives while aligning with Trump’s unique diplomatic style. Additionally, Bangladesh’s location makes it a key player in the US Indo-Pacific strategy, as a buffer to China’s growing influence in Asia. In this respect, a Trump administration would likely leverage ties with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, possibly exerting greater influence over Bangladesh’s political trajectory. Modi, who has openly aligned with Trump on multiple occasions, could be given latitude to influence Bangladesh, serving US interests in containing Chinese and Russian influence in the region.

As misinformation on social media continues to shape public perception of US foreign policy, it is critical to approach such discourse with discernment. The distinct roles of policy and strategy illustrate why changes in administration can lead to vastly different foreign policy implementations. While overarching US foreign policy principles may remain constant, the strategies employed to realize those principles vary, reflecting the political priorities of the administration in power. Should Trump secure the presidency, his administration would likely diverge from Biden’s approach, potentially reshaping the US relationship with Bangladesh and other strategic allies.

In the end, understanding these complexities allows for a clearer perspective, especially as geopolitical dynamics shift. As political discussions intensify online, fostering a well-informed public dialogue is essential to counter misleading narratives. 

M A Hossain, political and defense analyst based in Bangladesh. He can be reached at: writetomahossain@gmail.com

This article published at : 

1. The Asian Age, BD : 31 Oct, 24

2. Weekly blitz, BD : 28 Oct, 24

Türkiye Pursuing BRICS Membership

M A Hossain,

At this week’s BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, the presence of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan underscored Türkiye’s longstanding interest in joining the BRICS alliance. As the sole NATO member exploring membership in this predominantly non-Western organization, Türkiye’s pursuit of BRICS reflects Ankara’s shifting foreign policy stance toward strategic autonomy and economic multipolarity. Erdogan’s attendance conveyed Türkiye’s intentions and hinted at a broader message to its Western allies, particularly NATO and the EU, as it navigates its own path in a complex geopolitical landscape.

Türkiye’s primary motivations for aligning with BRICS are rooted in economic considerations. The current BRICS nations-Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa-recently expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE, strengthening the organization’s economic and political footprint. Türkiye, as a regional middle power and a G20 member, stands to benefit from joining BRICS by enhancing economic cooperation with emerging markets in energy, trade, and development. As Türkiye grapples with ongoing financial challenges, closer ties with BRICS could provide an alternative to its traditional economic partners, potentially stabilizing its economy by diversifying trade routes and investment sources.

Economic cooperation with BRICS members also aligns with Türkiye’s broader national interest. Türkiye has already pursued joint initiatives with BRICS members, particularly with China and Russia, indicating Ankara’s readiness to further strengthen these relationships. This partnership is significant because it offers Türkiye access to non-Western financial institutions, such as the New Development Bank, which could support major infrastructure and development projects in Türkiye.

Türkiye’s pursuit of BRICS membership reflects a wider foreign policy reorientation. While Ankara remains a NATO member and an EU candidate, it is increasingly prioritizing a more independent “strategic autonomy” that allows it to engage in alliances without being constrained by Western agendas. This shift has been particularly visible in Türkiye’s response to the EU’s criticism over its growing ties with BRICS nations, especially Russia.

The summit’s subdued reaction from NATO countries, such as Secretary-General Mark Rutte’s acknowledgment of Türkiye’s “sovereign right” to engage with BRICS, reveals the balancing act required of NATO members. Should Türkiye join BRICS officially, it would amplify the organization’s geopolitical stature as a symbol of nonalignment, while positioning Türkiye favorably within both Western and non-Western camps. This dual affiliation would increase Türkiye’s leverage in negotiations with Western allies, granting it more latitude in foreign policy decisions that serve its own interests rather than those of NATO or the EU.

Türkiye’s interest in BRICS reflects mounting frustration with Western hegemony. President Erdogan has frequently criticized Western dominance in global institutions, calling for more inclusive representation. Disappointment over Türkiye’s protracted EU membership process and strained relations with the US have only strengthened this critique. For many Turkish decision-makers, the Western era of global influence is in decline, as evidenced by recent developments in international conflicts and power dynamics.

Türkiye’s alignment with BRICS is, in part, a reaction to Western selective diplomacy. The Turkish government’s stance on conflicts like the Gaza war has highlighted its disapproval of what it perceives as Western double standards. By joining BRICS, Türkiye aims to engage with emerging global powers like China and Russia, who, while not immune to criticism, are viewed as less hypocritical in addressing global conflicts. The Astana peace process for Syria, involving Türkiye, Russia, and Iran, exemplifies Türkiye’s collaborative approach with BRICS members on regional security issues.

