How Syria’s Collapse Imperils U.S. Interests

M A Hossain,

The United States is leaving Syria. Not with the thunder of collapsing Saigon embassies or Black Hawk Down spectacles, but through a quiet, undignified fade into irrelevance. Three of America’s eight military bases in northeastern Syria are closing. U.S. troop levels are being halved—no declaration, no defined endgame, no accountability. What looks like prudent disengagement from a peripheral war is, in reality, the latest episode of America’s strategic abdication. The cost? Not just the abandonment of allies but the empowerment of adversaries—and a region inching toward chaos.

This is not a pivot; it’s a pattern. Like Afghanistan before it, Syria is another case study in America’s inability to match tactical success with strategic resolve. The illusion that a battlefield victory—defeating the Islamic State in territorial terms—would allow for a clean withdrawal has collapsed under the weight of Middle Eastern geopolitics. And while Washington looks away, the region is being reordered by powers with clearer aims and fewer scruples.

A Legacy of Incoherence

It’s worth recalling that the U.S. never had a grand strategy in Syria. The initial aim was modest: degrade ISIS and prevent its resurgence. And in 2019, the Islamic State’s self-proclaimed caliphate was destroyed. But even then, the critical question remained unanswered: what comes after?

That silence, maintained across administrations, now defines America’s presence in Syria. The Biden administration, much like Trump’s before it, has drifted—supporting the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) with minimal commitment, while avoiding a broader political or diplomatic engagement. This vacuum has left the U.S. presence not as a stabilizing anchor, but as an exposed, shrinking outpost with no political backing at home and even less deterrent credibility abroad.

In the meantime, Syria has changed. The civil war’s original dynamics are unrecognizable. Bashar al-Assad, once seen as the irredeemable villain of the conflict, has been overtaken in parts of the country by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a jihadist outfitted with transnational ambitions. What was once a contest between a brutal secular regime and various opposition factions has devolved into an ungoverned zone of extremists, shifting alliances, and regional interference.

The Cost of Strategic Illusions

Washington’s rationale for withdrawal is politically understandable. The American public is exhausted by the “forever wars.” Syria, with its complex tribal and sectarian tapestry, holds no obvious economic or political reward. But geopolitics is never a matter of public sentiment, it’s a matter of hard realities. And the reality is this; the U.S. is not exiting a war; it is conceding a geopolitical space.

That space will not remain empty. Already, Russia, Iran, and Turkey are maneuvering to shape post-American Syria. Moscow, with its airpower and regional diplomacy, is entrenching its military and political presence. Iran, through its Shiite militias and proxy networks, is threading together its long-sought land corridor to the Mediterranean. Turkey, under the guise of counterterrorism, is targeting Kurdish territories and expanding its influence in northern Syria. And now, radical factions are exploiting the uncertainty, aiming to recapture territory and legitimacy.

For Washington to pretend this outcome doesn’t matter is not merely naïve, it’s dangerous. Syria is not just another Middle Eastern mess. It sits at

the intersection of regional and global power struggles. It is a testing ground for how far Russia and Iran can go in defying the West. It is a pressure point on NATO’s southern flank. And most critically, it is the holding pen for thousands of ISIS fighters who remain in makeshift prisons, watched over by an increasingly abandoned and vulnerable Kurdish force.

Betraying the Kurds—Again

The betrayal of the SDF is a stain on American credibility. These forces, largely Kurdish, carried the brunt of the fight against ISIS. They did so without air power, armored divisions, or global diplomatic backing. They fought street by street, died by the thousands, and asked only for recognition and support. Now, they are being left to face Turkish bombardment, regime hostility, and radical revenge.

This isn’t just a moral failing—it’s a strategic blunder. Allies around the world take note of how America treats its partners. The message from Syria is loud and clear: the U.S. will use you, then abandon you. In the corridors of Taipei, Kyiv, and Tbilisi, this message echoes with alarming resonance.

Strategic Vacuum, Global Consequences

Those who argue that Syria is not worth the cost are missing the forest for the trees. The U.S. presence there is not about dominating Damascus or building a new democracy. It’s about maintaining a foothold in a region increasingly shaped by hostile powers. It’s about preventing the resurgence of ISIS before it threatens the world.

More broadly, it’s about signaling that the United States still has the will and capacity to shape global events. In geopolitics, perception is often as important as power. America’s quiet retreat signals something else entirely: fatigue, indecision, and strategic incoherence.

What a Real Strategy Looks Like

The choice is not between endless war and total withdrawal. There is a middle ground—one grounded in realism, responsibility, and resolve.

The U.S. withdrawal from Syria also disrupts the already fragile balance among regional non-state actors who have long operated in the shadow of major powers. With America's deterrent role vanishing, groups such as Hezbollah and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq may find new strategic corridors to operate across borders with greater impunity. Israel, compelled to conduct more pre-emptive operations without the cushion of American coordination in the region. 

Gulf monarchies, sensing a power vacuum and Washington’s retreat from its traditional guarantor role, may double down on proxy investments, exacerbating sectarian divides. Moreover, China's silent but steady diplomatic courtship could signal an emerging alignment that adds an Eurasian layer to Syria’s crisis. The withdrawal not only weakens U.S. leverage—it accelerates the transformation of Syria into a hub where multipolar competition, extremist resurgence, and regional insecurity converge unchecked.

The Verdict of History

Syria is not just another distant conflict. It is a mirror of America’s foreign policy choices, its resolve, and its values. A country that allows radical  networks to reclaim territory, that surrenders its alliances to Turkish drones and Russian maneuvering, is not leading the world—it is yielding it. The world is watching. Ukraine, Taiwan, and others are studying at this moment closely. If Washington cannot hold the line in Syria, what lines will it hold anywhere? The answer, increasingly, is none.

M A Hossain, political and defense analyst based in Bangladesh. He can be reached at: writetomahossain@gmail.com

  This article published at :

1. Eurasia Review, USA : 21 April, 25

2. The Nation, Pak : 22 April, 25

3. Daily Lead Pakistan, Pak : 23 April, 25

4. Iran Daily, Iran : 28 April, 25

BD Investment Summit, 2025: Can Bangladesh Deliver on Its Investment Promises?

