The Myth of Israeli Self-Reliance

M A Hossain, 

Benjamin Netanyahu's recent declaration that Israel must eventually free itself from dependence on American military aid sounded, at first glance, like an assertion of national self-confidence. Nations, after all, prefer autonomy to dependence. Great powers do not enjoy admitting that their security rests in another country's hands.

But there is a difference between aspiration and reality.

The reality is that modern Israel, as a military and diplomatic power, is inconceivable without the United States. This is not a moral judgment or a political slogan. It is a strategic fact.

For decades, Israel has cultivated an image of self-reliance. The story of a tiny nation surrounded by hostile neighbours, defending itself through ingenuity and determination, has become part of modern political mythology. There is truth in that narrative. Israel possesses one of the world's most sophisticated intelligence services, a formidable defence industry, and a military that has repeatedly demonstrated operational excellence.

Yet military capability is not the same as strategic independence. Strip away American support, and the architecture of Israeli power begins to look remarkably fragile.

The numbers tell part of the story. Since the 1970s, the United States has provided Israel with well over $150 billion in assistance, making it one of the largest recipients of American foreign aid in history. Today, Washington supplies approximately $3.8 billion annually in military assistance, not including supplemental packages that have surged since the Hamas attacks of October 2023.

The aid itself is only the visible layer of a much deeper relationship. Israel's most advanced weapons systems are intertwined with American technology. The celebrated F-35 fighter jets that form the backbone of Israel's air superiority rely heavily on American maintenance, spare parts and software support. Analysts have estimated that, without access to U.S. spare parts, Israel's fleet could begin facing operational constraints within a matter of weeks.

Wars are not won merely by possessing weapons. They are won by sustaining them. This is where dependence becomes glaring. Israel can certainly defend itself for a period of time without Washington. It has substantial stockpiles, a capable domestic arms industry and, by all accounts, a nuclear deterrent. It can launch strikes, intercept missiles and protect its territory. But can it sustain simultaneous campaigns in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and potentially Iran without American support? The answer is almost certainly no.

The recent wars in the Middle East have demonstrated this reality. Following the October 2023 attacks, the United States reportedly sent tens of thousands of tons of military equipment and munitions to Israel. American naval deployments in the eastern Mediterranean acted as a deterrent against wider regional escalation. U.S. intelligence cooperation remained indispensable.

Israel's military prowess was not operating in isolation. It was operating under an American umbrella. There is an even deeper dimension to this dependence. Diplomatic protection.

At the United Nations, Washington has repeatedly exercised its veto power to shield Israel from resolutions that could have resulted in sanctions or international isolation. The United States has spent decades constructing a political environment in which Israel can exercise military force with far fewer consequences than most countries would face.

Imagine, for a moment, a Middle East in which this diplomatic shield disappears. International investigations would intensify. Economic pressure would mount. Arms restrictions could become a realistic possibility. European governments, already increasingly uncomfortable with Israel's conduct in Gaza, might adopt much tougher positions.

Israel would not suddenly cease to exist. But it would become a significantly more constrained state.

The late Israeli strategist Charles Freilich once argued that the United States is not simply an ally of Israel; it has become an integral component of Israel's deterrence system. Israel's adversaries calculate not only Israeli capabilities but also the possibility of American intervention.

That observation deserves careful consideration. Iran does not merely confront Israel. Iran confronts Israel plus America. Hezbollah does not merely calculate the risks of fighting the Israeli military. It calculates the possibility that a regional war could bring American forces into the equation.

Remove the American factor, and the strategic calculus throughout the Middle East changes dramatically. This raises an uncomfortable question: has Israel become too dependent on American power? The answer appears to be yes.

Ironically, this dependence has also encouraged some of Israel's more ambitious policies. Knowing that the United States would likely provide emergency military resupply and diplomatic protection has created a sense of strategic insulation. Critics argue that this has enabled policies that might otherwise have been deemed too risky.

Even some American analysts now suggest that Israel's ability to pursue prolonged military campaigns rests partly on an assumption that Washington will ultimately absorb much of the political and strategic cost.

History offers numerous examples of allies becoming overconfident because they believed a stronger patron would always stand behind them. The South Vietnamese government believed it would enjoy indefinite American backing. The Afghan government made similar assumptions. Even European colonial powers in the post-war era often miscalculated because they expected Washington's unconditional support.

Dependence can create strategic complacency. Israel may not be comparable to these cases in many respects, but the principle remains relevant. Nations that become accustomed to external guarantees often overestimate their own freedom of action. This perhaps explains Netanyahu's recent rhetoric.

His call for greater military independence may not represent a realistic plan but rather an acknowledgement of an uncomfortable truth: no country wants its national security to depend entirely on the political moods of another nation's voters. American politics is changing.

Younger Americans are increasingly sceptical of unconditional support for Israel. Public opinion polls reveal widening partisan divisions. Calls to restrict arms transfers are no longer confined to the political fringes. The assumption that American support is permanent now appears less certain than it once did. This is precisely why Israeli leaders are worried.

For all its remarkable achievements, Israel remains a relatively small country of fewer than ten million people located in one of the world's most volatile regions. It lacks the economic scale, industrial depth and strategic geography of a superpower.

Its extraordinary military capabilities have been built in partnership with the United States, not independently of it. Can Israel survive without America? Yes. Can it defend itself in the short term without America? Certainly. Can it continue to fight prolonged wars on multiple fronts, maintain regional military dominance and enjoy near-total diplomatic protection without American support? Almost certainly not.

That is the distinction that often disappears in political debate. The more accurate question is not whether Israel can exist without the United States. It can.

The real question is whether Israel can remain the kind of Israel that the world has known for the past half-century without American power standing behind it. On that question, the evidence points in only one direction.

Israel is not merely supported by America. To a significant extent, the modern strategic posture of Israel has been built upon America. And empires, history reminds us, often discover their limitations only when the patron that sustained them begins to hesitate.

M A Hossain is a senior journalist and international affairs analyst, based in Bangladesh. He can be reached at: writetomahossain@gmail.com

   This article published at :

1. Sri Lanka Guardian, sl: 05 July, 26

America at 250: Democracy, Innovation, and the Enduring Promise of Freedom

M A Hossain,

On July 4, 2026, the United States reached a milestone few nations in history have achieved. The country celebrates the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, marking a quarter of a millennium since fifty-six men affixed their signatures to a document that would alter the course of human history.

