Beyond the ballot box

M A Hossain, 

Politics in Bangladesh has rarely been a gentle craft. It has been a battlefield. Victory has meant annihilation. Defeat has meant persecution. For decades, the culture was simple: win at all costs, govern without mercy, and prepare for revenge. The result was predictable — cycles of bitterness, institutional decay, and a democracy that existed more in speeches than in spirit.

But moments arrive in history when a leader is handed not merely power, but an opportunity to redefine a nation’s political character. Tarique Rahman now stands at such a moment.

The mass uprising of August 5, 2024, which led to the ouster of Sheikh Hasina’s government, was not merely a political transition. It was an eruption of public exhaustion. It signaled that Bangladeshis were tired of institutional weaponization, tired of partisan vengeance, tired of politics that felt less like governance and more like perpetual civil war. The landslide victory of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), securing 209 seats, was not simply an electoral triumph. It was a national plea for reset. And resets require statesmanship.

There are times when political leaders must look less like tacticians and more like healers. This is one of those times. Tarique Rahman would do well to look toward the example of Nelson Mandela. Mandela inherited a nation on the brink — fractured by race, scarred by imprisonment, poisoned by resentment. He had every moral justification for vengeance. Instead, he chose reconciliation. He understood a profound truth: justice without forgiveness becomes another form of oppression.

Bangladesh, though different in context, faces a parallel psychological crossroads. After years of confrontation politics, after the institutional lapses and excesses that defined previous administrations, there is understandable anger. But anger, if institutionalized, will only reproduce the very system that citizens rejected.

History offers another example closer to home. General Ziaur Rahman, after the turmoil of the mid-1970s, did not govern through perpetual purges. He sought political normalization. He opened political space. He reintroduced multiparty democracy. Whatever one’s partisan assessment of his legacy, he recognized that nations fractured by upheaval cannot survive on retribution alone. They require integration.

The father sought unity after instability. The son now faces a similar test. The recent courtesy calls by Tarique Rahman on others political contenders were more than symbolic gestures. In a country where leaders rarely visit rivals except to denounce them, such meetings carry cultural weight. They signal that electoral victory does not translate into moral monopoly. They hint at a shift from “winner-takes-all” to “winner-leads-all.”

His public warning against revenge politics was equally significant. Words matter in transitional periods. They can either inflame or stabilize. By urging party workers to avoid conflict and emphasizing that the victory belongs to democracy — not merely to the BNP — Tarique Rahman positioned himself above partisan triumphalism. That is the language of a statesman, not merely a victor.

But gestures, while important, must mature into institutions. Bangladesh now needs a formal reconciliation process. Not a theatrical commission designed to embarrass opponents. Not selective accountability. A genuine, structured national dialogue aimed at repairing trust between parties, strengthening institutional independence, and defining rules of democratic competition that survive changes in power.

The world offers ample precedents. South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission prevented civil war. Rwanda, after genocide, used community-based justice mechanisms to rebuild social cohesion. Even in Latin America, post-authoritarian governments have balanced accountability with political reintegration. The lesson is not that past wrongs should be ignored. It is that societies must decide whether punishment or stability will be their organizing principle.

After a mass uprising, wisdom lies in drawing a line — not to erase history, but to prevent history from consuming the future. Institutional lapses must be corrected through reform, not revenge. Oversight must replace obstruction. Parliament must become a chamber of argument, not a theatre of vendetta.

There are encouraging signs. Jamaat-e-Islami’s pledge to act as a “strong opposition” rather than an obstructive one hints at political maturation. The political climate itself is shifting. Citizens, particularly the younger generation who powered the uprising, are less patient with old hostilities. They demand governance, not drama.

Yet the temptation of retribution will linger. Supporters who suffered during previous administrations will demand repayment. Political activists accustomed to confrontation may resist moderation. Here lies the true test of leadership: the ability to disappoint one’s most fervent supporters for the sake of national stability.

Mandela did it. He risked alienating radicals within his own movement. Ziaur Rahman did it in his own way, prioritizing normalization over prolonged purges. Tarique Rahman must now decide whether he wishes to be remembered as a partisan victor or a national unifier.

Unity does not mean ideological surrender. It means establishing a political culture where disagreement is fierce but not existential. Where opposition is respected, not criminalized. Where elections determine power, but institutions limit its abuse.

A reconciliation framework could include cross-party constitutional dialogue, judicial reforms to ensure neutrality, depoliticization of administrative bodies, and protections for peaceful dissent. These are not abstract ideals. They are safeguards against the relapse into authoritarian reflexes.

Bangladesh stands at the edge of a new dawn. The uprising dismantled a regime. The election produced a mandate. But mandates are burdens, not trophies. They demand restraint in victory and magnanimity in power.

If Tarique Rahman embraces the mantle of unity — if he becomes a symbol of forgiveness, prospect, and democratic maturity — he will not merely lead a government. He will reshape the political grammar of the republic. And that would be a legacy far greater than 209 seats in parliament. The alternative is depressingly familiar: renewed cycles of accusation, institutional weaponization, and the slow erosion of public trust. Bangladesh has walked that road before. It ends nowhere.

A new democratic Bangladesh requires courage of a different kind — not the courage to fight, but the courage to forgive; not the instinct to dominate, but the discipline to reconcile. History occasionally gives leaders a Mandela moment. It is rare. It is fragile. And it does not wait forever. Tarique Rahman now has one. The question is whether he will seize it.

M A Hossain, political and defense analyst based in Bangladesh. He can be reached at: writetomahossain@gmail.com

   This article published at :

1. New Age, BD : 21 February, 26

What Awaits the BNP in Power?

M A Hossain,

Politics eventually meets reality. Campaign slogans fade; governing remains. An electoral mandate is not a trophy but a test. For the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), returning to power would mean confronting a nation weary from political turbulence, economic strain, and social fragmentation. Expectations are high—impatiently so. The next government will be judged not by rhetoric, but by results.

The first and most immediate challenge is price stability. If a government cannot discipline the market, the market will discipline the government. For years, essential commodities—rice, edible oil, onions, sugar—have drifted beyond the reach of ordinary citizens. Seasonal price spikes before Ramadan have come to feel less like market fluctuations and more like organized exploitation.