M A Hossain, 

Bangladesh, long known for its resilience in the face of poverty, political unrest, and environmental vulnerability, has in recent decades carved a surprising niche in the global garments trade. Yet in Dhaka last week, as global CEOs, venture capitalists, and trade envoys mingled at the Bangladesh Investment Summit 2025, the mood was not one of cautious gratitude for incremental progress—it was of ambition. The kind that suggests a country preparing for a tectonic shift.

Organized by the Bangladesh Investment Development Authority (BIDA), the summit presented itself as a coming-of-age moment. The message was clear: Bangladesh is ready to graduate from the world’s sweatshop into its startup lab, from the margins of global commerce to a place near its center. It was a grand performance of possibility. But like all performances, it invites a simple question: What happens when the curtain falls?

BIDA’s chairman, Ashik Chowdhury, made a compelling case that the summit was about more than glitzy pledges or photo ops. It was about “laying the groundwork” for a new identity—one that pitches Bangladesh as a high-growth frontier for investment in technology, logistics, and green energy. In a world increasingly suspicious of China’s long-term intentions and fatigued by India’s bureaucracy, that pitch has a certain intuitive appeal.

The optics didn’t disappoint. Executives from Inditex (the parent company of Zara), Samsung C&T, and Telenor Asia rubbed shoulders with policymakers and envoys from the UK and Finland. Panels buzzed with talk of innovation and transition. The Bangladesh Startup Connect 2025 event, backed by new funds like Infusion Partners, projected a youthful energy, echoing the country’s demographic advantage—70% of its population is under 35. In a rare show of political maturity, even bitter rivals from the BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami, and the NCP appeared to share a stage, signaling a veneer of unity to foreign investors. If that’s not a miracle in Dhaka, what is?

And yet, as with all stories of promise, the devil remains in the details.

There’s a certain predictability to these sorts of gatherings in emerging economies. Big talk, bigger expectations, and then—almost invariably—a slow fade into disappointment. Bangladesh has been here before: grand strategies thwarted by modest execution. For all the optimism at this summit, it was impossible to ignore the country’s Achilles’ heels.

Start with infrastructure. The speeches in Dhaka were digital-age, but the roads and ports still belong to the industrial past. The Chattogram port, vital to the country’s exports, remains congested and under-resourced. Energy shortages continue to plague manufacturing zones, with factories often forced to operate at half-capacity. While promises of LNG stability by 2026 may reassure diplomats, investors deal in present realities.

Then there’s the bureaucracy—the kind that wears a smile during summits and a frown when investors apply for permits. Bangladesh has rolled out a “one-stop service” to streamline approvals, but as any business executive who’s tried to open a factory or launch a venture in Dhaka knows, the service rarely stops at just one. Regulatory unpredictability is not a footnote—it’s the story.

The startup ecosystem, which featured prominently in the summit’s programming, reflects both the potential and the paradox. Companies like bKash and 10 Minute School show that innovation can flourish here. But they are exceptions, not yet the rule. As Rahat Ahmed of Anchorless Bangladesh rightly pointed out, most local startups survive on grants, not scalable venture capital. There is no meaningful exit environment—no culture of IPOs or acquisition pathways—making Bangladesh a speculative playground, not a mature startup economy.

And hovering over all this is the specter of politics. Investors aren’t just buying into an economy; they’re buying into a system. While Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus tried to assure attendees of a “level playing field,” one summit does not erase years of volatility. Memories of the 2024 unrest, election uncertainty, and sudden policy swings linger like smog over Dhaka.

Yet it would be a mistake to dismiss the entire effort as theater. Beneath the polish was a genuine urgency—a sense that Bangladesh knows time is running short. The global investment community is fickle. Opportunities have a shelf life.

And there are silver linings worth examining. The country’s location—nestled between India and China—offers strategic access to the ASEAN+ economies. The Bangladesh Economic Zones Authority (BEZA) is beginning to offer more competitive incentives than regional rivals like Vietnam. Tax holidays, profit repatriation, and long-term land leases are not mere policy points—they are magnets in the hands of capable governments.

More impressively, Bangladesh is showing signs of getting ahead of the sustainability curve. Yunus’s emphasis on “business with purpose” may strike some Western ears as platitude, but in a country where the climate crisis is not hypothetical, it lands differently. Green energy initiatives and social impact investing aren’t just ethical imperatives—they are survival strategies. Companies like Excelerate Energy and Marubeni are beginning to take notice.

China, ever the opportunist, certainly has. A 60-member delegation arrived in Dhaka with Belt and Road on the mind. Beijing sees Bangladesh as both a logistical node and a fintech experiment. What remains to be seen is whether Dhaka can leverage Chinese interest without becoming dependent on Chinese terms.

So what’s next?

The future of Bangladesh’s investment story hinges not on what happened between April 7 and 10, but on what happens between now and 2026. Will BIDA’s real-time investment tracking system actually ensure follow-through? Will port upgrades, smoother customs procedures, and the much-touted Japanese Economic Zone in Araihazar move from PowerPoint slides to concrete foundations? Will the interim government resist the temptation to return to partisan retrenchment after the cameras leave?

If the answer to these questions is yes, Bangladesh could well become the kind of success story Bretton Woods institutions love to claim credit for. A place where ambition and action finally align.

But if history is any guide, the summit risks becoming what many similar events have been for emerging economies: a well-lit stage, a compelling script, and no sequel. Bangladesh has long been underestimated. And maybe this summit marks the beginning of a new chapter. But even good beginnings demand better endings.

The world has now heard the pitch. It’s the delivery that matters.

M A Hossain, political and defense analyst based in Bangladesh. He can be reached at: writetomahossain@gmail.com

   This article published at :

1. Asian Age, BD : 20 April, 25

মার্কিন-চীন বাণিজ্যযুদ্ধ কীভাবে বিশ্বের অর্থনীতিকে বিপর্যস্ত করছে?