Anniversaries often invite nostalgia. Yet the Semiquincentennial of American independence is more than a ceremonial moment. It is an opportunity to reflect on an extraordinary political experiment that has survived wars, economic crises, social upheavals, and profound technological revolutions. Whether admired or criticized, the United States remains one of the most consequential nations ever created, not merely because of its power but because of the ideas upon which it was founded.

The World's Oldest Continuing Democratic Experiment

Debates over which country deserves the title of the world's oldest democracy are common among historians. Yet there is little dispute that the United States possesses one of the oldest continuously functioning constitutional systems in existence. The Constitution drafted in 1787 remains the foundational framework of the American government today.

That continuity is remarkable. Most nations have experienced multiple constitutional replacements, military interruptions, revolutions, or fundamental regime changes. The United States has certainly undergone dramatic transformations, but its core constitutional structure has endured.

This longevity matters because democracies are inherently fragile. They rely not only on elections but also on institutions, civic trust, and a willingness to resolve disagreements through law rather than force. For two and a half centuries, Americans have repeatedly tested those mechanisms. Sometimes they have succeeded brilliantly; sometimes they have fallen short. Yet the system has persisted.

At a time when democratic institutions face pressure across the globe, the survival of this constitutional experiment remains one of history's most significant political achievements.

Three Ideas That Changed the World

The philosophical foundation of the United States did not originate in the Constitution but in the Declaration of Independence adopted in 1776. Its most famous sentence remains among the most influential ever written: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”

Those words introduced three principles that continue to define the American political tradition. The first is life. Human beings possess inherent dignity and rights that governments do not create and therefore cannot legitimately remove without due process. This concept established the moral basis for individual rights and protections under law.

The second is liberty. The founders believed the government exists primarily to secure freedom rather than direct every aspect of citizens' lives. This idea helped shape America's enduring emphasis on individual choice, freedom of expression, religious liberty, and limited government.

The third is the pursuit of happiness. Unlike many political systems that focus solely on collective goals, the American vision grants individuals the freedom to build meaningful lives according to their own aspirations. It is a recognition that personal fulfillment, ambition, and opportunity are central to human flourishing.

From Thirteen Colonies to Global Leadership

The history of the United States is, in many ways, the history of expanding the promise contained in its founding declaration. In 1776, America consisted of thirteen colonies clustered along the Atlantic coast. By 2026, it has become a continental nation and a global superpower with unparalleled influence in economics, technology, culture, and international affairs.

The path was neither smooth nor inevitable. The Civil War nearly destroyed the republic but ultimately ended slavery. The women's suffrage movement expanded political participation. The Civil Rights Movement confronted racial segregation and transformed American law and society. Each generation wrestled with the contradiction between America's ideals and its realities.

The nation's greatest achievements often emerged from those struggles. That evolution helps explain why the American experiment continues to resonate globally. Its history is not one of perfection but of continual self-correction.

America's Contribution to Humanity

American constitutional ideas inspired democratic movements across continents. Concepts such as representative government, constitutional limits on power, freedom of speech, and individual rights influenced political developments far beyond American borders.

The United States has also played major roles in humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, global health initiatives, and postwar reconstruction efforts. From rebuilding Europe after World War II to responding to natural disasters worldwide, American resources and institutions have often shaped international responses to crises.

Equally important has been America's cultural influence. Its literature, music, films, universities, and intellectual traditions have reached audiences across the globe. American culture became one of the principal vehicles through which ideas of freedom, entrepreneurship, and individual aspirations spread internationally.

The Nation That Helped Build the Technological Age

If the first century of American history established the country's political influence, the second and third centuries cemented its technological leadership.

The airplane transformed transportation and shrank the world. The assembly line revolutionized manufacturing. The microchip became the foundation of modern computing. The laser enabled advances in medicine, communications, and industry. Personal computers changed how people work and learn.

Perhaps no innovation has had a greater impact than the internet. What began as ARPANET in 1969 evolved into the digital infrastructure that now connects billions of people. Commerce, communication, education, and entertainment have all been reshaped by technologies originating largely from American research institutions and companies.

Similarly, the Global Positioning System revolutionized navigation and logistics. What was once a military capability became an indispensable civilian tool used daily by people around the world.

Today, the United States remains at the forefront of emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, biotechnology, quantum computing, and space exploration. Silicon Valley continues to symbolize innovation, while American universities and research centers remain among the world's leading engines of scientific discovery.

Celebrating America at 250

The 250th anniversary celebrations reflected both the scale of American history and the diversity of contemporary America. The congressionally supported America250 initiative seek to engage communities nationwide through educational programs, exhibitions, and local commemorations. Its emphasis was on grassroots participation and historical reflection.

At the same time, the White House's Freedom 250 initiative included large-scale national events, public celebrations, sporting competitions, and commemorative activities designed to showcase American achievements.

Museums and cultural institutions were also marking the occasion. Smithsonian exhibitions highlighting artifacts such as early computing technology, aviation achievements, and iconic inventions helped to tell the story of two and a half centuries of American development.

The Next Chapter

Two hundred and fifty years ago, a single sheet of parchment launched an unprecedented political experiment. Few observers in 1776 would have predicted its survival, let alone its global influence.

Yet the United States endures. Its founding principles—life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness—remain relevant in an era defined by artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and rapid technological transformation. Indeed, they may be more important than ever as societies grapple with questions about freedom, human dignity, and the relationship between technology and democracy.

The anniversary is therefore not merely a celebration of what America has been. It is an invitation to consider what America might yet become.

M A Hossain is a senior journalist and international affairs analyst, based in Bangladesh. He can be reached at: writetomahossain@gmail.com

This article published at :

1. The South Asian Times, USA : 03 July, 26

How Connectivity Became the Ultimate Geopolitical Weapon

M A Hossain, 

There is an old imperial axiom, frequently attributed to various statesmen but belonging, in spirit, to all of them: control the routes, and you control the world. The British understood this when they planted garrisons at Gibraltar, Aden, and Singapore — not for their scenic value, but because they commanded chokepoints through which global commerce breathed. Today, the language of empire has changed. The garrisons are gone, replaced by fibre-optic cables, deep-water ports, satellite constellations, and data corridors. The logic, however, remains brutally unchanged. Connectivity is power. And power, in the hands of a determined state, is always eventually weaponized.

This is the defining strategic reality of the Indo-Pacific in 2026 — a region that carries more than 60% of global maritime trade, hosts the world's fastest-growing digital economies, and sits directly beneath a canopy of competing satellite networks. The battleground here is not primarily kinetic. It is infrastructural. Whoever owns the pipes, the ports, and the platforms controls, in very meaningful ways, the future.