This is not merely an economic failure; it is a moral one. When daily necessities become luxuries, it is the working poor who absorb the shock. Addressing this demands more than publicized crackdowns. It requires dismantling entrenched syndicates, enforcing competition laws, digitizing supply monitoring, and strengthening independent oversight bodies. Transparent import policies and strategic buffer stocks must replace reactive governance with preventive control. Inflation is more than a statistic; it is political volatility in numeric form.

Second comes law and order. A state that tolerates mob justice weakens itself. Recent years have seen episodes of public violence, partisan clashes, and a troubling perception that enforcement agencies were hesitant or politically influenced. Public safety cannot depend on party affiliation.

A BNP government would need to professionalize policing, ensure judicial swiftness against organized violence, and send a clear message that no political identity offers immunity. Visible, impartial enforcement is the foundation of public trust. Without it, insecurity becomes a daily tax on civic life.

Third is economic recovery. Capital flight, weakened accountability, pressure on foreign exchange reserves, and currency depreciation have undermined confidence. Economic revival cannot be improvised through short-term fixes. Institutional discipline must be restored. Anti-corruption mechanisms must function independently. Suspicious financial outflows require transparent audit and legal pursuit.

Simultaneously, structural reforms—tax rationalization, subsidy targeting, and export diversification—are essential. Bangladesh’s earlier growth story, powered by garments and remittances, demonstrated resilience. That resilience must now be modernized and broadened. Political stability cannot endure without economic credibility.

Fourth is the question of youth. Academic disruption and politicized campuses have left many students uncertain about their futures. Youth activism is a democratic right, but it must not devolve into disorder. Universities must operate consistently. Scholarship opportunities and employment pathways should expand. The aim should not be to silence young voices but to redirect their energy toward national reconstruction.

Finally, institutional credibility must be rebuilt. Governance is less theatrical than opposition politics, yet far more demanding. Regulatory bodies, the civil service, and oversight agencies require insulation from partisan interference. Reform will provoke resistance from entrenched interests who benefit from opacity and disorder. Leadership will be measured by its willingness to persist. Power is temporary; responsibility is immediate. History, as ever, will be unsparing.

M A Hossain, political and defense analyst based in Bangladesh. He can be reached at: writetomahossain@gmail.com

This article published at :

1. Pakistan Observer, Pak : 18 Feb, 26

নতুন সরকারের প্রাথমিক দায়িত্ব

এম এ হোসাইন,

রাজনীতি যদি সত্যিই কোনো অর্থ বহন করে, তবে একসময় তাকে সেই বাস্তবতার মুখোমুখি হতেই হয়। নির্বাচনী স্লোগান খুব দ্রুতই শাসনের কঠিন বাস্তবতায় উবে যায়। গণরায়ের ম্যান্ডেট কোনো ট্রফি নয়; এটি এক গভীর দায়বদ্ধতা। আর রাজনৈতিক পুনরুত্থানের পর ক্ষমতার দুয়ারে দাঁড়ানো বাংলাদেশ জাতীয়তাবাদী দল (বিএনপি)-এর জন্য সেই দায় সহজ নয়, বরং ভারী ও জটিল।

তারেক রহমান এমন এক সময়ে ক্ষমতার দারপ্রান্তে অবস্থান করছেন, যখন জনমানসের প্রত্যাশা শুধু উচ্চ নয়—অস্থির ও অধীর। দেশ একধরণের রাজনৈতিক অস্থিরতা, অর্থনৈতিক টালমাটাল অবস্থা এবং সামাজিক বিভাজনের দীর্ঘ সময় অতিক্রম করেছে। আগামী সরকারকে বিচার করা হবে কথার জোরে নয়, স্বাভাবিকতা ফিরিয়ে আনার সক্ষমতার ভিত্তিতে।

ক্ষমতার প্রথম দিন থেকেই যে পাঁচটি বড় চ্যালেঞ্জ বিএনপি সরকারকে মোকাবিলা করতে হবে, সেগুলো অনিবার্য ও জরুরি।

বাজার মূল্য নিয়ন্ত্রণে ব্যর্থ হলে বাজারই নিয়ন্ত্রণ করবে সরকারকে। বাংলাদেশে টানা কয়েকটি সরকার নিত্যপণ্যের দাম নিয়ন্ত্রণে অনীহা কিংবা অক্ষমতার পরিচয় দিয়েছে। পেঁয়াজ, চাল, ভোজ্যতেল, চিনি—এসব প্রয়োজনীয় পণ্য যেন জল্পনা-কল্পনার হাতিয়ার হয়ে উঠেছে। রমজানের আগে মূল্যবৃদ্ধি এখন আর মৌসুমি উঠানামা নয়; এটি এক ধরনের প্রাতিষ্ঠানিক শোষণে রূপ নিয়েছে।

এই সংকট কেবল অর্থনৈতিক নয়; এটি নৈতিকও। যখন নিত্যপণ্য সাধারণ মানুষের নাগালের বাইরে চলে যায়, তখন প্রকৃত মূল্য দেয় দিনমজুর, রিকশাচালক, গার্মেন্টসকর্মী কিংবা ক্ষুদ্র ব্যবসায়ী। রাষ্ট্রীয় ব্যর্থতার আঘাত নীরবে সহ্য করে এই শ্রেণিই। এদিকে অভিযোগ রয়েছে—সংশ্লিষ্ট মন্ত্রণালয়ের এক শ্রেণির দূর্নীতিবাজ কর্তাব্যক্তিরাই কখনো চোখ বুজে থেকেছে, কখনো বা বাজার কারসাজির সঙ্গে পরোক্ষভাবে জড়িয়ে পড়েছে।

এই চক্র ভাঙতে টেলিভিশন ক্যামেরার সামনে অভিযানের নাটক যথেষ্ট নয়। প্রয়োজন কাঠামোগত সংস্কার। বাজার সিন্ডিকেট ভাঙা, সরবরাহব্যবস্থার ডিজিটাল নজরদারি, প্রতিযোগিতা আইন কার্যকর প্রয়োগ এবং বাজার তদারকি সংস্থার স্বাধীনতা নিশ্চিত করা জরুরি। স্বচ্ছ আমদানি নীতি, বাফার স্টক ব্যবস্থাপনা ও তাৎক্ষণিক তথ্যভিত্তিক পর্যবেক্ষণের মাধ্যমে প্রতিক্রিয়াশীল নয়, প্রতিরোধ মূলক শাসনব্যবস্থা গড়ে তুলতে হবে। এখানে ব্যর্থ হলে বিএনপি সরকার শুরুর আগেই বিশ্বাসযোগ্যতা হারাবে। মূল্যস্ফীতি শুধু অর্থনীতির সূচক নয়; এটি রাজনৈতিক বিস্ফোরক।