এম এ হোসাইন,

বিশ্বের দরিদ্রতম দেশগুলো আবারও উপলব্ধি করছে—ক্ষমতার কেন্দ্রে না থাকলে তাদের কী পরিণতি হয়। ২১ শতকের পরাশক্তির প্রতিদ্বন্দ্বিতার সর্বশেষ অধ্যায়ে, ওয়াশিংটন ও বেইজিং এক অর্থনৈতিক যুদ্ধে জড়িয়ে পড়েছে, যার সূচনা হয়েছিল শুল্ক আরোপের মাধ্যমে, কিন্তু এখন তা পরিণত হয়েছে একটি বিস্তৃত ভূরাজনৈতিক সংঘাতে যার প্রভাব ছড়িয়ে পড়েছে পুরো বিশ্বে। এই সংঘাত ন্যায়বিচার, মেধাস্বত্ব, ও জাতীয় মর্যাদার নামে শুরু হলেও—বাস্তবতা হলো, এই অর্থনৈতিক কুয়াশার মধ্যে সবচেয়ে বড় ক্ষতিটা হচ্ছে স্বল্পোন্নত দেশগুলো যারা নীরবে, যন্ত্রণায়, এবং কোনো মুক্তির পথ না পেয়ে সবচেয়ে বেশি ক্ষতির সম্মুখীন হচ্ছে।

২০১৮ সালে ট্রাম্প প্রশাসনের হাত ধরে এই বাণিজ্যযুদ্ধ শুরু হয়েছিল মূলত যুক্তরাষ্ট্র-চীন বাণিজ্য ঘাটতি দূর করার লক্ষ্য নিয়ে। কিছু যৌক্তিকতা অবশ্যই ছিল: চীনের বাণিজ্যচর্চা—যেমন প্রযুক্তি হস্তান্তরের চাপ সৃষ্টি কিংবা মেধাস্বত্ব চুরি—এর বিরুদ্ধে প্রতিরোধ প্রয়োজন ছিল। শুল্ককে বেছে নেওয়া হয়েছিল সহজতম প্রতিরোধমূলক হাতিয়ার হিসেবে। তবে এই যুদ্ধ এখন কেবল সয়াবিন বা সৌর প্যানেলের বিষয় নয়—এটা এখন একটি কৌশলগত যুদ্ধ, যেখানে পাল্টা শুল্ক, প্রযুক্তি নিষেধাজ্ঞা, এবং অর্থনৈতিক নীতিকে জাতীয় নিরাপত্তার অস্ত্র বানানো হয়েছে।

২০২৫ সালের মধ্যে, চীনা পণ্যের ওপর যুক্তরাষ্ট্রের শুল্ক ১৪৫% পর্যন্ত পৌঁছেছে, আর আমেরিকান পণ্যের ওপর চীনের শুল্ক ৮৪% পর্যন্ত। দুই দেশই দাবি করছে, তারা তাদের জাতীয় স্বার্থ রক্ষা করছে। কিন্তু বাস্তবে, তারা বৈশ্বিক বাণিজ্যের কাঠামো এমনভাবে পাল্টে দিচ্ছে। এরফলে সবচেয়ে দুর্বল অর্থনীতিগুলো ভয়াবহ ঝুঁকির মুখে পড়ছে।

বিশ্ব অর্থনীতি কোনো দাবার ছক নয় যেখানে চালগুলো স্পষ্ট ও নিয়ন্ত্রিত। বরং এটা একটি জীবন্ত বাস্তুতন্ত্রের মতো যা পরস্পর সংযুক্ত এবং সূক্ষ্ম ভারসাম্যে স্থিত। এক জায়গায় নড়চড় হলেই অন্যখানে কম্পন লাগে। মার্কিন-চীন শুল্ক যুদ্ধ এমন এক ঝাঁকুনি দিয়েছে যা বিশ্বজুড়ে সাপ্লাই চেইন ব্যবস্থায় ব্যাঘাত ঘটিয়েছে, পণ্য পরিবহনের খরচ বাড়িয়েছে, এবং এক অনিশ্চয়তার তরঙ্গ সৃষ্টি করেছে। যার বড় ধাক্কা এসে পড়েছে সেইসব দেশে যেগুলো এরকম আঘাত সামাল দিতে অক্ষম।

স্বল্পোন্নত দেশগুলো সাধারণত কাঁচামাল, কৃষিপণ্য, কিংবা শ্রমনির্ভর তৈরি পোশাকের মতো পণ্যের রপ্তানির ওপর নির্ভরশীল। তাদের অর্থনীতি এক বা দুইটি খাতের ওপর নির্ভরশীল, অবকাঠামো দুর্বল, এবং শ্রমবাজার অপ্রাতিষ্ঠানিক। যখন বৈশ্বিক বাণিজ্যে স্থবিরতা নামে যেমনটি ঘটেছে এই শুল্ক যুদ্ধ ও কভিড-১৯ মহামারির পরবর্তী ধাক্কায়—তখন এসব দেশ বৈদেশিক মুদ্রা ও কর্মসংস্থানের গুরুত্বপূর্ণ উৎস হারায়। রপ্তানি আয় কমে, বাজেট সংকুচিত হয়, এবং দারিদ্র্য বিমোচনে অর্জিত অগ্রগতি ধ্বংসের মুখে পড়ে।

এই ক্ষতির পেছনে চীনের কৌশলগত অভিযোজনও ভূমিকা রাখছে। যুক্তরাষ্ট্রে প্রবেশাধিকার হারিয়ে, বেইজিং এখন ঝুঁকছে উন্নয়নশীল বাজারের দিকে। চীনের প্রণোদনাপ্রাপ্ত ও রাষ্ট্রীয় সমর্থনপুষ্ট পণ্য এখন সয়লাব করে দিচ্ছে আফ্রিকা, লাতিন আমেরিকা ও দক্ষিণ-পূর্ব এশিয়ার বাজার। এইসব অঞ্চলের ক্ষুদ্র উদ্যোক্তারা এমনিতেই হিমশিম খাচ্ছেন, এখন চীনা পণ্যের সঙ্গে প্রতিযোগিতা করাও অসম্ভব হয়ে উঠছে।

উদাহরণস্বরূপ, ইথিওপিয়ার তৈরি পোশাক শিল্প একসময় চীনের নিম্নব্যয় শিল্পকে গ্রহণ করে শিল্পায়নের মডেল হিসেবে বিবেচিত হয়েছিল। কিন্তু এখন চীনা টেক্সটাইল প্রতিষ্ঠানগুলো তৃতীয় দেশের মাধ্যমে রপ্তানি করে বা দামের দিক থেকে ইথিওপিয়ান পণ্যকে বাজার থেকে সরিয়ে দিচ্ছে। একই ঘটনা ঘটছে কেনিয়ার কৃষি, বাংলাদেশের ইলেকট্রনিক অ্যাসেম্বলি, এবং গুয়েতেমালার কফি রপ্তানিতে।