Türkiye’s BRICS aspirations are also reflective of its vision for a multipolar world where it can operate without succumbing to any single power’s dominance. A more interconnected Global South, bolstered by BRICS, provides Türkiye with an alternative geopolitical orientation. This perspective is particularly attractive as Ankara’s leaders observe the rise of the Global South and an emerging coalition of nations that increasingly resist Western dominance.

BRICS membership would enable Türkiye to adopt a nonaligned foreign policy that prioritizes its national interests over ideological alignment. Historically, Türkiye has maintained its position as a close U.S. ally and a founding NATO member. However, Ankara has repositioned itself in recent years, building pragmatic alliances with former adversaries like Russia and cultivating relations with China-often at the expense of Western ties. Türkiye’s BRICS membership would support its pursuit of a nonaligned foreign policy that balances relations with both East and West, enabling it to act in its own best interests rather than as a passive player in Western alliances.

Türkiye’s diplomatic overtures to BRICS also serve as a message to the West, particularly the EU. Türkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has implied that Türkiye’s interest in BRICS would not exist if it were already an EU member. By aligning with BRICS, Türkiye sends a clear signal to Brussels, encouraging European leaders to reassess their treatment of Ankara if they hope to retain Türkiye as a cooperative ally. This is especially pertinent given that BRICS is rapidly emerging as a viable platform for global influence, attracting countries that feel marginalized by Western policies.

Furthermore, Türkiye’s frustrations with the West’s selective humanitarian rhetoric-particularly regarding Gaza-have underscored the limitations of Western support. The country perceives BRICS as a platform where it can engage with other influential powers who, while not perfect, are deemed more genuine in addressing regional issues. As Türkiye’s regional influence grows, its ties with BRICS countries could elevate its standing in international negotiations and solidify its position as a respected middle power.

Türkiye’s interest in joining BRICS reflects a calculated approach to the shifting global order. Driven by economic interests, strategic autonomy, frustration with Western hegemony, and aspirations for a more multipolar world, Türkiye’s BRICS bid challenges traditional alliances and signals Ankara’s readiness to explore partnerships beyond its Western commitments. While Türkiye remains committed to its NATO obligations, the benefits of BRICS membership are appealing enough to risk potential Western criticism.

The message from Türkiye is clear: should Western allies continue to overlook Türkiye’s grievances and dismiss its calls for greater autonomy, Ankara will pursue its path to an independent foreign policy. Erdogan’s presence at the Kazan summit underscores this sentiment and serves as a reminder that Türkiye’s foreign policy is not beholden to Western preferences alone. With growing influence in the BRICS bloc, Türkiye could reshape its role in the international arena, strategically positioning itself between Western and emerging powers to advance its interests in an increasingly interconnected world.

M A Hossain, political and defense analyst based in Bangladesh. He can be reached at: writetomahossain@gmail.com

This article published at :

1. The Nation, Pak : 29 Oct, 24

2. Weekly blitz, BD : 27 Oct, 24

3. Newage,BD : 30 Oct, 24

Significance of the Kazan Summit

M A Hossain, 

The Kazan summit of the BRICS bloc is poised to shape global geopolitics by asserting a collective vision that challenges the current Western-dominated world order. The BRICS alliance, originally comprised of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, has expanded its reach by inviting new members, including Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE. This expansion, coupled with the recent geopolitical shifts driven by growing competition between the West and major powers like Russia and China, sets the stage for the summit to become a significant milestone in the ongoing push for an alternative world order.

The BRICS bloc has long been a platform for emerging economies to express dissatisfaction with Western-led global governance structures. With its members representing nearly 40% of the world's population and around 25% of global GDP, BRICS carries substantial weight in international discussions on economic development, climate change, and multilateral cooperation. However, its expanded membership now introduces new dimensions of influence, particularly in energy markets and developing economies.

The key agenda for the BRICS summit in Kazan is advancing a multipolar world order. This vision seeks to reduce the dominance of the U.S. and the Western-led global financial system by increasing the use of non-dollar currencies in international trade and encouraging reforms in multilateral institutions. The New Development Bank (NDB), created by BRICS in 2015 as an alternative to the World Bank, is one such initiative aimed at offering a non-Western model for development financing. However, the NDB's lending capacity remains dwarfed by its Western counterparts, indicating that while BRICS has made some progress, it still faces considerable challenges in reshaping the global financial system.