আইনশৃঙ্খলা পুনরুদ্ধার ও মব সংস্কৃতির অবসান ঘটাতে হবে। যে রাষ্ট্রে জনতা আইন হাতে তুলে নেয়, সেখানে শাসন দুর্বল হয়ে পড়ে। সাম্প্রতিক সময়ে গণপিটুনি, হঠাৎ মিছিল, ভয়ভীতি প্রদর্শন, দলীয় কোন্দল—এসব যেন স্বাভাবিক দৃশ্য হয়ে উঠেছিল। আইনশৃঙ্খলা রক্ষাকারী বাহিনী কখনো দ্বিধাগ্রস্ত, কখনো রাজনৈতিক প্রভাবাধীন বলে প্রতীয়মান হয়েছে। ফলাফল—পেশিশক্তি বিচারপ্রক্রিয়াকে ছাড়িয়ে গেছে।

এমন পরিস্থিতিতে নতুন সরকারের করণীয় স্পষ্ট, কিন্তু তা হতে হবে আইনানুগ ও পেশাদার। প্রথমত, পুলিশকে রাজনৈতিক প্রভাবমুক্ত করে পেশাগত স্বাধীনতা দিতে হবে। দ্বিতীয়ত, সংঘবদ্ধ সহিংসতার ক্ষেত্রে দ্রুত বিচার নিশ্চিত করতে হবে। তৃতীয়ত, সুস্পষ্ট বার্তা দিতে হবে—দলীয় পরিচয় অপরাধের ঢাল হতে পারবে না।

বাংলাদেশ অতীতেও নানাবিধ অস্থিতিশীল সময় দেখেছে; ভবিষ্যতেও দেখতে পারে। তবে আইনশৃঙ্খলা যদি বাছবিচারহীন ও দৃশ্যমান না হয়, তাহলে নাগরিকের নিরাপত্তাবোধ ভেঙে পড়বে। তখন সরকার কেবল অর্থনৈতিক ব্যর্থতাই নয়, নিরাপত্তাহীনতার দায়ভারও তার উপর বর্তাবে।

আইসিইউতে থাকা অর্থনীতিকে পুনরুদ্ধার করতে হবে।অর্থনৈতিক বাস্তবতা কঠিন। গত দেড় বছরে কার্যকর জবাবদিহি ও প্রাতিষ্ঠানিক ভারসাম্য দুর্বল হয়েছে। মূলধন পাচার বেড়েছে। অভিযোগ রয়েছে—ক্ষমতাশীন প্রভাবশালীদের একটি অংশ ও তাদের কুশীলবরা বিপুল অঙ্কের অর্থ বিদেশে সরিয়ে নিয়েছে। বৈদেশিক মুদ্রার রিজার্ভে চাপ, মুদ্রার অবমূল্যায়ন—সব মিলিয়ে আস্থার সংকট তৈরি হয়েছে।

অর্থনীতি তাৎক্ষণিক জোড়াতালি দিয়ে টেকে না। নতুন সরকারকে তিন দিক থেকে অগ্রসর হতে হবে: প্রাতিষ্ঠানিক শৃঙ্খলা পুনঃপ্রতিষ্ঠা, পাচার হওয়া সম্পদ পুনরুদ্ধার, এবং বৈধ বিনিয়োগ আকর্ষণ। দুর্নীতি দমন কমিশনের প্রকৃত স্বাধীনতা নিশ্চিত করা, সন্দেহজনক মূলধন স্থানান্তর অডিট করা এবং আন্তর্জাতিক আর্থিক অংশীদারদের সঙ্গে সমন্বয় করে অবৈধ অর্থ অনুসন্ধান জরুরি। একই সঙ্গে রাজস্ব সংস্কার, ভর্তুকির যৌক্তিকীকরণ এবং রপ্তানি বৈচিত্র্য—এসব এখন আর বিলাসিতা নয়, টিকে থাকার শর্ত।

একসময় বাংলাদেশের অর্থনৈতিক সাফল্যের গল্প দাঁড়িয়ে ছিল পোশাকশিল্প, প্রবাসী আয় ও ক্ষুদ্রঋণ উদ্ভাবনের উপর। সেই স্থিতিস্থাপকতার বয়ানকে নতুন করে প্রাণ দিতে হবে। অর্থনৈতিক স্থিতিশীলতা ব্যর্থ হলে রাজনৈতিক স্থায়িত্ব কল্পনাই থেকে যাবে।

দ্বিপাক্ষিক সম্পর্কের পুনঃসমন্বয়—বিশেষত ভারতের সঙ্গে সম্পর্ক উন্নয়ন। ভৌগোলিক অবস্থান বদলানো যায় না। চারদিক ঘিরে থাকা প্রতিবেশীর সঙ্গে সম্পর্ক কৌশলগতভাবেই পরিচালনা করতে হয়। ভারতের সঙ্গে বাংলাদেশের ইতিহাস, সংস্কৃতি ও মুক্তিযুদ্ধের রক্তাক্ত বন্ধন রয়েছে। আবার আঞ্চলিক বাস্তবতায় পূর্বদিকে মিয়ানমারের অস্থিরতা নতুন জটিলতা তৈরি করছে। নতুন সরকারকে মর্যাদা ও পারস্পরিক স্বার্থের ভিত্তিতে সম্পর্ক পুনর্গঠন করতে হবে।

এই সম্পর্ক কোন আনুগত্যের আহ্বান নয়, আবার অকারণ সংঘাতেরও নয়। বাণিজ্য, জ্বালানি সহযোগিতা, নদীর পানি বণ্টন, সীমান্ত ব্যবস্থাপনা—এসব ক্ষেত্রে ধারাবাহিক কূটনৈতিক সংলাপ প্রয়োজন হবে।

একই সঙ্গে ভারতেরও উচিত ‘বড় ভাই’ মানসিকতা পরিহার করা। ঔপনিবেশিক মনস্তত্ত্বের ছায়া অংশীদারত্বকে দুর্বল করে। আয়তনের বৈষম্য থাকলেও মর্যাদায় সমতা থাকতে হয়। বাংলাদেশের পররাষ্ট্রনীতি হতে হবে ভারসাম্যপূর্ণ, বাস্তববাদী ও সার্বভৌম। কৌশলগত স্বায়ত্তশাসন মানে বিচ্ছিন্নতা নয়; এটি একটি বিচক্ষণ হিসাব।