এদিকে চীনের বেল্ট অ্যান্ড রোড ইনিশিয়েটিভ —যেটি বিশ্বব্যাপী অবকাঠামো নির্মাণের উদ্যোগ হিসেবে পরিচিত তা এখন অনেক স্বল্পোন্নত দেশের ওপর চীনের প্রভাব বিস্তারের হাতিয়ার হয়ে উঠেছে। এসব প্রকল্পের ঋণ শর্ত অস্পষ্ট, কাজগুলো অনেক সময় প্রলম্বিত, আর ঋণের বোঝা দুঃসহ। শ্রীলঙ্কার হাম্বানটোটা বন্দরের দীর্ঘ মেয়াদি লিজের ঘটনাটি এখনও সতর্কবার্তা হিসেবে বিবেচিত। জাম্বিয়া ও লাওসের মতো দেশগুলোও বাড়তে থাকা ঋণের বোঝায় পর্যুদস্ত।

যুক্তরাষ্ট্রের অবস্থানও খুব আশাব্যঞ্জক নয়। ওয়াশিংটনের নীতি কখনো রক্ষণশীল পন্থায় ফিরে যায়, আবার কখনো "মিত্রদের দিয়ে সরবরাহ ব্যবস্থা গড়া"র মতো স্লোগানে আটকে থাকে। আফ্রিকান গ্রোথ অ্যান্ড অপরচুনিটি অ্যাক্ট (AGOA) কিংবা উন্নয়নের উদ্দেশ্যে বিনিয়োগের আরও ভালো ব্যবহার অ্যাক্টের (BUILD) মতো প্রকল্পগুলোর তহবিল সীমিত ও অনুচ্চারিত। বাইডেন প্রশাসনের তথাকথিত “শ্রমিক-কেন্দ্রিক” বাণিজ্যনীতি ছিলো মূলত ঘরোয়া শ্রম ইউনিয়নকে তুষ্ট করার একটি প্রচেষ্টা মাত্র।

অন্যদিকে, ইউরোপ অনেক বড় বড় কথা বললেও বাস্তবতা সম্পূর্ণ ভিন্ন। ইউরোপীয় ইউনিয়নের গ্লোবাল গেটওয়ে প্রকল্প কিছু শক্তিশালী অবকাঠামো উদ্যোগ নিলেও এর ব্যাপ্তি এখনও সীমিত। ফলে স্বল্পোন্নত ও উন্নয়নশীল বিশ্বের জন্য একটি সমন্বিত, মূল্যভিত্তিক অর্থনৈতিক কৌশলের জায়গা ফাঁকা পড়ে আছে।

কেউ কেউ যুক্তরাষ্ট্র-চীনের বিচ্ছিন্নতাকে সুযোগ হিসেবে দেখেন। ভাবনাটা এমন, চীন নির্ভরতা কমাতে বহুজাতিক কোম্পানিগুলো "চায়না-প্লাস-ওয়ান" কৌশলে যেমন ভিয়েতনাম, ইন্দোনেশিয়া, ভারতকে গুরুত্ব দিচ্ছে, তাতে স্বল্পোন্নত দেশগুলো লাভবান হবে। কিছুটা হয়েছে বটে যেমন ভিয়েতনাম ইলেকট্রনিক বিনিয়োগ পেয়েছে, বাংলাদেশ পোশাক শিল্প শক্তিশালী করেছে, মেক্সিকো পেয়েছে উৎপাদন কেন্দ্র।

কিন্তু এগুলো ব্যতিক্রম, সাধারণ নিয়ম নয়। অধিকাংশ স্বল্পোন্নত দেশে প্রয়োজনীয় অবকাঠামো, নীতিগত সামঞ্জস্যতা বা রাজনৈতিক স্থিতিশীলতার অভাব রয়েছে, যা তাদেরকে বাস্তবসম্মত বিকল্প হিসেবে গড়ে উঠতে বাধা দিচ্ছে। আর যেসব শিল্প খাত স্থানান্তরিত হচ্ছে, সেগুলো মূলত কম লাভজনক এবং উচ্চ ঝুঁকিপূর্ণ—অর্থাৎ এমন ধরনের কাজ যা অটোমেশন ও কৃত্রিম বুদ্ধিমত্তার গতিবৃদ্ধির সঙ্গে সবার আগে বিলুপ্ত হয়ে যাবে। বাস্তবে, স্বল্পোন্নত দেশগুলোকে বৈশ্বিক বাণিজ্যের অংশীদার হিসেবে নয়, বরং একটি আরও বিভাজিত ও আঞ্চলিকীকৃত অর্থনৈতিক ব্যবস্থার ভোগ্য উপাদান হিসেবে পুনঃস্থাপন করা হচ্ছে।

তাহলে করণীয় কী? প্রথমত, অর্থনৈতিক বহুমুখীকরণ এখন আর বিলাসিতা নয়। এটা টিকে থাকার পূর্বশর্ত। রুয়ান্ডা যেমন ধীরে ধীরে ডিজিটাল সেবা খাত গড়ে তুলছে, বা ঘানা কৃষি প্রক্রিয়াজাতকরণে বিনিয়োগ করছে—এগুলো পথ দেখাচ্ছে। তবে এর জন্য প্রয়োজন শুধু অবকাঠামো নয়—মানসম্পন্ন শিক্ষা, সুশাসন এবং কার্যকর বিধিব্যবস্থা।

দ্বিতীয়ত, আঞ্চলিক সংহতি শুধু মুখের বুলি নয়, বাস্তবে রূপ দিতে হবে। আফ্রিকান কন্টিনেন্টাল ফ্রি ট্রেড এরিয়া (AfCFTA) ২০৩০ সালের মধ্যে ৫০% পর্যন্ত অভ্যন্তরীণ বাণিজ্য বাড়াতে পারে। কিন্তু এর পথে বাধা প্রচুর—নন-ট্যারিফ প্রতিবন্ধকতা, অবকাঠামোর দুর্বলতা, রাজনৈতিক অনিচ্ছা।