The Submarine Cable as Strategic Asset

The British Empire understood something fundamental about global dominance. Its strength did not rest solely on warships or colonial garrisons. It rested on communication. In the late nineteenth century, Britain constructed the "All-Red Line," a vast telegraph network linking London to its imperial possessions. The cables rarely touched foreign territory. Information moved faster through British-controlled networks than through those of any rival.

Consider what lies beneath the ocean's surface today. More than 400 undersea cables carry approximately 95% of the world's international data traffic — financial transactions, military communications, diplomatic cables, and civilian internet use. These are not abstract technicalities. They are the circulatory system of modern civilisation. And they are alarmingly vulnerable.

In 2022, mysterious cuts to undersea cables near the Shetland Islands disrupted communications across northern Europe. In the Red Sea, Israeli media and some officials blamed the Houthi activities (widely assessed to be enabled by Iranian intelligence) damaged four major cables in early 2024, throttling roughly a quarter of the internet traffic flowing between Asia and Europe. These incidents were not accidents. They were proof of concept. If a relatively limited non-state actor can achieve this degree of disruption, the calculus for a major power grows considerably darker.

China has been particularly methodical here. Chinese state-linked firms (most prominently HMN Technologies, formerly Huawei Marine) have built or maintained a significant share of the undersea cable infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific and beyond. The strategic implications are not subtle. A state with deep familiarity with cable routing, landing stations, and repair protocols possesses an enormous information advantage over any adversary relying on the same infrastructure. Washington has moved, belatedly, to restrict Chinese involvement in cable projects connecting U.S. territories. But the damage, in many corridors, is already embedded in the architecture.

Ports, Chokepoints, and the Geometry of Dependence

Throughout history, control of strategic chokepoints has translated into geopolitical influence. Britain understood this at Gibraltar and Suez. The United States understood it through the Panama Canal. Trade routes have always been arteries of power.

Maritime ports are the second vector of this quiet campaign. China's Belt and Road Initiative, whatever its developmental rhetoric, has functioned strategically as the most ambitious port-acquisition programme since the Dutch East India Company. Hambantota in Sri Lanka. Gwadar in Pakistan. Djibouti. Piraeus in Greece. The pattern is consistent: financing offered on terms that recipient governments struggle to meet, followed by equity stakes, operational control, and eventually a presence that is, for all practical purposes, permanent.

The Indo-Pacific geometry here is particularly acute. The Strait of Malacca — through which nearly 40% of global trade passes — represents a chokepoint of extraordinary sensitivity. Beijing has long acknowledged what Chinese strategists call the "Malacca Dilemma": the vulnerability of Chinese energy imports to interdiction at this narrow passage. Its response has been dual-track. Domestically, it has pursued overland pipelines and alternative routes. Externally, it has cultivated port relationships along the entire length of the Indian Ocean littoral — a strategic arc that Indian planners describe, with barely concealed anxiety, as the "String of Pearls."

India has responded with countermoves of its own named " Necklace of Diamond". The Chabahar port development in Iran, pursued in partnership with Tehran despite American pressure, is explicitly designed to provide an alternative access corridor to Central Asia that bypasses Pakistan. New Delhi's investments in Oman, the Maldives, and along the Andaman chain reflect a similar logic: connectivity as deterrence, infrastructure as a strategic buffer. The contest is not between good actors and bad ones. It is between competing visions of who gets to set the terms.

Digital Infrastructure and the New Sovereignty Debate

Beneath the cables and beyond the ports lies an even more elusive domain: the digital infrastructure layer. Satellite communication systems, cloud computing platforms, 5G networks, and the data centres that underpin them are not merely commercial assets. They are, increasingly, instruments of national power — and sites of profound vulnerability.

Satellite systems have become indispensable to everyday life. They guide ships and aircraft, synchronize financial markets, support telecommunications networks, monitor weather patterns, and provide military intelligence.

Most people encounter these capabilities through smartphone navigation. Yet the broader reality is far more consequential. Modern economies depend on positioning, navigation, and timing systems with a degree of reliance few citizens fully appreciate. A significant disruption to these networks would produce effects that extend far beyond inconvenience. It could impair transportation systems, financial transactions, communications infrastructure, and military operations simultaneously.

Elon Musk's Starlink system demonstrated this with uncomfortable clarity during the early months of the Ukraine war, providing battlefield connectivity that Ukrainian forces described as operationally decisive. The lesson was not lost on anyone paying attention. Low-Earth orbit satellite constellations have crossed from civilian convenience into military-critical infrastructure almost without public debate. China's response — the development of its own Guowang constellation, projected to eventually exceed 13,000 satellites — reflects a direct acknowledgement that space-based connectivity is now a domain of great-power competition.

In the Indo-Pacific specifically, the United States has moved to accelerate partnerships around digital infrastructure through frameworks like the Blue Dot Network and the G7's Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment. The ambition is legitimate. The execution has been uneven. American and allied financing has struggled to match the speed and the willingness to absorb political risk that Chinese state-backed lending has consistently demonstrated. Bureaucratic caution is a poor match for strategic urgency.

The Shape of the Next Crisis

None of this is an inevitable catastrophe. States have always competed for positional advantage, and the history of infrastructure competition — from railway rivalries in the nineteenth century to airline route disputes in the twentieth — shows that such contests can be managed short of open conflict. The concern is not competition per se. It is the accumulation of leverage at chokepoints, the normalisation of infrastructure as coercion, and the erosion of the shared norms that once made global connectivity a genuinely common good.

The Indo-Pacific is where this contest will be decided. Its sea lanes, its cables, its ports, and its digital corridors represent not merely commercial routes but the physical expression of the international order itself. To allow any single power to establish decisive dominance over those networks would be to concede something far larger than a trade route. Above all, it requires abandoning the comforting illusion that infrastructure is politically neutral.

Connectivity built for dependence is not connectivity at all. It is a leash — elegantly engineered, commercially packaged, and very difficult to remove once fitted. The nations that understand this reality will shape the future. Those that do not may discover, too late, that sovereignty is no longer measured solely by the territory they control, but by the networks upon which they depend.

M. A. Hossain, senior correspondent and journalist from Bangladesh. He is a seasoned political and defense analyst on international affairs. He covers major developments in South Asia and the ASEAN Region for The News Analytics Journal.