A key theme of the Kazan Summit was the need for reforms in global governance institutions, such as the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the IMF. BRICS nations have consistently argued that these institutions are outdated and do not accurately reflect the current global balance of power. The summit called for a more inclusive and representative international system that gives greater voice to emerging economies and developing nations. 

Russia and China, two of the bloc's most assertive voices, are particularly keen on reducing reliance on the US dollar. This is a strategic goal for both countries, as they face Western sanctions and increasing economic isolation. The inclusion of countries like Iran, which is also heavily sanctioned by the US, reflects the growing identity of BRICS as a counterweight to Western pressure. Iran's participation, alongside energy giants like the UAE, positions BRICS to challenge the dollar’s dominance in global oil markets, where transactions are predominantly conducted in dollars.

Despite its ambitions, BRICS is not without internal contradictions. While Russia and China aggressively push for an anti-Western agenda, countries like India, Brazil, and South Africa are more cautious. These nations still rely heavily on trade with the U.S. and Europe and are hesitant to fully align themselves with an anti-Western bloc. India, for instance, continues to maintain strong economic relationships with both Western countries and its BRICS counterparts, using the bloc as a forum to advance its interests without burning bridges.

The addition of new members, including those with conflicting geopolitical interests, further complicates the bloc’s cohesion. For example, the UAE and Egypt are key U.S. allies in the Middle East, while Iran has been a longstanding adversary of Washington. This geopolitical diversity raises questions about whether BRICS can maintain a unified agenda while balancing the divergent interests of its members.

The Kazan summit will also highlight tensions within the bloc over how far it should go in expanding its membership. While Russia advocates for further enlargement, others within the bloc are more cautious, wary of diluting its influence or introducing new members with conflicting priorities.

The energy sector will be a focal point of the BRICS summit, especially with the inclusion of major energy producers like Iran and the UAE. By leveraging their collective influence over global energy markets, BRICS could create alternative trading mechanisms that bypass the U.S. dollar, potentially challenging the currency’s dominance in global trade. This goal aligns with Russia and China’s broader ambition to reduce their vulnerability to U.S. sanctions, which often rely on the global financial system's deep-rooted reliance on the dollar.

However, dethroning the dollar is not without significant hurdles. The U.S. dollar is deeply embedded in global financial systems, with the vast majority of cross-border transactions and reserves held in dollars. While BRICS has made efforts to increase the use of local currencies in trade, progress has been slow, and the global financial architecture remains dominated by Western institutions.

The expansion of BRICS is both an opportunity and a challenge for the Global South. For countries like Brazil, India, and South Africa, the bloc provides a platform to amplify their voices in global governance while maintaining economic relationships with the West. These countries see BRICS as a means to hedge against future uncertainties, allowing them to navigate the geopolitical shifts without having to choose sides in a new Cold War-like rivalry between the U.S. and China.

For Russia and China, however, BRICS is a strategic tool to counterbalance U.S. influence and reshape global governance. Both countries are positioning themselves as champions of a new world order that rejects Western political and economic hegemony. This strategy is particularly important for Russia, which, in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine, is seeking to show that it is not isolated on the global stage.

One of the most significant takeaways from the Kazan Summit was the recognition that the current global order, dominated by the United States and its Western allies, is increasingly ill-equipped to address the complexities of the 21st century. Global challenges such as climate change, pandemics, and economic inequality require a cooperative, multilateral approach that goes beyond the narrow interests of any one region or bloc.

BRICS, with its emphasis on multilateralism, inclusivity, and mutual respect, offers a viable alternative to the existing world order. The group's vision of a multipolar world, where power is more evenly distributed, contrasts sharply with the dominance of Western powers in global decision-making. As the world becomes more interconnected, BRICS' model of cooperation and shared responsibility is increasingly relevant in addressing global issues that transcend national borders.

Nevertheless, the expansion of BRICS and its growing influence in global energy markets represent a significant shift in the global balance of power. If the bloc can navigate its internal challenges and present a united front, it could play a pivotal role in reshaping the global order. As the Kazan summit unfolds, the world will be watching to see whether BRICS can translate its vision of an alternative world order into reality.