তৃতীয়ত, আর্থিক দায়িত্ববোধ সর্বোচ্চ অগ্রাধিকার পাওয়া উচিত। যেমন সহজ শর্তে ঋণ গ্রহণ করে অপচয়মূলক প্রকল্প ব্যয় এর প্রবনতা, বিশেষ করে যখন বৈশ্বিক পুঁজি লাভের খোঁজে ছুটছে। তাছাড়া, শ্বেতহস্তী প্রকল্প, অনাবশ্যক বিমানবন্দর কিংবা জনশূন্য শহর বাস্তবে অর্থনৈতিক স্থিতিশীলতা গড়ে তুলতে খুব সামান্যই সাহায্য করে। স্বল্পোন্নত দেশগুলোর প্রয়োজন নিরবচ্ছিন্ন বিদ্যুৎ সরবরাহ ব্যবস্থা, সড়ক যোগাযোগ, ডিজিটাল প্রবেশাধিকার এবং মৌলিক স্বাস্থ্যসেবার অবকাঠামো।

সবশেষে, বিশ্বের পরাশক্তিগুলোকে স্বীকার করতে হবে তাদের অর্থনৈতিক জাতীয়তাবাদের তরঙ্গ কতটা দূর পর্যন্ত পৌঁছায়। যুক্তরাষ্ট্র যদি মুক্ত বাজার অর্থনৈতিক বিশ্বের নেতৃত্ব দিতে চায়, তাহলে তাকে কেবল নিজের স্বার্থ নয়—বিশ্বের স্থিতিশীলতার কথাও ভাবতে হবে। বাণিজ্য সুবিধা, সক্ষমতা গড়ে তোলা, এবং ন্যায্য বাজার প্রবেশাধিকার—এসব হতে হবে নীতির অংশ। আর যদি চীন একটি দায়িত্বশীল অংশীদার হিসেবে বিবেচিত হতে চায়, তাহলে তাকে তার ঋণের সুযোগ সন্ধানী দিকগুলো পুনর্বিবেচনা করতে হবে এবং অংশীদারদের স্বাধীন কর্মপন্থাকে সম্মান জানাতে হবে।

ইতিহাস কখনোই ক্ষমতাধরদের ক্ষমতার বাইরে থাকা বিশ্বকে ভুলে যাওয়ার অপরাধ ক্ষমা করে না। যুক্তরাষ্ট্র-চীন শুল্ক যুদ্ধ হয়তো একদিন একপক্ষের বিজয়ে শেষ হবে, কিন্তু ইতিমধ্যেই হেরেছে কোটি কোটি মানুষ। এই যুদ্ধে যাদের নেই কোনো সম্মতি, নেই কোনো কণ্ঠ, আর নেই  কোনো উপায় যেখানে এই ধ্বংসযজ্ঞ থেকে পালিয়ে বাঁচতে পারে।

যদি আমরা এমন একটি বিশ্বব্যবস্থায় বিশ্বাস করি যা উন্মুক্ত, নিয়মভিত্তিক এবং ন্যূনতম মাত্রায় ন্যায়সঙ্গত, তবে সেটি এমন হতে পারে না যেখানে দূর্বল দেশগুলোকেই সর্বদা সবচেয়ে বেশি মূল্য দিতে হয়। অথচ এই মুহূর্তে আমরা ঠিক এমনই এক বিশ্বে বসবাস করছি।

   লেখক : রাজনৈতিক ও নিরাপত্তা বিশ্লেষক।

এই লেখাটি প্রকাশিত হয়েছে :

১. দৈনিক সংবাদ, বাংলাদেশ : ১৭ এপ্রিল, ২৫

The Forgotten Victims of Great-Power Rivalry

M A Hossain, 

The world’s poorest nations are once again discovering what it means to be peripheral to power. In the latest chapter of 21st-century great-power rivalry, Washington and Beijing have locked horns in an economic slugfest that began with tariffs and has metastasized into a geopolitical confrontation with global consequences. The fight was supposed to be about fairness, intellectual property, and national pride. But in the fog of economic war, it is the least-developed countries (LDCs) that are losing the most—quietly, painfully, and with no clear way out.

This trade war began in 2018 as a calculated maneuver by the Trump administration to rectify perceived imbalances in the U.S.-China trade. There were some justifications, like China’s trade practices, ranging from forced technology transfers to outright theft of intellectual property, merited a robust response. Tariffs, the administration reasoned, were the simplest way to penalize bad behavior and protect American manufacturing. But what started as a tactical skirmish over soybeans and solar panels has become an entrenched strategic rivalry, complete with tit-for-tat tariffs, restricted access to critical technologies, and the ideological framing of economic policy as a weapon of national security.

By 2025, tariffs have reached eye-watering levels—up to 145% on some Chinese goods, and as high as 84% on American exports. Both governments, cloaked in patriotic rhetoric, insist they are protecting national interests. What they are actually doing is recalibrating the terms of global trade in a way that imperils the fragile economies least capable of absorbing shocks.

The global economy doesn’t operate like a chessboard where moves are discrete and predictable. It functions more like an ecosystem, deeply interconnected, often delicately balanced. Disturb one part, and tremors are felt everywhere. The U.S.-China tariff war has delivered exactly that kind of shock. It has disrupted global supply chains, sent shipping costs surging, and created a cascade of uncertainty that disproportionately affects those already on the economic margins.

Least-Developed Countries tend to rely on exports of raw materials, low-cost agricultural goods, and labor-intensive manufactured products such as garments. Their economies are often mono-sectoral, their infrastructure underdeveloped, and their labor markets heavily informal. When global trade slows—as it has, both due to tariffs and persistent post-pandemic disruptions—these nations lose access to the vital lifelines of foreign exchange and employment. Export revenues fall, government budgets constrict, and hard-won progress in poverty reduction risks being undone.

Compounding the pain is the way China has adapted to U.S. tariffs. Facing dwindling access to American consumers, Beijing has turned aggressively into other markets, many of them in the developing world. Chinese goods, often heavily subsidized or state-backed, now flood African, Latin American, and Southeast Asian markets. Local producers in these regions, already operating on razor-thin margins, cannot compete.

Consider the garment industry in Ethiopia, once touted as a model of how low-income countries could industrialize by capturing China’s low-end manufacturing as it moved up the value chain. In recent years, that promise has stalled. Chinese textile firms, seeking tariff-safe havens, are re-exporting through third countries or pricing Ethiopian products out of regional markets altogether. The same story is playing out in Kenyan agriculture, Bangladeshi electronics assembly, and Guatemalan coffee exports.