This article published at :

1. The News Analytics Herald, India : 03 July,26

তেলাপোকা তত্ত্ব

এম. এ. হোসাইন,

ইতিহাসের কিছু পুনরাবৃত্ত ধারা আছে, যা কখনো নিজেদের পরিচয় প্রকাশ করে না। এটি নিঃশব্দে আসে — ন্যায়ের ভাষায় মোড়ানো, তরুণদের অভিযোগে সাজানো, এবং আন্তর্জাতিক গণমাধ্যমের প্রশংসার আলোয় নিজেদের বৈধতা নির্মাণ করে। যে সময়ে কোনো রাষ্ট্র উপলব্ধি করে যে সে আসলে কীসের মুখোমুখি হয়েছে, তখন অনেক দেরি হয়ে যায়। কারণ ততক্ষণে অস্থিতিশীলতার অবকাঠামো রাষ্ট্রের ভেতরেই শক্ত ভিত্তি গড়ে ফেলেছে।

বাংলাদেশে যা ঘটেছিল, তা ছাত্রদের দিয়ে শুরু হয়নি; চাকরির কোটাব্যবস্থার প্রশ্নে শেষও হয়নি। এর পেছনে ছিল আরও গভীর পরিকল্পনা, এমন সকল কৌশলবিদ, যারা জানেন—সবচেয়ে টেকসই বিপ্লব সেই বিপ্লব, যেটিকে জনগণ নিজের সৃষ্টি বলে বিশ্বাস করে। এ ধারণা নতুন নয়। ১৯২৮ সালে জনমত-প্রকৌশলের জনক এডওয়ার্ড বার্নেইস বিষয়টি সুন্দর ভাবে ব্যাখ্যা করেছিলেন। ১৯৫৩ সালে তেহরানে সিআইএ তা প্রয়োগ করেছিল। ২০১৪ সালে কিয়েভেও অনুরূপ প্রক্রিয়া দেখা গিয়েছিল। নতুন যা, তা হলো এর গতি, ব্যাপ্তি এবং প্রযুক্তিগত পরিশীলন। আজকের বিশ্বে, বিশেষত বৈশ্বিক দক্ষিণে, এই কৌশল অনেক বেশি সূক্ষ্ম ও কার্যকর রূপে ব্যবহৃত হচ্ছে। দক্ষিণ এশিয়াও এর বাইরে নয়।

বাংলাদেশ দিয়েই শুরু করা যাক, কারণ এটি দক্ষিণ এশিয়ার সাম্প্রতিক ইতিহাসে সবচেয়ে শিক্ষণীয় কেস স্টাডি। সরকারি চাকরিতে কোটা সংস্কারের দাবিতে শুরু হওয়া ছাত্র আন্দোলন খুব দ্রুত এমন এক রূপ নেয়, যা কেবল স্বতঃস্ফূর্ত জনবিক্ষোভের ব্যাখ্যায় সীমাবদ্ধ রাখা কঠিন। কোটাব্যবস্থা নিয়ে তরুণদের অসন্তোষ বাস্তব ছিল। ক্ষোভও ছিল সত্যিকার। কিন্তু প্রায় সব বড় রাজনৈতিক প্রকৌশলের সূচনাই ঘটে এমন বাস্তব অসন্তোষকে কেন্দ্র করেই। পরজীবী যেমন জীবন্ত দেহে আশ্রয় নেয়, তেমনি রাজনৈতিক অপারেশনও প্রকৃত ক্ষোভকে বাহন হিসেবে ব্যবহার করে।

প্রথম গুরুত্বপূর্ণ সংকেত ছিল আন্দোলনকারীদের একটি অংশের ‘রাজাকার’ পরিচয়কে গ্রহণ করার প্রবণতা। বাংলাদেশের জাতীয় স্মৃতিতে ‘রাজাকার’ শব্দটি ১৯৭১ সালের গণহত্যার সহযোগীদের সঙ্গে অঙ্গাঙ্গিভাবে জড়িত। ফলে এই অভিধাকে প্রত্যাখ্যান না করে বরং রাজনৈতিক অস্ত্রে পরিণত করা নিছক আবেগের বহিঃপ্রকাশ ছিল না; এটি ছিল একটি যোগাযোগ-কৌশল, একটি প্রতীকী বার্তা।

পরবর্তী সময়ে আরও নানা স্তর উন্মোচিত হতে থাকে। জামায়াতে ইসলামী, বিএনপি, বিভিন্ন মাদ্রাসাভিত্তিক নেটওয়ার্ক এবং সংগঠিত ইসলামপন্থী গোষ্ঠীর সদস্যরা ধীরে ধীরে আন্দোলনের ভিড়ে মিশে যেতে থাকে। তারা নিজেদের সাংগঠনিক পরিচয় আড়াল করে বৃহত্তর জনতার অংশ হয়ে উঠে। এ কৌশল নতুন নয়। ২০১১ সালের মিসরের তাহরির স্কয়ার আন্দোলনের সময়ও মুসলিম ব্রাদারহুড প্রথমে পেছনের সারিতে অবস্থান করেছিল। উদারপন্থী ও ধর্মনিরপেক্ষ কর্মীরা আন্তর্জাতিক মিডিয়ার দৃষ্টি আকর্ষণ করলেও শেষ পর্যন্ত আন্দোলনের সবচেয়ে বড় রাজনৈতিক সুবিধাভোগী হয়েছিল ব্রাদারহুড। ধৈর্য ও সময়—এই পদ্ধতির সবচেয়ে বড় শক্তি।

পরিস্থিতির আরেকটি গুরুত্বপূর্ণ উপাদান ছিল অর্থের প্রবাহ। ক্রিপ্টোকারেন্সির মাধ্যমে সীমান্ত পেরিয়ে অর্থ স্থানান্তর আজ আগের যেকোনো সময়ের চেয়ে সহজ। প্রচলিত ব্যাংকিং ব্যবস্থার বাইরে এই অর্থায়ন শনাক্ত করতে বিশেষ তদন্ত প্রয়োজন হয়। একই সঙ্গে বিভিন্ন পশ্চিমা কূটনীতিক ও সরকারবিরোধী গোষ্ঠীর ঘনিষ্ঠ যোগাযোগের বিষয়টিও আলোচনায় আসে। টেলিভিশন টকশো, ইউটিউব চ্যানেল এবং সামাজিক যোগাযোগমাধ্যমের নানা প্ল্যাটফর্ম একটি নির্দিষ্ট বয়ানকে ক্রমাগত শক্তিশালী করতে থাকে। প্রশ্ন হলো—এটি কি কেবল সাংবাদিকতা, নাকি আরও বৃহত্তর কোনো রাজনৈতিক বাস্তুতন্ত্র নির্মাণের অংশ?