   

This article published at : 

1. The Nation, Pak : 24 Oct, 24

2. Weekly Blitz, BD : 23 Oct, 24

3. Pakistan Today, Pak : 25 Oct, 24

4. Daily Lead Pakistan, Pak : 25 Oct,24

China-India Agreement: A Strategic Shift Toward Multipolarity

M A Hossain, 

Nations in the Global South have started realizing, unity within nations is essential to counter Western conspiracy and hegemony. The recent military disengagement agreement between China and India is a significant milestone in the complex geopolitical landscape of South Asia. This diplomatic breakthrough is not only a vital step toward reducing tensions between two nuclear-armed neighbors, but also a signal of a broader message to the West regarding the shifting dynamics of global power. As both Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in Russia for the BRICS summit, this pact symbolizes more than just the resolution of a border dispute—it reflects the strategic intent of two rising powers to redefine their roles on the global stage, particularly in defiance of Western dominance.

The Sino-India border dispute dates back to the 1962 war, during which China and India clashed over the demarcation of their border in the Himalayas. The Line of Actual Control (LAC), a de facto boundary, remains largely undefined and has been a source of friction between the two nations for decades. The 2020 clash in the Ladakh region was the most violent in over 40 years, resulting in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese soldiers. This conflict reignited long-standing tensions and led to a series of military standoffs, forcing both countries to reassess their strategies in dealing with each other along the border.

The agreement announced recently by India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar signifies a return to the status quo ante, a situation similar to that before the 2020 skirmishes. This deal follows months of diplomatic and military negotiations aimed at restoring peace and reducing the presence of troops along the contentious border.

India and China have both recognized the need to stabilize their bilateral relationship, particularly as their leaders prepare to engage in multilateral forums like BRICS. By reaching an agreement on military disengagement, both nations have demonstrated a willingness to prioritize diplomatic solutions over military confrontations. The deal reportedly involves restoring the patrolling rights that existed before 2020 and creating buffer zones to prevent future clashes.

While the full details of the agreement have yet to be made public, the move is seen as a positive development in the strained relationship between the two countries. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian confirmed that China “positively evaluates” the agreement, and Indian officials have expressed optimism that the disengagement will allow for a more stable and manageable border situation. Jaishankar described the process as “patient and persevering diplomacy,” highlighting the importance of strategic dialogue in resolving contentious issues.

The timing of this agreement is crucial. Both Modi and Xi arrived in Russia for the BRICS summit—a gathering of major developing economies including Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. This platform offers an opportunity for these nations to collectively challenge the Western-centric global order, and the Sino-India agreement could potentially shift the focus of the summit toward fostering closer cooperation between these two Asian giants.

By resolving their border issues—at least temporarily—China and India send a strong message to the West, particularly the United States and its allies. The pact underscores the capacity of non-Western powers to manage their disputes independently, without reliance on Western mediation. In doing so, it serves as a direct challenge to Western hegemony in global politics, where powers like the U.S. and Europe have traditionally dominated the narrative on conflict resolution and international diplomacy.

The Western response to the Sino-India agreement has been relatively muted, with many analysts waiting for more details on the deal. However, the mere fact that two rising powers with significant global influence have managed to de-escalate a potentially volatile situation on their own terms is a notable shift. It reflects a growing trend in global politics where non-Western actors seek to chart their own paths, independent of traditional Western influence.

The Sino-India agreement also has profound implications for the broader Indo-Pacific region. As both China and India are major players in the region, their relationship can significantly impact the strategic calculations of other nations, including Japan, Australia, and Southeast Asian countries. The reduction of military tensions between China and India can lead to a more stable Indo-Pacific, though it remains to be seen how long this stability will last.

For China, the deal offers an opportunity to focus on other strategic priorities, such as its relationship with the United States and its efforts to expand its influence in Asia through initiatives like the Belt and Road. By reducing tensions with India, Beijing can divert attention and resources away from its southwestern border and focus on its growing rivalry with the U.S. and its allies in the Indo-Pacific.

For India, the agreement is a chance to stabilize its northern border while continuing to pursue its broader strategic goals. New Delhi has been strengthening its relationships with other major powers, including the US, Japan, and Australia, through initiatives like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The Sino-India pact allows India to reduce the immediate threat posed by China and maintain its focus on its partnerships with other Indo-Pacific powers.

The broader message of the Sino-India pact is clear: the world is moving toward a multipolar order, where the dominance of Western powers is increasingly being challenged by the rise of nations like China and India. This agreement exemplifies the ability of non-Western nations to resolve their conflicts without Western interference, a trend that could reshape the global political landscape in the years to come.