তরুণ প্রজন্মকে ব্যারিকেড থেকে শ্রেণিকক্ষে ফেরাতে হবে। সবচেয়ে সূক্ষ্ম চ্যালেঞ্জটি তরুণদের ঘিরে। সাম্প্রতিক সময়ে শিক্ষার্থীদের একটি বৃহত্তর অংশ রাজনৈতিক অস্থিরতায় জড়িয়ে পড়েছিল। এর ফলে একাডেমিক ক্যালেন্ডার বিঘ্নিত হয়েছে, পড়াশোনার ধারাবাহিকতা ভেঙেছে। হঠাৎ ক্ষমতার স্বাদ, তারুণ্যের উত্তেজনা ও অনিশ্চয়তার মিশ্রণ বর্তমান একটি প্রজন্মকে বিভ্রান্ত করেছে।

যুবশক্তিকে কেবল ধ্বংসাত্মক নয় বরং তা সৃজনশীলে পরিনত করতে হবে। শিক্ষার্থীদের দাবি তোলার অধিকার আছে, তবে তা সহিংসতায় পরিণত হওয়া উচিত নয়। সরকারের দায়িত্ব দ্বিমুখী: শিক্ষাব্যবস্থা স্বাভাবিক করা এবং ভবিষ্যতের আশা পুনর্গঠন করা। বিশ্ববিদ্যালয় গুলো নিয়মিত চালু রাখা, বৃত্তি বাড়ানো, কর্মসংস্থানের বাস্তব পথ দেখানো এবং অতীতের ছাত্র রাজনীতির নামে অপরাজনীতির পূনরাবৃত্তি রোধ করা অপরিহার্য।

নির্বাচনী সাফল্য সুযোগ এনে দেয়, নিশ্চয়তা নয়। মূল্যস্থিতি, আইনশৃঙ্খলা, অর্থনৈতিক পুনরুদ্ধার, কূটনৈতিক ভারসাম্য, তরুণদের পুনর্নির্দেশ—এসব প্রান্তিক ইস্যু নয়; রাষ্ট্রের ভিত্তি। তারেক রহমান ও তাঁর সহকর্মীরা দ্রুত উপলব্ধি করবেন—শাসন রাজনীতির চেয়ে কম নাটকীয়, কিন্তু বেশি কঠিন। এতে ধৈর্য লাগে, প্রতিষ্ঠান পুনর্গঠন লাগে, কখনো অজনপ্রিয় সিদ্ধান্তও নিতে হয়। বাজার সিন্ডিকেট, অপরাধচক্র, দুর্নীতিগ্রস্ত অর্থলিপ্সু গোষ্ঠী—এরা সংস্কারের পথে বাধা হয়ে দাঁড়াবে। কিন্তু নেতৃত্বের পরীক্ষা সেখানেই।

বাংলাদেশ অতীতে ঝড় সামলে পুনরায় শক্ত হয়ে দাড়িয়েছে। এ অধ্যায় পুনর্জাগরণের হবে, নাকি পশ্চাদপসরণের—তা নির্ভর করবে আশু সরকারের বাস্তবায়নের উপর। ক্ষমতা সাময়িক, দায়িত্ব তাৎক্ষণিক আর ইতিহাস বড়োই নির্মম।

লেখক : আন্তর্জাতিক সম্পর্ক বিশ্লেষক। 

এই লেখাটি প্রকাশিত হয়েছে :

১. দেশ রূপান্তর, ঢাকা : ১৮ ফেব্রুয়ারী,২৬

২. সময়ের আলো, ঢাকা : ১৯ ফেব্রুয়ারী, ২৬

India and Bangladesh Cannot Wished Away Each Other: Why BNP Must Reset Relations with India

M A Hossain, 

Politics in South Asia has always been hostage to geography. Mountains, rivers, corridors, and coastlines dictate strategy more stubbornly than campaign slogans ever could. For the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), fresh from its commanding victory in the February 2026 elections, the question is not whether it likes India. The question is whether it can afford not to engage India seriously.

Geography answers that question before ideology even gets a word in.

Bangladesh shares a 4,097-kilometer border with . It is ringed on three sides by Indian territory, and its economy is interlaced with Indian markets, transit routes, and energy grids. Whatever political tensions may flare, the map remains stubbornly unchanged. A wise government begins from that reality.

Interdependence Is Not Submission

Trade between the two countries has crossed $13 billion in recent years, with India exporting energy, cotton, machinery, and food products, while Bangladesh sends garments, jute goods, and pharmaceuticals across the border. India is Bangladesh’s largest trading partner in South Asia. That is not a sentimental statistic; it is a structural fact.

BNP’s “Bangladesh First” manifesto promises ambitious infrastructure development, expansion of port capacity, and a target of generating 35,000 megawatts of electricity by 2030. Those are not achievable in a vacuum. They require capital, connectivity, and stable supply chains. India matters here.

Indian investments in power plants, cross-border electricity transmission, and railway modernization have already created an integrated energy and logistics network. A government serious about growth does not rip out functioning circuits to prove a point. It improves the terms, renegotiates where necessary, and insists on transparency—but it keeps the lights on.

A Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), long discussed but never finalized, offers BNP a platform to reset trade on more equal footing. Lower tariffs, harmonized standards, and smoother customs processes would benefit Bangladeshi exporters as much as Indian suppliers. Pragmatism is not capitulation. It is competence.

There is also the matter of connectivity to India’s Northeast. Bangladesh’s ports (Chattogram and Mongla) can serve as gateways for landlocked Indian states. In return, Dhaka can secure transit fees, infrastructure upgrades, and deeper integration into regional supply chains. Done transparently, such arrangements strengthen sovereignty rather than weaken it.

Economic nationalism, if it is to be taken seriously, must produce growth. Growth requires stability. Stability requires cooperative neighbors.

Lessons from 2001–2006

New Delhi’s anxieties are not imaginary. During BNP’s previous tenure from 2001 to 2006, India accused Dhaka of allowing northeastern insurgent groups, including elements of ULFA, to operate from Bangladeshi soil. The infamous Chattogram arms haul remains etched in Indian strategic memory. 