সবচেয়ে উদ্বেগজনক অভিযোগ ছিল স্নাইপার অস্ত্রধারীদের উপস্থিতি নিয়ে। কিছু প্রতিবেদনে সাবেক সামরিক সদস্য এবং বিদেশি নেটওয়ার্ক-সংশ্লিষ্ট ব্যক্তিদের সম্পৃক্ততার কথা উল্লেখ করা হয়েছে। অপ্রাপ্তবয়স্কদের মৃত্যুর ঘটনা জনমনে প্রবল ক্ষোভ সৃষ্টি করে। দায় চাপানো হয় আইনশৃঙ্খলা বাহিনীর উপর। ফলে রাষ্ট্রের বৈধতা দ্রুত প্রশ্নবিদ্ধ হতে থাকে।

যারা শীতল যুদ্ধ-পরবর্তী আন্তর্জাতিক রাজনীতি নিরপেক্ষভাবে অধ্যয়ন করেছেন, তাদের কাছে এ ধরনের অভিযোগ সম্পূর্ণ অপরিচিত নয়। ১৯৭৩ সালে চিলিতে সামরিক অভ্যুত্থানের আগে সিআইএ শুধু সেনাবাহিনীর সঙ্গে যোগাযোগই করেনি; তারা বিরোধী সংবাদমাধ্যমকে সহায়তা, ধর্মঘটকে উৎসাহ এবং রাজনৈতিক পরিবেশকে উত্তপ্ত করার ক্ষেত্রেও ভূমিকা রেখেছিল বলে বহু গবেষণায় উঠে এসেছে। ১৯৫৩ সালের ইরানে ‘অপারেশন অ্যাজাক্স’-এর সময় ভাড়াটে জনতা, কৃত্রিম সংবাদ এবং রাজনৈতিক বিশৃঙ্খলার মাধ্যমে একটি নির্বাচিত সরকারকে উৎখাতের পরিবেশ তৈরি করা হয়েছিল। ২০১৪ সালের ইউক্রেনের ময়দান আন্দোলনের কেন্দ্রবিন্দুতে গণতান্ত্রিক আকাঙ্ক্ষা থাকলেও, পশ্চিমা এনজিও অর্থায়ন, মার্কিন পররাষ্ট্র দপ্তরের সম্পৃক্ততা এবং ভিক্টোরিয়া নুল্যান্ডের আলোচিত টেলিফোন আলাপ নতুন প্রশ্নও উত্থাপন করেছিল। এসব ঘটনা কোন কল্পকাহিনী নয়; ইতিহাসের নথিভুক্ত অধ্যায়।

তবে প্রযুক্তি বদলেছে। নগদ অর্থভর্তি স্যুটকেসের জায়গা নিয়েছে ক্রিপ্টোকারেন্সি। রেডিও ফ্রি ইউরোপের জায়গায় এসেছে সামাজিক যোগাযোগমাধ্যমের অ্যালগরিদম। সরাসরি সশস্ত্র গোষ্ঠীর বদলে এসেছে এমন অপারেটিভ, যাদের সম্পৃক্ততা অস্বীকার করা সহজ। কিন্তু উদ্দেশ্য অপরিবর্তিত—যে সরকার বৃহৎ কৌশলগত স্বার্থের সঙ্গে সামঞ্জস্যপূর্ণ নয়, তাকে দুর্বল করা এবং বিকল্প শক্তিকে ক্ষমতার পথে এগিয়ে দেওয়া।

ভারতে বিদেশি অর্থায়নে পরিচালিত কিছু এনজিওকে কেন্দ্র করে দীর্ঘদিন ধরেই বিতর্ক রয়েছে। ভারত সরকার বৈদেশিক অনুদান নিয়ন্ত্রণ আইন ব্যবহার করে একাধিক প্রতিষ্ঠানের বিরুদ্ধে ব্যবস্থা নিয়েছে। গণতন্ত্রের অবক্ষয়, সংখ্যালঘু অধিকার বা বিচার বিভাগের স্বাধীনতা—এসব বিষয় অবশ্যই গুরুত্বপূর্ণ। তবে একই সঙ্গে এগুলো আন্তর্জাতিক চাপ প্রয়োগের হাতিয়ার হিসেবেও ব্যবহৃত হতে পারে—এমন অভিযোগও রয়েছে।

পাকিস্তানের চিত্র আরও জটিল। দেশটি কখনো এ ধরনের কৌশলের লক্ষ্যবস্তু হয়েছে, আবার কখনো নিজেই আঞ্চলিক ভূ-রাজনীতির বাহক হিসেবে ব্যবহৃত হয়েছে। ২০২২ সালে ইমরান খানের ক্ষমতাচ্যুতি নিয়ে বিতর্ক আজও শেষ হয়নি। তথাকথিত সাইফার বার্তা, মার্কিন অসন্তোষ এবং দ্রুতগতির অনাস্থা ভোট—সবকিছুই নানা প্রশ্নের জন্ম দিয়েছে। যদিও চূড়ান্ত সত্য নিয়ে বিতর্ক অব্যাহত, রাজনৈতিক অস্থিতিশীলতার প্রযুক্তি সেখানে সক্রিয় ছিল—এ বিষয়ে অনেক পর্যবেক্ষক একমত।

এখানে একটি কঠিন বাস্তবতা রয়েছে, যা কূটনৈতিক ভদ্রতার আড়ালে লুকিয়ে রাখা উচিত নয়। সব বিক্ষোভ একই ধরনের নয়। কিছু আন্দোলন প্রকৃত সামাজিক অসন্তোষের বহিঃপ্রকাশ, কিছু আবার বৃহত্তর রাজনৈতিক অপারেশনের অংশ হয়ে উঠতে পারে। এই দুইয়ের মধ্যে পার্থক্য নির্ণয় করা রাষ্ট্র পরিচালনার গুরুত্বপূর্ণ দক্ষতা।

একটি প্রকৃত গণআন্দোলনের জবাব হতে পারে সংস্কার, সংলাপ ও সমঝোতা। কিন্তু যদি কোনো আন্দোলনের ভেতরে বিদেশি অর্থায়ন, সমন্বিত অপপ্রচার এবং গোপন রাজনৈতিক কৌশলের উপাদান সক্রিয় থাকে, তবে রাষ্ট্রকে গোয়েন্দা সক্ষমতা, আইন প্রয়োগ এবং অর্থায়ন নেটওয়ার্কের উপর নজরদারির মতো ভিন্ন কৌশল অবলম্বন করতে হয়।