At the same time, the Belt and Road Initiative—China’s globe-spanning infrastructure drive has tightened its grip on many LDCs. While billed as an engine of development, the BRI too often functions as a lever of influence. The loans are opaque, the projects frequently under-deliver, and the debt burdens can be crushing. Sri Lanka’s loss of the Hambantota Port to Chinese control remains a cautionary tale. Others, like Zambia and Laos, face mounting debt-service obligations without commensurate economic gains.

To be fair, the U.S. hasn’t offered a particularly compelling counter-narrative. Washington’s approach has oscillated between protectionist retrenchment and rhetorical gestures about near-shoring or "friend-shoring" supply chains. Initiatives like the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) or the BUILD Act, which created a new development finance agency, remain underfunded and underpublicized. Meanwhile, the Biden administration’s “worker-centered” trade policy often seems more focused on appeasing domestic labor unions than on engaging meaningfully with global economic partners.

Europe, for its part, talks a good game. The EU’s Global Gateway strategy is meant to be a high-standard alternative to the BRI. But aside from some promising energy and digital infrastructure projects, its reach remains modest. The result is a gaping vacuum where a coordinated, values-based economic strategy for the developing world should be.

Some argue that this U.S.-China decoupling presents an opportunity for LDCs. The theory goes like this: as multinationals seek to diversify supply chains away from China—“China-plus-one” being the operative term—countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, and India will benefit. To a limited extent, they have. Vietnam has attracted significant electronics investment. Bangladesh has strengthened its apparel sector. Even Mexico has enjoyed a mini-renaissance in nearshoring.

But these are exceptions, not the rule. Most LDCs lack the infrastructure, policy coherence, or political stability to become viable alternatives. And the industries that are migrating tend to be low-margin and high-risk—exactly the sort of jobs that will be first to vanish as automation and artificial intelligence accelerate. If anything, LDCs are being repositioned not as partners in global trade, but as expendable nodes in a more fractured, regionalized economic system.

So what should be done? For one, economic diversification is no longer a luxury—it is a necessity. Countries like Rwanda, which is cautiously nurturing a digital services sector, or Ghana, investing in agro-processing, point to possible paths forward. But these require investment, not just in capital projects, but in education, governance, and regulatory frameworks.

Second, regional integration must move from aspiration to reality. Africa’s Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) has the potential to boost intra-African trade by more than 50% by 2030. That would provide a vital buffer against external shocks. But the barriers—non-tariff restrictions, poor infrastructure, political reluctance—remain formidable.

Third, fiscal responsibility is paramount. The temptation to borrow cheaply and spend extravagantly is understandable, especially when global capital is chasing yield. But vanity projects, white-elephant airports, and ghost cities will do little to build resilience. What LDCs need are power grids, roads, digital access, and basic health infrastructure.

Finally, the major powers must acknowledge the ripple effects of their economic nationalism. If the United States wants to lead the free world, it cannot pursue a trade policy that prioritizes parochial interests over global stability. Trade preferences, capacity-building, and fair market access must be part of the toolkit. And if China wants to be seen as a responsible stakeholder, it must rethink the predatory aspects of its development lending and respect the agency of its partners.

History is unkind to great powers that forget the rest of the world exists. The U.S.-China tariff war may yet produce a winner in some abstract sense of global economic supremacy. But it has already produced real losers—millions of people in countries that had no vote in this conflict, no say in the decisions, and no means of escape from the fallout.

If we believe in a world order that is open, rules-based, and minimally fair, then it cannot be one where the smallest nations always pay the steepest price. For now, that’s precisely the world we’re living in.

M A Hossain, political and defense analyst based in Bangladesh. He can be reached at: writetomahossain@gmail.com

  This article published at :

1. The New Nation, BD : 17 April, 25

2. New Age, BD : 22 April, 25

3. Asian Age, BD : 24 April, 25

4. Pakistan Today, Pak : 23 April, 25

Chaos in Kathmandu

M A Hossain,

History has a way of repeating itself, first as tragedy, then as farce—and sometimes as both at once.

Nepal is living through such a moment. Eighteen years after mass protests forced King Gyanendra Shah to surrender power, ending a royal dictatorship, the same man is now being championed as the solution to the country’s political dysfunction. The streets of Kathmandu have erupted in violence, with pro-monarchy demonstrators clashing with police, two dead (including a journalist), and a government crackdown in full swing. The Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), a Hindu nationalist group backing the protests, has warned Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli against arresting the former king—or risk turning simmering discontent into a full-blown revolt.

This is more than just another episode of Himalayan instability. It is a case study in democratic failure—and a warning for the region.

Nepal’s transition from monarchy to republic in 2008 was supposed to usher in an era of stability and prosperity. Instead, the country has cycled through thirteen governments in sixteen years, a revolving door of corruption and incompetence. Economic growth has stagnated, while inflation hovers near seven percent, crushing ordinary Nepalis who rely on remittances that account for nearly a quarter of the country’s GDP. These remittances are now shrinking as job opportunities dry up in India and the Gulf.

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the state’s weaknesses. Nepal’s healthcare system buckled under the weight of the crisis, tourism collapsed, and the government’s response was sluggish and mired in infighting. Meanwhile, China and India poured money into infrastructure projects, turning Nepal into yet another battleground for regional influence. Now, the bill has come due.

The former king, now eighty-two, has seized the moment. In a calculated move, he declared last month that Nepal’s republican experiment has failed—a message that resonates with a public weary of political paralysis. His supporters, a mix of Hindu nationalists, royalists, and disaffected youth, have taken to the streets, demanding a return to monarchy. But nostalgia is a dangerous drug.

Gyanendra’s reign was hardly a golden age. His 2005 power grab, dissolving parliament and ruling by decree, ended in disaster, triggering the protests that ultimately toppled him. The 2001 palace massacre, in which Crown Prince Dipendra gunned down much of the royal family before killing himself, left deep scars. While nearly ninety percent of Nepalis still identify as Hindu, support for restoring the monarchy is far from unanimous. Yet, when democracies fail, people often turn to strongmen—or in this case, a strongman from the past.