Whether one accepts every Indian allegation or not, perceptions shape policy. The Siliguri Corridor—the narrow “Chicken’s Neck” connecting mainland India to its Northeast—is strategically vulnerable. Any hint of militant activity across the Bangladeshi border heightens Indian alarm.

BNP today has an opportunity to break decisively with that era. A public commitment to zero tolerance for anti-India insurgents, reinforced by intelligence-sharing mechanisms and visible counterterror operations, would reassure New Delhi and stabilize the frontier.

Security cooperation does not negate sovereignty. It strengthens it. A state that controls its territory projects authority; a state that allows ambiguity invites suspicion.

There is also the issue of minority protection. Reports of attacks on Hindu communities, whether exaggerated or real, travel quickly across borders and inflame domestic politics in Indian states. BNP must understand that internal communal harmony is no longer a purely domestic affair. In a hyper-connected age, local incidents acquire geopolitical weight. A mature government anticipates this and acts preemptively.

The Hasina Question: Law, Not Theatre

One immediate flashpoint is India’s decision to shelter former prime minister Sheikh Hasina . BNP leaders have demanded her extradition, reflecting strong domestic pressure and expectations among party cadres. But diplomacy is not street theatre.

An overly aggressive public campaign risks cornering India into defensive postures. A quieter, law-based approach—framing extradition requests in judicial rather than rhetorical terms—would serve BNP better. Let the courts speak. Let documentation lead. Quiet negotiation often succeeds where megaphone diplomacy fails.

India has already signaled willingness to engage the new government. Early congratulatory messages and outreach suggest that New Delhi understands the political shift in Dhaka. That window will not remain open indefinitely.

Border, Water, and Migration

No India–Bangladesh relationship is complete without acknowledging perennial disputes: river water sharing, border killings, and undocumented migration.

The Teesta water-sharing agreement has languished for years, entangled in Indian federal politics. BNP can revive negotiations, but it must do so with patience. Indian state governments—especially West Bengal—play decisive roles. Shouting at New Delhi will not move Kolkata.

Border shootings by India’s Border Security Force remain emotionally charged within Bangladesh. Addressing these requires institutional mechanisms—joint patrols, non-lethal enforcement protocols, and regular flag meetings. Quiet progress often yields more than nationalist posturing.

Migration, meanwhile, has become politically explosive in several Indian states. BNP must recognize that inflammatory rhetoric in Assam or West Bengal can derail otherwise productive bilateral agendas. Calm engagement and data-sharing offer a path forward.

Geopolitics: The China and Pakistan Variables

South Asia today is not insulated from global power competition. China’s expanding footprint through infrastructure financing and defense cooperation offers Bangladesh options. Pakistan maintains symbolic resonance within segments of Bangladeshi politics. But diversification must not morph into triangulation.

A deliberate drift toward Beijing or Islamabad as counterweights to India would alarm New Delhi and risk regional polarization. Bangladesh’s strength lies in balanced diplomacy—engaging China economically, maintaining relations with Pakistan, but grounding its immediate neighborhood policy in stability with India.

History offers cautionary tales. Smaller states that attempted to leverage great-power rivalries often found themselves squeezed rather than empowered. Sovereignty thrives on equilibrium, not brinkmanship.

The Domestic Dimension: Rhetoric vs. Responsibility

BNP has previously flirted with “India-Out” rhetoric. Such slogans may energize crowds, but governing demands a different vocabulary.

The 2026 election victory gives BNP legitimacy. It also imposes responsibility. Tarique Rahman’s language of “equality and mutual respect” strikes the right tone. Equality does not mean symmetry in size or power; it means clarity in expectations and firmness in negotiation.

Bangladesh does not need to be subordinate to India. Nor does it benefit from reflexive antagonism. Mature diplomacy lives in the space between those extremes.

The Strategic Imperative

The post-Hasina era presents BNP with a rare strategic opening. By resetting relations with India, the party can secure economic momentum, reassure investors, and stabilize borders at a time of regional uncertainty.

South Asia has witnessed too many cycles of suspicion and recrimination. The alternative is not naïve harmony but structured cooperation: institutional dialogues, regular high-level visits, defense exchanges, and cultural engagement.

People-to-people ties matter. Millions of Bangladeshis travel to India annually for healthcare, education, and tourism. Simplifying visa procedures, encouraging academic collaboration, and promoting cross-border cultural festivals can soften hardened perceptions.

Statesmanship requires long horizons. The grievances of yesterday should not dictate the opportunities of tomorrow. BNP now governs a nation of more than 170 million people. It cannot outsource its geography. It cannot ignore its largest neighbor. And it cannot afford policies driven by nostalgia or resentment.

The choice before BNP is not between pride and pragmatism. It is between performance and paralysis. If it chooses performance—anchored in economic realism, security cooperation, diplomatic tact, and geopolitical balance—Bangladesh can emerge as a confident regional actor. If it chooses paralysis, South Asia will revert to its familiar rhythm of mistrust. Geography, history, and shared cultural heritage means that India and Bangladesh cannot wish away each other.

M A Hossain, political and defense analyst based in Bangladesh. He can be reached at: writetomahossain@gmail.com

This article published at :

1. South Asia Monitor, India: 15 Feb, 26

2. The South Asian Times, NY : 16 Feb,26

3. Hindu Post, India : 17 February, 26

4. New Delhi Post, India : 17 Feb, 26

5. Icpsnet.org: India : 18 Feb, 26

Strategic meaning of BNP’s victory

M A Hossain,

History has a way of returning, though rarely in the same uniform. Bangladesh’s 2026 election was not merely a transfer of power; it was a verdict on identity. When voters handed the Bangladesh Nationalist Party a landslide—nearly two-thirds of Parliament—they were not just ending fifteen years of Awami League dominance. They were closing the door on something else: the quiet re-entry of pro-Pakistan political nostalgia into our public life.

For months, the political atmosphere carried an uncomfortable tilt. campaigned with unusual confidence, presenting itself as a disciplined alternative. Yet beneath the organizational polish lay a troubling imbalance. The party’s rhetoric and regional alignments leaned conspicuously toward —a country whose historical relationship with Bangladesh is not a footnote but a wound. Sovereign nations may reconcile; they must not forget.