As China and India work toward normalizing their relationship, the West will need to adapt to a new reality where emerging powers have a greater say in shaping global norms and institutions. The Sino-India pact is a reminder that Western hegemony is no longer uncontested, and that the balance of power is shifting toward a more multipolar world order.

In conclusion, the recent Sino-India agreement is a significant development in the evolving geopolitical landscape. It not only reduces the immediate tensions between the two Asian giants but also sends a strong message to the West about the changing dynamics of global power. As China and India continue to assert their independence in international affairs, the world may witness a gradual erosion of Western dominance and the rise of a more balanced, multipolar world.

M A Hossain, political and defense analyst based in Bangladesh. He can be reached at: writetomahossain@gmail.com

This article published at :

1. Kashmir Observer, India: 24 Oct,24

2. South Asia Monitor, India: 24 Oct, 24

3. Weekly Blitz, BD : 23 Oct, 24

4. The Asian Age, BD : 26 Oct, 24

   

How the US Election Could Reshape Bangladesh's Political Landscape

M A Hossain, 

The upcoming US presidential election on November 5, 2024, carries significant implications for the entire world, including Bangladesh’s political landscape. With the recent ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her fleeing the country thus taking refuge in India, Bangladesh stands at a political crossroads, facing unprecedented geopolitical pressures. An intriguing aspect of this shift is the waning interest of foreign lobbyists in Washington, particularly in favor of Nobel laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus, a close ally of the Democratic Party in the United States, including the Clinton family and George Soros. However, with the personal influence of Dr. Yunus, and the absence of Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami support for incumbent government, Bangladesh is facing a power vacuum in the US Capitol. As a result, the political dynamics between Bangladesh and the United States are entering an uncertain phase where international influence and internal political control are in flux.

In the midst of these geopolitical shifts, India’s role in Bangladesh's future leadership cannot be ignored. Rumors have surfaced that India may facilitate Sheikh Hasina’s political asylum in a third country, distancing her from the political limelight. However, such assumptions, which suggest that India aims to exile Hasina for better bilateral relations with Bangladesh, are misleading. In reality, India has a vested interest in keeping Hasina in a position of influence, albeit from behind the scenes.

India's strategic game revolves around ensuring Hasina remains a key player, but not necessarily within India. By removing her physically from the country, India seeks to control her role and use her as leverage to maintain influence over Bangladesh’s political apparatus. Some argue that India would prefer to have Hasina operating from abroad, making her a more malleable figure for Indian interests. Once Hasina is outside India, Hindutva lobbyists in Washington will likely increase their efforts to secure India’s influence in Bangladesh, particularly if the Democratic Party remains in power. India’s objective is not to distance itself from Hasina but to ensure that her political network remains intact, allowing India to manipulate the situation in its favor.

One more important factor, which might be missing the attention of many is – sitting in India almost in isolation, Sheikh Hasina is currently unable to mobilize her actual efforts against Dr. Yunus and his government. Once she lands in any third country, she will begin aggressively pushing her agenda against the government, thus channeling millions of dollars – as we all know, Awami League leaders, including family members of Mujib family are filthily wealthy, where they will have no problem in spending even few hundred million dollars for ousting Yunus and pave path for return to Sheikh Hasina to Bangladesh.

It is important to note, lobbying in Washington is a well-established mechanism that has become an integral part of foreign policy, particularly for smaller nations like Bangladesh. At the same time, in the US Capitol, all of those mighty figures, including Senators and members of the Congress are readily available for extending lobbyist services – openly or secretly, in favor of any foreign clients.

While it is well-known that Dr. Muhammad Yunus, has strong connections with the Democratic Party, if the Democrats maintain control of the White House following the November 5 election, and once Barack Obama’s prodigy Kamala Harris wins, Yunus’s influence could further expand, leading to a major shift in US-Bangladesh relations. In this case, Washington may advance its military interest with the effort of establishing a military base in Bangladesh, which would be difficult for Dr. Yunus to refuse.

Meanwhile, under the Biden administration, although Sheikh Hasina, her son Sajeeb Wazed Joy and her family members and inner circle, accused of widespread corruption and mismanagement, should have fallen under US sanctions or other punitive measures, there has never been any such actions. In my opinion, the Biden administration does not want to completely cut-off its relations with Sheikh Hasina.

On the other hand, if the Republican Party’s candidate Donald Trump wins, and there is a sharp prediction of such consequences, a very different approach will emerge. Trump is likely to view Bangladesh’s interim government, particularly Dr. Yunus, with the same suspicion and hostility that Biden's administration held toward Myanmar’s former leader, Aung San Suu Kyi.