দক্ষিণ এশিয়ার রাষ্ট্রগুলোর সামনে তাই নতুন চ্যালেঞ্জ—স্বতঃস্ফূর্ত গণঅসন্তোষ এবং পরিকল্পিত অস্থিতিশীলতার মধ্যে পার্থক্য নির্ণয়ের সক্ষমতা অর্জন। ইয়াবা-প্রভাবিত জনতা, বিদেশি অর্থায়নে পরিচালিত সমন্বয়কারী, ছায়ার আড়ালে অবস্থান নেওয়া স্নাইপার কিংবা পূর্বনির্ধারিত আন্তর্জাতিক প্রচার—এসব যদি সত্যিই কোথাও উপস্থিত থাকে, তবে সেগুলো নিছক জনবিক্ষোভের লক্ষণ নয়; বরং সুপরিকল্পিত প্রযোজনার উপাদান। আর প্রতিটি প্রযোজনারই একজন প্রযোজক থাকে। ‘তেলাপোকা তত্ত্ব’-এর মূল বার্তাও সেখানেই। তেলাপোকা অন্ধকারে বেঁচে থাকে। আলো জ্বাললেই তারা দৃশ্যমান হয়।

ঢাকার তরুণদের অনেকেই বিশ্বাস করেছিলেন, তারা ইতিহাস রচনা করছেন। হয়তো সত্যিই কেউ কেউ করেছিলেন। কিন্তু অন্য অনেকেই অজান্তে অন্য কারও ভূ-রাজনৈতিক কৌশলের অংশে পরিণত হয়েছিলেন। দক্ষিণ এশিয়ার জন্য প্রশ্নটি তাই অত্যন্ত গুরুত্বপূর্ণ: আমরা কি ইতিহাসের পাঠ সময়মতো শিখব, নাকি প্রতিবারই তার মূল্য দিতে হবে অস্থিতিশীলতা, বিভাজন ও অনিশ্চয়তার মাধ্যমে?

লেখক : প্রাবন্ধিক। 

   এই লেখাটি প্রকাশিত হয়েছে :

১. দৈনিক সংবাদ, ঢাকা : ১৪ জুন, ২৬

The Cockroach Doctrine

M. A. Hossain,

There is a template. There has always been a template. It does not announce itself. It arrives quietly — wrapped in the language of justice, dressed in the grievances of the young, amplified by the megaphone of Western media approval. By the time governments recognize what they are dealing with, the architecture of destabilization is already load-bearing. 

What happened in Dhaka did not begin with students and it did not end with jobs. It began in the planning rooms of people who understood that the most durable revolutions are the ones the target population believes it started itself. This is not a new insight. Edward Bernays understood it in 1928. The CIA understood it in Tehran in 1953. The State Department understood it in Kyiv in 2014. What is new is the speed, the scale, and the disturbing sophistication with which the playbook is now being deployed across the Global South — including, with increasing visibility, across South Asia.

The pattern is not theoretical. It is operational. And it is worth examining with the clinical detachment it deserves.

The Blueprint Decoded

Begin with Bangladesh, because it is the most instructive case study in recent South Asian history.

What started as student protests against a quota system in government jobs rapidly mutated into something far more structured, far more lethal, and far less spontaneous than the world's editorial pages were willing to admit. The initial grievance was legitimate on its face. Quota reform is a real issue. Students were genuinely frustrated. This is always how these operations begin — latching onto authentic discontent the way a parasite finds a living host.

Then came the first signal: the protesters adopted the term "Razakar" after the then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina deployed it rhetorically. In Bangladesh's historical memory, Razakars were collaborators with the Pakistani military during the 1971 genocide. That the movement's core chose to embrace — even weaponize — this label rather than reject it was not accidental. It was a communicative choice. A signal to certain audiences that this was not merely a jobs protest.

Then the layers peeled back further. Members of Jamaat-e-Islami, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, madrassa networks, and organized Islamist factions quietly folded themselves into the crowd, shedding their organizational identities like shed skin. This is a tactic with a long pedigree. In Egypt's Tahrir Square in 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood initially stayed in the background, letting secular liberals take the cameras, before eventually inheriting the revolution wholesale. The method is patient. The method is proven.

Cryptocurrency financing entered the picture — decentralized, traceable only with forensic effort, crossing borders without the friction of wire transfers or donor disclosure laws. Western and American diplomats held frequent meetings with anti-government groups. Media infrastructure — television talk shows, YouTube channels — provided the ideological runway. This is not journalism. This is ecosystem construction.

And then — the most chilling element — snipers. Former military men, reportedly alongside shooters linked to foreign networks, entered the operational theater. Minors were killed. The deaths were attributed to law enforcement. Public fury metastasized. The government's legitimacy collapsed under the weight of manufactured horror.

History Does Not Repeat, But It Rhymes Loudly

None of this should surprise anyone who has studied American covert foreign policy since the Cold War with intellectual honesty.

In Chile in 1973, the CIA did not simply sponsor a coup. It first spent years funding opposition media, supporting strikes, and cultivating military contacts — creating the conditions in which a coup became, to many Chileans, a relief. In Iran in 1953, 'Operation Ajax' began with hired crowds and fabricated newspaper stories before the tanks rolled. In Ukraine in 2014, the Maidan revolution had genuine democratic aspirations at its core — and also had the documented fingerprints of American NGO funding, State Department involvement, and the now-infamous phone call between Victoria Nuland and the U.S. Ambassador selecting Ukraine's next prime minister. The pattern is not conspiracy theory. It is documented, declassified, peer-reviewed history.

What has changed is the toolkit. Cryptocurrency has replaced suitcases of cash. Social media algorithms have replaced Radio Free Europe. Snipers who can be disavowed have replaced paramilitaries who sometimes could not be. The operating system is updated. The objective function is identical: remove governments that do not serve Washington's strategic architecture, and install those that will.

India and Pakistan in the Crosshairs

The question remains — do similar formations exist in India and Pakistan — deserves a serious answer, not a reflexive one.

In India, the signs are not invisible to those trained to look. A pattern of foreign-funded NGOs, some operating with suspiciously timed activism around electoral cycles, has been documented enough that the Indian government has moved against several under FCRA regulations. Civil society organizations with opaque funding structures have amplified narratives around democratic backsliding, minority rights, and judicial independence — all legitimate topics, but all simultaneously useful as pressure instruments against the Modi government in Western capitals.