Bangladesh’s foreign policy, at its best, has been guided by equilibrium. We trade with , invest with , negotiate with the , and maintain relations with Muslim-majority states without surrendering autonomy. Jamaat’s posture risked disturbing that balance. It hinted at a narrower worldview—one that conflated religious affinity with strategic wisdom. The electorate saw through it.

The youth vote made the difference. The so-called Gen-Z uprising, born in frustration with corruption and authoritarian stagnation, matured into a disciplined electoral force. Young Bangladeshis are digitally fluent, globally aware, and impatient with ideological theatrics. They have watched the Middle East’s experiments with political Islam, Europe’s battles with extremism, and South Asia’s oscillations between strongman rule and democratic revival. Their message was not radical; it was refreshingly moderate. They chose liberal democracy over radical romanticism.

This is why the 2026 verdict matters. BNP’s victory signaled a rejection of politics that tethered Bangladesh to external patrons—whether Eastern or Western—at the expense of national agency. There had been whispers, even subtle encouragement from abroad, that political Islamist parties could serve as leverage in reshaping Bangladesh’s strategic direction. Interim arrangements, opaque economic understandings, and one-sided concessions were floated as necessities of “stability.” Voters rejected that script.

Instead, they rallied behind a manifesto anchored in a simple phrase: “Bangladesh First.” It is an unpretentious motto, yet it carries historical weight. Nations that survive turbulent neighborhoods learn to place sovereignty above sentiment.

BNP’s 51-point manifesto reads less like a revolutionary tract and more like a technocratic repair manual. Nine priority pledges form what Tarique Rahman calls a social compact. Family Cards for marginalized households. Farmer Cards to guarantee fair prices. The recruitment of 100,000 health workers. Education reform aimed at skills rather than slogans. These are not dramatic gestures; they are instruments of statecraft.

The governance plank is even more telling. Zero-tolerance anti-corruption measures. Real-time audits. Open tenders. An ombudsman. Institutional accountability. A Truth and Healing Commission to investigate abuses of the prior era. Such proposals reveal a party conscious of its own past and wary of repeating it. BNP’s earlier tenure, after all, was not immune to allegations of graft or political favoritism. The electorate’s generosity comes with expectation—and memory.

Economically, the ambitions are muscular: transforming Chattogram and Mongla ports into logistics hubs, generating 35,000 megawatts of power by 2030, reviewing rental power contracts, expanding digital payments, and granting autonomy to capital market regulators. These are state-building measures. They suggest a government that understands infrastructure as geopolitical leverage.

But beyond policy details lies the deeper significance of the landslide. Bangladesh has experienced what might be called a democratic reset. The ouster of Sheikh Hasina in 2024 created uncertainty; the 2026 election restored procedural legitimacy. BNP’s commanding majority ensures constitutional reform without dependence on Islamist blocs. Jamaat, with its 63 seats, remains a vocal opposition—but not a kingmaker.

That arithmetic matters. It prevents the ideological overreach many feared. It assures regional partners that Dhaka’s compass will not swing unpredictably toward Islamabad or any other capital.

Geopolitically, recalibration is inevitable. India will watch closely, particularly along the sensitive Siliguri Corridor, where Chinese infrastructure ambitions intersect with security anxieties. China, for its part, will continue courting Bangladesh through development financing. The United States will advocate democratic consolidation. Pakistan may hope for warmer rhetoric.

The test for BNP is to engage all without submitting to any. “Bangladesh First” must not become a slogan of isolation. It should mean reciprocity. Bilateral relations that are balanced, not submissive. Trade agreements that protect national interest. Security cooperation that respects sovereignty. Diplomatic warmth without strategic dependency.

The electorate has drawn a boundary: no more experiments with ideological radicalism; no more opaque deals conducted in the name of expediency. Voters demanded transparency in governance and clarity in foreign policy. They demanded that Bangladesh be neither a pawn nor a proxy.

Gen-Z’s role in this shift cannot be overstated. In cafés and campuses, on encrypted messaging platforms and street rallies, they debated constitutional amendments with the same intensity once reserved for football matches. They do not romanticize 1971 through inherited narratives alone; they reinterpret it as a mandate for pluralism. Their rejection of pro-Pakistan politics was not born of hostility toward Pakistanis as people, but of resistance to any ideology that diminishes Bangladesh’s independent identity.

The coming years will determine whether BNP can translate mandate into reform. Anti-corruption drives must avoid becoming instruments of vengeance. Welfare pledges must survive fiscal scrutiny. Institutional autonomy must be real, not rhetorical. And foreign policy must reflect maturity rather than muscle-flexing.

Still, elections are moments of moral clarity. On February 12, 2026, Bangladesh chose equilibrium over extremism, democracy over doctrinaire politics, and sovereignty over subtle subservience.

The lesson is larger than party lines. A nation that fought for linguistic and political freedom will not casually surrender it to ideological nostalgia or external choreography. The electorate has spoken in the firm language of ballots rather than barricades.

If BNP remembers that its victory was less about triumph and more about trust, Bangladesh may indeed enter a new era—one defined not by tilts toward distant capitals but by confidence at home. Bangladesh First. Not as defiance. As discipline.

M A Hossain, political and defense analyst based in Bangladesh. He can be reached at: writetomahossain@gmail.com

  This article published at :

1. New Age, BD : 14 February, 26

2. Daily Observer, BD : 14 February, 26

3. New Delhi Post, India: 13 February, 26

4. Weekly Blitz, BD : 13 February,26

5. Hindu Post, India : 18 Feb, 26

Bangladesh's Trade Pact With US: A Strategic Shift By An Interim Administration?

M A Hossain 

Trade agreements are never just about tariffs. They are about power. They define alignments, redraw strategic boundaries, and quietly decide which way a nation tilts when the great powers begin to lean. The newly signed United States–Bangladesh Agreement on Reciprocal Trade, concluded under the Yunus-led interim government, is not merely a commercial arrangement. It is a geopolitical document.

And it may prove to be one of the most consequential strategic shifts in Bangladesh’s modern history.

On paper, the agreement reduces reciprocal tariffs on Bangladeshi goods to 19% and opens American markets to certain textile products tied to U.S. cotton imports. In exchange, Bangladesh grants broad preferential access to U.S. industrial and agricultural goods, commits to regulatory reforms, aligns export controls, facilitates cross-border data flows, and signals large-scale procurement of American aircraft, energy, and defense equipment.

This is being sold as reciprocity. But geopolitics rarely runs on equal footing.