If New Delhi believes a Hindu nationalist resurgence in Nepal would serve its interests, it is making a grave miscalculation. India’s heavy-handed approach to its neighbors has backfired repeatedly. The blockade between 2015 and 2017, orchestrated by Madhesi groups along the India-Nepal border, was meant to pressure Kathmandu into constitutional concessions. Instead, it fueled anti-Indian sentiment, pushing Nepal closer to China. Today, Beijing has surpassed Delhi in infrastructure investment, including highways, hydropower plants, and even a proposed railway link to Lhasa. The RPP, despite its Hindu nationalist rhetoric, is no Indian puppet. Its leaders have courted Chinese investment and criticized India’s big-brother attitude. If the monarchy returns, it will be on Nepal’s terms—not India’s.

Beijing prefers dealing with Nepal’s communist leaders, who have proven reliable partners. But China is nothing if not pragmatic. If the tide turns decisively toward monarchy, expect Beijing to adapt swiftly—perhaps even backing Gyanendra if it serves their interests. Already, Chinese state media has framed the protests as a symptom of Western-style democracy’s failures. A stable, authoritarian-leaning Nepal would suit Beijing just fine.

Nepal’s ongoing crisis is emblematic of a broader geopolitical shift in South Asia. In Bangladesh, a former close ally of India, Sheikh Hasina’s government has been ousted, and the interim administration under Dr. Muhammad Yunus is actively strengthening ties with China, fueling a surge in anti-India sentiment. In Sri Lanka, despite India’s efforts to stabilize its economy following the 2022 financial meltdown, Colombo has increasingly gravitated toward Beijing’s influence. Meanwhile, in the Maldives, President Mohamed Muizzu has taken a firm stance by expelling Indian troops, signaling a clear strategic realignment in favor of China. India’s neighborhood policy is in shambles. Instead of building trust, Delhi has alienated allies with abrupt moves like the Citizenship Amendment Act of 2019, which sparked fears of marginalization in Bangladesh. Meanwhile, China offers cash without lectures—a winning formula in the region.

The political instability in Nepal is also leading to a concerning security vacuum. Given its porous borders with India and China, a weak or chaotic Nepal could become fertile ground for extremist elements to exploit. The presence of armed Maoist factions, remnants of Nepal’s decade-long civil war, further complicates the situation. If governance continues to deteriorate, there is a risk that radicalized groups could take advantage of the instability, adding another layer of volatility to the already fragile region. Intelligence reports have previously warned about the potential for cross-border extremism, which would be disastrous not only for Nepal but for its neighbors as well.

The impact of Nepal’s crisis on its people is equally alarming. Youth unemployment has soared, prompting an exodus of Nepali workers seeking jobs abroad. The desperation is palpable as thousands of young men and women leave their homeland every day, seeking economic opportunities in the Gulf and Southeast Asia. This mass migration not only weakens Nepal’s domestic labor market but also creates a long-term demographic crisis where the country’s brightest and most capable individuals seek futures elsewhere. As public frustration grows, Nepal’s ruling elite remains engrossed in petty power struggles, showing little urgency in addressing these fundamental issues.

The immediate crisis may pass. The protesters’ April 3 ultimatum could fizzle out. But the anger won’t disappear. Nepal’s political class faces a stark choice: reform or face revolt. If it continues to govern as it has—with incompetence and graft—the calls for radical change will only grow. As for India, it must finally learn that influence isn’t imposed by coercion. It’s earned through consistency, respect, and reliable partnership. Right now, Delhi is failing on all fronts.

This isn’t just about Nepal. It’s about whether democracy can deliver in places where it’s still young and fragile. When governments fail to provide basic stability, people will look elsewhere—even to the ghosts of the past. The chaos in Kathmandu is a warning. The world should pay attention.

M A Hossain, political and defense analyst based in Bangladesh. He can be reached at: writetomahossain@gmail.com

  This article published at :

1. The Nation, Pak : 16 April, 25

The High Cost of Trump’s Tariff Tantrum

M A Hossain,

Donald Trump’s decision to suspend most of his proposed “reciprocal” tariffs—save for those aimed at China—was not a clever recalibration. It was a reluctant concession to economic reality. What he initially billed as a bold protectionist strategy has unraveled into a belated acknowledgment that trade wars, far from being easy to win, are devastatingly expensive to fight—especially when you’re waging them against friends and foes alike. The damage of his original plan would have been catastrophic, and even the diluted version he now proposes will leave scars.

Consider the data. Economic modeling suggested that if the full tariff plan had gone into effect—blanketing nearly all imports with steep duties and triggering sweeping retaliation from trading partners—U.S. real consumption would have fallen by 2.4% in 2025, GDP would have contracted by 2.6%, and employment would have dropped by 2.7%. For an economy operating at near-full employment, that would mean millions of jobs suddenly vanish. What begins with a modest 4.2% unemployment rate could quickly spiral into something far more painful.

Nor would the pain have been temporary. Over a 15-year horizon, the economic effects compound: investment dries up, productivity slows, and real incomes stagnate. Tariffs don’t revive American manufacturing—they hollow out the economy from the inside. The fantasy that high tariffs could somehow resurrect an imagined industrial golden age is just that: a fantasy. What they actually do is erode the very economic power that made America influential in the first place.

The scaled-down version of Trump’s plan—essentially a 10% blanket tariff on most imports while China remains saddled with a whopping 125%—is marginally less apocalyptic but still injurious. The revised numbers still project a 1.9% drop in consumption next year, a 4.8% decline in investment, and a 2.1% fall in employment. None of this counts as good news, and it doesn’t qualify as a sound policy. What’s more, the structure of these tariffs remains fundamentally incoherent.

Start with the basics: many of the goods targeted by tariffs—minerals, coffee, bananas—are items the U.S. simply doesn’t produce. Taxing them does nothing to boost domestic manufacturing. All it does is raise costs for ordinary consumers. And when it comes to the industries America might try to reshore, the logic collapses under its own weight. Low-wage, labor-intensive manufacturing isn’t coming back, nor should we want it to. The objective of modern economic policy ought to be creating high-wage, high-skill jobs—not reopening sweatshops.