Pakistan's situation is almost inverted in its complexity. The country has been, at different moments, both a target and a vector of precisely these operations. The removal of Imran Khan from power in 2022 carried its own cloud of disputed signals — alleged cypher communications, American diplomatic displeasure, a parliamentary no-confidence vote that moved with unusual speed. Whether Khan was removed by Washington's preference or by a domestic military calculation remains contested. What is not contested is that the technology of political disruption was present and active.

What Governments Must Understand

Here is the hard truth that no amount of diplomatic niceties should soften. These are not movements. They are operations. The difference matters enormously, because the appropriate response to a movement is political engagement — reform, dialogue, compromise. The appropriate response to a foreign-directed operation is intelligence work, law enforcement, and strategic disruption of the financing and coordination networks that sustain it. Conflating the two is not just an analytical error. It is a fatal one.

Governments across South Asia — democratic, authoritarian, or somewhere in the complicated middle — need to develop what might be called regime-change literacy. The ability to distinguish organic civil unrest from engineered destabilization is not paranoia. It is statecraft. The failure to exercise it has cost governments their survival and countries their stability.

The yaba-fueled crowds, the foreign-currency-funded coordinators, the snipers in the shadows, the compliant Western media coverage that arrives on cue — these are not the marks of a spontaneous uprising. They are the marks of a production. And every production has producers. The cockroaches, as the framing goes, thrive in the dark. Turn on the lights.

The protesters in Dhaka thought they were making history. Some of them were. The rest were making someone else's foreign policy. South Asia cannot afford to keep learning this lesson the hard way.

M A Hossain is a senior journalist and international affairs analyst, based in Bangladesh. He can be reached at: writetomahossain@gmail.com

   This article published at : 

1. Hindu Post, India : 11 June, 26

A Monopoly on Violence

M A Hossain, 

The sovereign state is many things, but above all, it is a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. When that monopoly is shattered—not by foreign invading armies, but by localized, heavily armed syndicates operating within a nation’s own geographic borders—the state ceases to be a state in anything but name. It becomes a failed state.

What is unfolding in Jungle Salimpur, a 3,100-acre tract of government-owned land in the Sitakunda Upazila of Chattogram, is not mere lawlessness. It is a direct, armed insurrection against the sovereignty of Bangladesh.

Consider the sheer audacity of the events on May 25, 2026. A mob of 200 to 250 men, part of the notorious "Yasin Bahini" syndicate led by the criminal kingpin Md Yasin, descended upon an under-construction joint forces camp. They did not arrive under the cover of night with small arms alone; they arrived with bulldozers. They systematically demolished nearly 70 percent of the security camp, exchanged gunfire with state forces for two hours, and dug up vital roads and culverts to deliberately maroon law enforcement and prevent reinforcements from arriving.

This followed an equally brazen assault on January 19, 2026, when a Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) team executing an arms-recovery operation was ambushed by a mob of 400 to 500 criminals mobilized via loudspeakers. In that encounter, state forces were taken hostage, several were wounded, and Naib Subedar Md Motaleb Hossain Bhuiyan was killed.

For a criminal gang to twice defeat, dismantle, or kill members of elite state security forces within five months is an intolerable humiliation for any government. Yet, the physical violence is only half the crisis. The more insidious threat lies in the bizarre, ideological nature of the demand now being pushed through relentless propaganda by the Yasin group: the complete "independence" or "liberation" of Jungle Salimpur.

To the casual observer, the demand for a criminal fiefdom to be granted sovereign autonomy sounds entirely farcical. It is easy to dismiss it as a joke. But history warns us that when state institutions collapse and criminal enterprises grow wealthy off land-grabbing and illegal arms, their demands transition rapidly from financial impunity to political sovereignty.

We have seen this tragic script play out across South Asia and the broader developing world whenever central governments grow frail. In Pakistan’s erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), decades of state absenteeism transformed local criminal networks into heavily armed, autonomous entities that eventually challenged the nuclear-armed state itself. In the favelas of Rio de Janeiro or the cartel-dominated regions of Michoacán, Mexico, criminal syndicates effectively achieved "liberation" from the state, establishing parallel tax systems, parallel judiciaries, and heavily fortified borders that state police cross only at the risk of their lives.

How did Bangladesh arrive at a point where local land grabbers feel emboldened to declare their own micro-republic? The answer lies in the profound institutional decay that preceded the current administration.

The preceding interim government led by Yunus left behind a legacy of ruin. By systematically dismantling the chain of command within the security forces and patronizing partisan mobs for short-term political survival, they fostered an environment of "state-sponsored mobocracy." When the state itself begins using mobs to enforce its will, it effectively signals to every local warlord, gang leader, and extortionist that the rule of law is dead and that power belongs exclusively to whoever possesses the most firepower and the largest crowd.

The shattering of the security forces' internal discipline under the previous administration created a vacuum. In that vacuum, groups like the Yasin Bahini grew from localized nuisances into existential threats. Now, an unsuspecting public is being pulled into a vicious, highly dangerous cycle, manipulated by criminal propaganda to see these fiefdoms as legitimate, autonomous entities rather than what they truly are: dens of violent extortion.

The administration led by Mr Tareque Rahman must recognize that this is a defining test of its tenure. There can be no negotiation, no backroom political compromise, and no hand-wringing over the "complex socio-economic roots" of the Salimpur crisis. When a criminal group deploys bulldozers against the military and requests the territorial dismemberment of the nation, the time for nuance has passed.

A sovereign state cannot absorb these sorts of subversive demands. To tolerate them, or to treat them as ordinary municipal crimes, is to invite the total balkanization of Bangladesh's internal security. If Jungle Salimpur is allowed to stand as a self-governing criminal sanctuary, what stops the next armed syndicate in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, or the sundarbans, or the urban slums of Dhaka from demanding their own "liberation"?

The response from the government must be swift, unyielding, and executed with an iron hand. The deployment of border guard platoons is a minor administrative step; what is required is a comprehensive, sustained military and law enforcement sweep to permanently dismantle the Yasin Bahini, reclaim every square inch of the 3,100 acres of government land, and bring those who murdered Naib Subedar Bhuiyan to absolute justice.

Sovereignty is not maintained by lines drawn on a map or by seats held at the United Nations. It is maintained by the absolute certainty that if you attack the forces of the state, the state will break you. The BNP government must send that message clearly to Jungle Salimpur, before the rot spreads too deep to cure.