The most profound shift lies in Section 4 — the economic and national security alignment provisions. Bangladesh commits to adopting complementary restrictive measures if the United States introduces trade or border actions deemed necessary for its national security. It agrees to cooperate on export controls and align policies on sensitive technologies.

Translated into strategic reality, this means that Bangladesh is tying its external economic conduct to U.S. geopolitical priorities.

Narrowing Dhaka's Choices

Consider the broader Indo-Pacific environment. The United States is locked in systemic competition with China. Sanctions regimes are expanding. Technology export controls are tightening. Supply chains are being reorganized along political lines. Under this agreement, if Washington escalates restrictions against Beijing — whether in semiconductors, telecommunications equipment, or dual-use technologies — Dhaka is expected to follow.

Bangladesh has historically practiced a careful balancing act. It has welcomed Chinese infrastructure investment under the Belt and Road Initiative. It has sourced military hardware from multiple partners. It has relied on Russia for nuclear energy cooperation at Rooppur. It has maintained economic ties with India and the European Union. This diversification has been a rational survival strategy for a middle-sized developing state situated in a geopolitically sensitive region.

The agreement narrows that strategic bandwidth.

The nuclear clause illustrates the point with unusual clarity. Bangladesh may not purchase nuclear reactors, fuel rods, or enriched uranium from any country that jeopardizes essential U.S. interests, except under limited conditions. The language is diplomatically framed, but the implication is unmistakable: future nuclear cooperation with Russia — or potentially with other disfavored states — could become treaty-inconsistent.

Defense and Digital Dependence 

Energy security is a pillar of national sovereignty. Limiting supplier options in advance weakens negotiating leverage. It signals that Bangladesh’s strategic autonomy in critical infrastructure decisions is conditional.

Then comes defense alignment. The pact states that Bangladesh shall endeavor to increase purchases of U.S. military equipment and limit purchases from certain countries. Again, no specific weapons systems are listed. But the policy direction is unmistakable: a gradual reorientation of Bangladesh’s defense procurement ecosystem.

Defense supply chains are not transactional; they create long-term dependencies. Training systems, maintenance contracts, spare parts, software updates — all bind the purchasing state to the supplier for decades. By structurally privileging one supplier, Bangladesh risks narrowing its defense diplomacy options and complicating relationships with other partners.

In the Bay of Bengal — a region of increasing strategic contestation involving India, China, the United States, and regional actors — such alignment will not go unnoticed. Bangladesh may find itself perceived less as a neutral economic partner and more as a strategic node within a U.S.-aligned framework. Perception, in geopolitics, shapes reaction.

The digital trade provisions add another layer to this transformation. Bangladesh commits to permitting free cross-border data transfers and refrains from imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions. It also risks termination of the pact if it enters into a digital trade agreement with a country deemed to jeopardize essential U.S. interests.

Data governance is now a frontline geopolitical issue. The United States promotes open data flows; China emphasizes digital sovereignty; the European Union champions regulatory control and privacy regimes. By locking into one model under treaty obligations, Bangladesh reduces its room to experiment with hybrid frameworks tailored to domestic interests.

Digital dependence is subtler than military dependence, but no less consequential. When cloud infrastructure, fintech platforms, artificial intelligence services, and data storage ecosystems are aligned with a particular geopolitical bloc, policy flexibility shrinks.

The procurement undertakings further entrench structural alignment. Fourteen Boeing aircraft. Fifteen billion dollars in LNG over 15 years. Billions in agricultural imports. Expanded defense purchases. These are framed as “endeavors,” yet they are quantified and embedded in treaty annexes.

This resembles managed trade — commerce guided by strategic objectives rather than pure market dynamics. For the United States, the arrangement strengthens export industries and deepens bilateral dependence. For Bangladesh, it commits scarce foreign exchange to pre-structured flows.

What happens if global LNG markets shift and cheaper alternatives emerge? What if aviation demand patterns change? What if agricultural sourcing from regional suppliers becomes more efficient? Treaty-embedded expectations complicate recalibration.

Perhaps most concerning is the enforcement asymmetry. If consultations fail and Washington determines non-compliance, it may reimpose reciprocal tariffs on Bangladeshi imports. In practice, the United States retains interpretive authority and enforcement leverage. Bangladesh bears the export vulnerability.

In strategic terms, this creates a disciplining mechanism. Economic penalties can be activated if Dhaka’s policies drift from Washington’s expectations. That is not an equal partnership; it is conditional alignment.

All of this would be consequential even under a fully elected government with a clear popular mandate. It becomes more troubling under an interim administration. Trade and security alignments of this magnitude shape a nation’s geopolitical posture for decades. They influence relations with China, Russia, India, the European Union, and ASEAN. They affect bargaining positions in multilateral forums. They alter perceptions among investors and strategic planners.

After the completion of 13 th parliamentary election,  the elected governments will inherit this architecture. They will face a choice: comply and accept narrowed autonomy, or attempt renegotiation and risk economic retaliation.

Tilt Towards A Geopolitical Axis

None of this suggests that Bangladesh should distance itself from the United States. Strong relations with Washington are valuable. Market access matters. Regulatory modernization can be beneficial. Labor and environmental reforms are necessary.

But sovereign states thrive when they preserve strategic optionality. The art of middle-power diplomacy lies in maximizing partnerships without surrendering independence.

The agreement, as structured, tilts Bangladesh decisively toward one geopolitical axis. It embeds economic commitments within a security alignment framework. It links trade access to policy conformity. It narrows diversification in energy and defense. It institutionalizes digital openness without reciprocal safeguards.

In the short term, tariff relief may ease export pressures. In the long term, the cost may be reduced maneuvering space in an increasingly polarized world.

Trade agreements are rarely reversed. Strategic alignments, once formalized, become the scaffolding of foreign policy. The Yunus government may believe it secured economic stability under pressure. But stability purchased at the expense of strategic autonomy is a fragile bargain.

History teaches that small and mid-sized states survive great-power competition not by choosing sides prematurely, but by retaining the freedom to navigate among them. This agreement does not expand Bangladesh’s choices. It contracts them. And in geopolitics, contracted choices often become constrained futures.