Sheikh Hasina and her supporters, who have accumulated vast wealth over years of massive financial misdeeds and corruption, would likely spend millions of dollars in lobbying efforts to secure favorable outcomes in Washington and London in particular. They may also spend significantly towards Western media, as it is well-known, almost all of those media are readily available for extending favor in exchange for cash.

Given the precedent of how lobbying has worked in the past, it is not far-fetched to imagine Hasina utilizing her resources to sway opinions on the US Capitol and influence US policy in favor of her continued political relevance. Lobbyists, whose influence can be bought for a hefty price, would undoubtedly jump at the opportunity to represent Hasina’s interests.

Despite the political maneuvering aimed at sidelining Sheikh Hasina, the peculiar nature of lobbying in the United States and the United Kingdom presents her with a potential pathway to return to power. In both countries, lobbying is a legal and highly lucrative business, where money can be used to influence governmental decisions. Hasina, with her extensive financial resources and Indian connections, can easily mount a campaign from abroad to reassert herself in Bangladesh’s political landscape.

The problem with this approach is that it opens Bangladesh to the dangers of foreign influence, particularly from powerful countries like the United States and India, both of which are keenly interested in the country’s political landscape. Hasina’s ability to utilize lobbyists to her advantage could set a dangerous precedent, wherein a foreign-funded political comeback may further destabilize Bangladesh’s already fragile democracy. 

Still, Hasina's potential return cannot be ruled out, especially considering that powerful lobbyists are often willing to push any agenda for the right price. With Sheikh Hasina’s Indian lobbyists, billions of ill-gotten financial capacities, it is feasible for her to reinstate her party's influence, even if she remains physically removed from the political stage in Dhaka.

If Donald Trump wins the 2024 election, the scenario in Bangladesh could change dramatically. Unlike the Democratic Party, which has a strong connection with Dr Yunus, would face a setback like Aung San Suu Kyi.  Trump would offer two options to Dhaka: reinstate Hasina in full capacity or allow the military to take over. In this case, the Pentagon may use its “Option-2” card. The Republican Party would prefer any alternative option other than Yunus because Trump personally would be tremendously vindictive towards Democrats and its allies. 

A military takeover, which is not unheard of in Bangladesh’s history, could serve both US and Indian interests by ensuring a stable government that maintains close ties with Washington and New Delhi.  It might be seen as a win-win situation for regional stability and US geopolitical interests, particularly if India continues to exert its influence. Such actions would eject China from its existing influence in Bangladesh. On the other hand, if Vladimir Putin shall respect Trump’s proposal for ending the crisis in Ukraine, Moscow shall also become a beneficiary in Dhaka alongside Washington and Delhi.

The November 5 US election holds profound significance for Bangladesh, as the country stands at a critical juncture with Sheikh Hasina's political future hanging in the balance. Most importantly, until now, it seems, Yunus is more dependent on his allies in the US and believes it only can help him in remaining in power without much interruption from major political forces in the country. He also is gradually becoming isolated from the people due to his over-dependence on a hand-picked number of student protestors. Unfortunately, Yunus’ key allies in Bangladesh – those student protestors are also becoming controversial very promptly as there are signals and allegations of their growing involvement in corruption, nepotism and illegal activities.

However, with Dr. Yunus’s strong influence over the Democratic Party and India’s strategic maneuvering in the region, Bangladesh’s future is being shaped not only in Dhaka but also in Washington and New Delhi. Whether Hasina returns to power, remains exiled, or is replaced by a military regime, depends largely on how the next US administration perceives Bangladesh’s strategic importance. A Trump victory could lead to a starkly different outcome than a Democratic win, signaling either a renewed military presence or Hasina’s political revival through foreign lobbying. Ultimately, Bangladesh’s political fate is deeply intertwined with the results of the US election, making it crucial for the country’s future trajectory.

M A Hossain, political and defense analyst based in Bangladesh. He can be reached at: writetomahossain@gmail.com

This article published at :

1. The Arabian Post, UAE : 09 Oct, 24

2. The Country Today, BD : 10 Oct, 24

3. The Messenger, BD : 11 Oct, 24

4. Pakistan Today, Pak : 12 Oct, 24

5. Asian Age, BD : 12 Oct, 24

6. The Nation, Pak : 15 Oct, 24

7. Daily Lead Pakistan, Pak : 16 Oct, 24