M A Hossain is a journalist and international affairs analyst, based in Bangladesh. He can be reached at: writetomahossain@gmail.com

  This article published at :

1. Counterpoint BD, BD : 08 June, 26

2. Weekly Blitz, BD : 01 June, 26

Xi's Pyongyang Gambit

M A Hossain, 

Xi Jinping's arrival in Pyongyang on June 8, his first in nearly seven years, is precisely that kind of visit. It is the visit of a patron who suspects, with some justification, that his most loyal vassal is finding new masters. And the anxiety behind it tells us more about the shifting architecture of Asian power than any joint communiqué ever will.

The last time Xi set foot in Pyongyang was June 2019, when the geopolitical landscape looked considerably different. Back then, Kim Jong Un was emerging from a brief, spectacular flirtation with Donald Trump — the Singapore handshakes, the DMZ photo-ops — that ultimately produced nothing. China was comfortable. It remained indispensable. It held the economic levers. North Korea had nowhere else to go.

That comfortable arrangement no longer quite exists. North Korea has been deepening its military and economic collaboration with Russia at a pace that would make any traditional patron a little uneasy. For Beijing, which has long viewed itself as Pyongyang's primary diplomatic and economic lifeline, the Russia-DPRK relationship represents a quiet but real challenge to its influence. This is the inconvenient truth that Xi's delegation carries into Kim's reception halls — not just goodwill and solidarity rhetoric, but something closer to strategic unease dressed in diplomatic costume.

History offers instructive parallels. When the Soviet Union began courting Egypt in the 1950s and early 1960s, Nasser leveraged superpower competition masterfully — playing Moscow against Washington with the practiced ease of a bazaar merchant. Kim Jong Un, a man whose strategic instincts are routinely underestimated by Western analysts, appears to have absorbed that lesson thoroughly. He now sits between Beijing and Moscow with growing confidence, collecting dividends from both.

North Korea has more leverage vis-à-vis China compared to June 2019, when Xi last visited Pyongyang. That leverage has a very specific source: the Ukraine war and what it has done for Pyongyang's strategic value to Moscow. Kim dispatched troops and ammunition to support Russia's war effort, and Russia, grateful and flush with wartime necessity, returned the favor in ways that matter enormously to a sanctions-squeezed regime. A South Korean security assessment suggests Russia has transferred the equivalent of roughly $14.4 billion in assistance to North Korea since 2023, a significant portion likely including advanced military technology.

Xi wants to counterbalance all of the Russian influence over North Korea as a result of their military cooperation in the war in Europe. China does not like anyone else having more influence on Pyongyang than they do. That is, stripped of all diplomatic circumlocution, the real story. This is not a celebration of brotherhood. It is a power recalibration — Beijing reminding Pyongyang that Russia can offer military technology, but only China can offer something irreplaceable: a shared border, sustained economic sustenance, and the UN Security Council veto that has shielded North Korea from international accountability for decades.

North Korea has conducted multiple missile tests in 2026, including an intercontinental ballistic missile test in April that demonstrated potential range to reach the US mainland. Days before Xi's visit was even announced, Kim unveiled a new nuclear fuel production facility — a gesture of defiance so conspicuously timed that it could not have been accidental. Whether it was a signal to Beijing that Pyongyang will not be managed, or an opening bid in forthcoming negotiations, it underlined a fundamental reality: Kim is no longer the supplicant figure of earlier years. He bargains now. He postures. He makes patrons come to him.

At a macro level, Xi is likely hoping to demonstrate a dynamic leading role on the international stage — particularly within the China, Russia, Iran, North Korea grouping of revisionist autocracies — while portraying U.S. influence as diminishing. The optics are deliberate and layered. In May 2026, Xi held summits with both U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Now he arrives in Pyongyang, completing a triangular diplomatic circuit that signals Beijing's ambition to be the indispensable node in every consequential relationship — the pivot around which both accommodation and resistance to American power revolves.

But triangles, as geometers and geopoliticians alike know, are stable only until the internal forces shift. The Russia-North Korea axis has introduced precisely that kind of destabilizing tension. Moscow is no longer content to play a secondary role in Pyongyang's patronage network. And Kim, emboldened, is not inclined to return to a purely subordinate relationship with Beijing simply because Xi arrives bearing state banquets and ideological affirmations.

Some analysts believe Xi may also be carrying a message from Donald Trump, who has signaled willingness to resume diplomacy with Kim. North Korea, however, has insisted Washington drop its denuclearization precondition before any talks begin. If true, this adds another dimension entirely — Xi positioning himself as an intermediary, a role that would dramatically amplify Chinese relevance on the peninsula and conveniently remind Kim that Beijing's value proposition extends well beyond trade routes and energy subsidies.

Step back from the immediate theater of this summit, and the broader contours of a restructuring world come into focus. The Korean Peninsula has always been — a terrain where great powers project ambitions, fight proxy contests, and conduct the choreography of dominance. That dynamic has not changed. What has changed is the number of whales and the ferocity of their competition.

International sanctions on North Korea remain in place, but enforcement has weakened due to divisions at the UN Security Council. The very multilateral architecture designed to constrain Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions is fracturing — and China, Russia, and North Korea know it. Xi's visit is, among other things, an acknowledgment that the post-Cold War rules-based order that once hemmed in rogue actors is now sufficiently degraded that new arrangements are possible, perhaps even inevitable.

For Washington and its allies in Seoul and Tokyo, this moment demands clarity of purpose rather than reactive alarm. The worst response to Xi's Pyongyang visit would be to treat it as confirmation of an irreversible bloc. Alliances formed from mutual opportunism — not shared values or genuine strategic alignment — carry their own internal contradictions. The Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang axis is not monolithic. It is a marriage of inconveniences, held together by shared antipathy toward American power rather than genuine solidarity.

History suggests such arrangements are brittle. The Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s, born from precisely this kind of ideological proximity masking deep strategic competition, remains one of the most consequential ruptures of the 20th century. Xi knows it. And somewhere in the Kumsusan halls of Pyongyang, Kim Jong Un — a student of survival above all else — knows it too.

The patron has come calling. Whether the client is still listening is the real question of this summit.

M A Hossain is a senior journalist and international affairs analyst, based in Bangladesh. He can be reached at: writetomahossain@gmail.com

  This article published at :

1. The Nation, Pak : 9 June, 26

2. European Times, EU : 8 June, 26

3. Nepal Today, np: 8 June, 26

4. Business Today, Malaysia: 09 June,26

5. Sri Lanka Guardian, sl: 09 June,26

6. Pakistan Today, Pak : 11 June, 26

7. Counter Point, BD : 15 June, 26