M A Hossain, political and defense analyst based in Bangladesh. He can be reached at: writetomahossain@gmail.com

This article published at :

1. South Asia Monitor, India : 13 Feb,26

Trade deal that mortgages the future

M A Hossain, 

In the quiet corridors of Washington, far from the anxieties of Dhaka’s election season, an agreement was signed that may shape Bangladesh’s economic sovereignty for decades. It was presented as a breakthrough — a reciprocal trade pact promising “unprecedented access,” lower tariffs, and deeper cooperation. But beneath the diplomatic language and polished press releases lies a document that reads less like a partnership and more like a strategic lock-in.

The Yunus-led interim government may argue that it rescued Bangladesh from punitive tariffs and secured a stable trade channel with the United States. That is the headline. The fine print tells a different story.

At its core, this agreement is asymmetrical. The United States reduces reciprocal tariffs to 19 percent — not zero — while Bangladesh grants broad preferential access to its industrial, agricultural, digital, and strategic sectors. Dhaka’s market opens wide; Washington’s remains selectively ajar. Reciprocity, it seems, has been redefined.

Take the digital trade provisions. Bangladesh is prohibited from imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions and must permit the free transfer of data across borders. On the surface, this aligns with global digital trade norms. In practice, it means that data generated by 175 million Bangladeshis — commercial, financial, behavioral — can flow freely to U.S. platforms without meaningful restrictions.

Data is not a trivial commodity. It is the oil of the modern economy. Countries from India to the European Union have wrestled fiercely over data localization and digital sovereignty. Yet Bangladesh, under an unelected interim government, has conceded its leverage without a national debate. Once such commitments are embedded in a binding trade treaty, reversing them becomes diplomatically and economically costly.

More troubling still is Section 4 — the economic and national security alignment clause. Here the language shifts from commerce to geopolitics.

If the United States imposes trade or security measures against a third country, Bangladesh must adopt “complementary restrictive measures.” In plain terms: if Washington sanctions a country, Dhaka is expected to follow suit. Export controls must align. Sensitive technology flows must mirror U.S. priorities.

That is not neutral trade policy. That is strategic alignment.

For a country that has historically balanced relations among China, India, Russia, and the West, this clause narrows maneuvering space dramatically. Bangladesh’s economic rise has depended on diversified partnerships. Cheap raw materials from China, infrastructure cooperation with multiple partners, energy support from Russia — these were pragmatic choices of a developing economy. Under the new framework, such pragmatism risks becoming non-compliance.

The nuclear provision is particularly stark. Bangladesh may not purchase nuclear reactors, fuel rods, or enriched uranium from any country that “jeopardizes essential U.S. interests,” except under narrow conditions. The Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant — built with Russian assistance — stands as a symbol of Bangladesh’s energy diversification. Future expansions or similar partnerships could now collide with treaty obligations.

Energy security is not an abstract concern. Bangladesh’s industrial growth depends on stable, affordable power. Restricting supplier options in advance is not strategic foresight; it is strategic confinement.

Then there is Section 5 — the procurement undertakings. Official language softens them as “shall endeavor” clauses. But when specific numbers are embedded — 14 Boeing aircraft, $15 billion in LNG over 15 years, $3.5 billion in agricultural imports — the distinction between best-effort and obligation becomes largely semantic.

Biman Bangladesh Airlines is to facilitate the purchase of 14 Boeing aircraft. Energy entities are to pursue long-term LNG contracts valued at $15 billion. Agricultural imports of wheat, soy, cotton, and corn are quantified. Military procurement from the United States is to increase, while purchases from certain countries are to be limited.

This is not free trade in the classical sense. It resembles managed trade — a system in which commercial flows are guided not solely by market need, but by diplomatic commitment.

What happens if future governments determine that LNG from another supplier is cheaper? What if global grain prices shift? What if aviation market conditions change and fleet diversification becomes economically prudent? The treaty framework constrains flexibility. Policy becomes pre-negotiated.

Defenders of the agreement will say these are voluntary commercial signals, not binding mandates. Yet the enforcement mechanism tells a harder truth. If consultations fail and the United States believes Bangladesh is not complying, Washington may reimpose reciprocal tariffs on some or all Bangladeshi imports.

In effect, the United States retains the authority to judge compliance and enforce penalties. Bangladesh bears the commercial consequences. That imbalance is structural.

The most profound issue, however, is political legitimacy. This agreement was concluded during an interim administration. Trade treaties are not routine administrative acts; they shape industrial policy, foreign alignment, energy sourcing, digital governance, and defense procurement for decades. They are instruments of national strategy.

When an unelected or transitional government makes commitments of this magnitude, it binds future elected governments to frameworks they did not negotiate. The next administration — whatever its political complexion — will inherit obligations that narrow its choices. Renegotiation, if attempted, risks economic retaliation.

History offers cautionary examples. From Latin American states locked into disadvantageous commodity arrangements to small nations pressured into strategic alignments during the Cold War, asymmetrical trade deals often outlive the governments that signed them. Undoing them proves far harder than signing them.

Bangladesh is not powerless. It is one of the world’s leading garment exporters. Its labor force is young. Its strategic location in the Bay of Bengal grants it geopolitical relevance. It could have negotiated a phased, balanced arrangement tied strictly to tariff relief. Instead, it accepted a broad-spectrum framework intertwining trade with security alignment and procurement undertakings.

None of this argues against engagement with the United States. Strong economic ties with Washington are valuable. Diversified partnerships are prudent. Labor and environmental reforms are necessary. Digital modernization is inevitable.

But partnership must not mean dependency.

A sovereign trade policy should preserve optionality — the ability to source energy competitively, to choose defense suppliers based on national interest, to regulate digital flows in accordance with domestic priorities, and to conduct foreign policy without automatic alignment clauses.

The Yunus government may believe it acted pragmatically under tariff pressure. Yet in seeking short-term relief, it may have mortgaged long-term flexibility. The agreement’s architecture embeds strategic concessions in exchange for tariff adjustments that remain partial and conditional.

The next government of Bangladesh will confront a difficult inheritance: comply and accept constrained autonomy, or challenge provisions and risk economic retaliation. Trade agreements should expand opportunity. This one narrows choice. And in geopolitics, the narrowing of choice is rarely a prelude to prosperity.

M A Hossain, political and defense analyst based in Bangladesh. He can be reached at: writetomahossain@gmail.com

   This article published at :

1. New Age, BD : 13 February, 26

2. The Daily Guardian, India: 13 Feb, 26

3. Daily Observer, BD : 13 Feb, 26