Moreover, protectionist volatility is poisonous for long-term investment. Businesses don’t allocate capital or build factories when they suspect trade policy will be upended with every presidential tweet. Trump’s inconsistency undermines the very confidence his tariffs are supposed to inspire. And retaliation is never just a threat; it’s a certainty. American farmers, already weary from earlier trade skirmishes, are likely to find themselves once again on the front lines, facing tariffs from countries that used to be reliable buyers of U.S. produce.

Modern supply chains are another sticking point. An iPhone isn't manufactured in a single country—it’s the product of components from around 40. A Ford F-150 isn’t just American steel and rubber; it depends on intricate contributions from a dozen countries. Rebuilding these supply chains domestically is a task that spans decades, not election cycles. And it isn’t simply a matter of political will or patriotic desire. It’s a matter of physics, finance, and global logistics.

Then there’s the legal question. The emergency powers Trump cites as justification for these sweeping tariffs were never intended to authorize broad economic warfare. His maneuvering stretches the law to its limits—possibly past them. Even if factories do come back under the weight of protectionism, they won’t be populated by battalions of workers. They’ll be filled with robots and run by engineers. The new plants that rise will be highly automated, offering employment mostly to skilled labor that remains in short supply.

Equally baffling is the decision to hit U.S. allies with these tariffs. Why slap a 10% duty on goods from countries like the United Kingdom or Australia—nations with whom the U.S. actually runs trade surpluses? That’s not just economic folly; it’s strategic self-sabotage. Trade deficits are not, as Trump insists, signs of national weakness. They often shrink during recessions—a fact that no economist considers a win. The focus on “reciprocity” in tariffs, as defined by balance-of-payments metrics rather than product-by-product analysis, reveals an understanding of trade rooted more in emotion than in economics.

One of the most inexplicable parts of Trump’s tariff vision is the exemption he granted to Russia. In a bizarre twist, Moscow is spared the punitive duties that are being leveled at longstanding allies. This is not only diplomatically mystifying—it also opens the U.S. up to accusations of arbitrariness and capriciousness in trade enforcement. Compounding the issue is the method used to calculate the tariffs in the first place: a reliance on a single year’s trade data rather than multi-year averages. That kind of cherry-picking distorts reality and breeds bad policy.

Trump’s approach also runs afoul of global trade agreements. By flouting the World Trade Organization’s rules, Washington not only undermines its legal obligations but also chips away at the very institutions that have helped maintain global economic order for decades. Foreign investors, watching this spectacle unfold, may start to lose faith in the stability of the U.S. market—and in the dollar as the world’s reserve currency.

This matters because when America pulls back, other powers step in. If European and Asian nations find themselves frozen out of U.S. markets or alienated by its erratic behavior, they won’t stop trading. They’ll just trade more—with China. Tariffs meant to contain Beijing’s influence could have the perverse effect of pushing Washington’s allies into its arms.

To be sure, confronting China is a necessary task. But the tools must match the target. A narrow set of tariffs tied to clearly defined goals—intellectual property theft, forced tech transfers, state-backed subsidies—could be part of a coherent response. But this requires diplomacy, coordination, and the patient building of alliances. Instead, Trump’s tariff tantrum alienates the very partners we need while failing to exact real concessions from Beijing. China, for its part, has already imposed retaliatory tariffs on 84% of U.S. goods, hammering American exporters while remaining largely unbothered at home.

What’s left is a set of policies that act more as self-inflicted wounds than geopolitical leverage. Tariffs are, at their core, taxes on American consumers. They raise prices, stifle growth, invite retribution, and diminish U.S. global influence. That Trump himself has stepped back—at least partially—from the abyss suggests even he understands their costs. And yet, he clings to the remains of his plan, either out of pride or political calculus, both of which are poor substitutes for sound economics.

There is a better way. Economic nationalism is a dead-end street. The United States should be spearheading a global effort to modernize trade rules, one that holds China accountable while reaffirming the alliances that made America prosperous. If Trump refuses to learn that lesson, the responsibility will fall on the next administration. And the sooner, the better.

This article published at :

1. Eurasia Review, USA : 12 April, 25

Trump's Tariff Pause is Still Economically Damaging

 M A Hossain,

Donald Trump’s retreat from his sweeping “reciprocal” tariff plan—excluding China—was not strategic recalibration but a reluctant nod to economic facts. His vision of a protectionist America collided with the harsh truth that trade wars are neither easy to win nor painless to fight. Economic modeling had painted a dire picture: had Trump’s full plan been enacted, U.S. real consumption would have declined by 2.4%, GDP by 2.6%, and employment by 2.7% by 2025. For an economy near full employment, the outcome would’ve meant millions of lost jobs and prolonged economic stagnation.

Even the revised plan—a 10% blanket tariff on most imports and 125% on Chinese goods—remains damaging. Consumption is projected to drop by 1.9%, investment by 4.8%, and employment by 2.1%. These figures don’t reflect resilience—they reveal persistent harm. Worse, the structure of the tariffs is incoherent. Many taxed imports, like bananas or minerals, aren’t produced in the U.S., so the duties raise consumer prices without reviving domestic industries. And attempts to reshore low-wage manufacturing ignore the reality that such sectors aren’t coming back—and shouldn’t. The goal should be to create high-wage, high-skill jobs, not resurrect sweatshops.

Tariff unpredictability deters investment. Businesses won’t commit capital if policy flips with presidential whims. Supply chains today are global—an iPhone relies on 40 countries; a Ford truck on dozens more. Reconstructing such systems domestically takes decades, not election cycles. Moreover, the legal basis of Trump’s tariffs, rooted in emergency powers, strains credibility. Even if new factories emerge, they will be automated, offering few jobs to unskilled labor.

Trump’s decision to penalize allies like the UK and Australia—while sparing Russia—is both strategically baffling and diplomatically corrosive. It invites charges of arbitrariness and threatens to weaken ties with long-standing partners. Trade deficits, often framed as weaknesses, can actually shrink in recessions—making them poor indicators of national strength.

By disregarding WTO rules and alienating allies, the U.S. risks eroding global trust and ceding economic leadership. Countries shut out by U.S. tariffs may simply deepen trade with China—defeating the very goal of containment. A smarter approach would involve targeted, alliance-backed tariffs addressing real concerns like IP theft or state subsidies. Instead, Trump’s tariffs function as self-inflicted wounds, undermining both economic strength and international influence.

This article published at :

1. South China Morning Post, HK, 12 April, 25