M A Hossain
In geopolitics, alliances are often less about ideals and more about imperatives. History offers few better examples than Winston Churchill’s wartime pact with Joseph Stalin. Having once likened the Soviet dictator to a menace that should’ve been extinguished in infancy, Churchill reversed course when Hitler posed a greater threat. The rationale was blunt, even cynical: “If Hitler invaded Hell, I would make at least a favorable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons.”
The sentiment underscores a hard truth: geopolitical strategy frequently demands cooperation among adversaries. These are what we call “unholy alliances”—temporary, tactical arrangements formed not out of shared values but mutual threats or benefits. Their roots lie not in ideology but in necessity.
Such alliances are now commonplace. From the U.S.-Taliban agreement to Saudi-Iranian diplomatic overtures, today's geopolitical map is dotted with unlikely alignments. These partnerships can be useful, even necessary. But they often come at the expense of long-term stability, institutional legitimacy, and public trust.
Formed by Fear, Not Friendship
Realpolitik defines the genesis of most unholy alliances. Theories of international relations, from Thucydides to Waltz, have consistently emphasized that states act to ensure survival, not solidarity. In the 1980s, for example, the United States backed Saddam Hussein to contain Iran’s revolutionary regime. This gamble succeeded temporarily, but later exploded into a regional crisis that haunted Washington for decades.
Similarly, President Nixon’s 1972 outreach to Maoist China stunned observers. For a president elected on anti-communist credentials, opening to Beijing was a sharp pivot. But it was also a calculated move to outflank the Soviet Union. The ideological contradictions mattered less than the strategic dividends.
These examples demonstrate that shared interests can override even entrenched animosities. But the alliances forged on this logic often prove brittle and morally ambiguous.
Institutions in the Crossfire
The proliferation of such tactical partnerships erodes the foundation of postwar international institutions. Organizations like the United Nations, NATO, and the World Trade Organization were built on the idea of a rules-based order. But that order depends on consistency, mutual confidence, and the ability to enforce norms—qualities that suffer when expedience dominates.
The Iran nuclear deal in 2015 highlighted this dilemma. Structured to build trust through verification and diplomacy, it was ultimately undone by persistent suspicion on both sides. Each party anticipated betrayal—and delivered. The failure wasn’t procedural but psychological: no treaty can substitute for trust.
As institutions weaken, global diplomacy becomes increasingly bilateral and transactional. The Abraham Accords, brokered outside traditional UN frameworks, achieved diplomatic normalization between Israel and several Arab states. But their success also underscored how marginal multilateral institutions have become in brokering substantive agreements.
Temporary Relief, Lasting Risk
Unholy alliances can deliver immediate results. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan became feasible only after an agreement with the Taliban—an organization it had fought for nearly two decades. Likewise, recent Saudi-Iranian talks have cooled tensions across the Persian Gulf.
Yet the risks are significant. The Taliban, once ousted for harboring al-Qaeda, now governs with few constraints, leaving space for extremist groups to reemerge. Riyadh’s diplomatic turn may have reduced overt hostilities with Tehran, but it hasn’t erased underlying sectarian and strategic rivalries.
Moreover, the normalization of such alliances signals to smaller states and non-state actors that duplicity is permissible, even rewarded, in global affairs. This perception undermines efforts to build durable coalitions against transnational threats—be they terrorism, climate change, or pandemics.
The Consequences of Moral Evasion
Governments often justify these alliances through rhetorical sleights of hand. Franklin Roosevelt softened Stalin’s image by calling him “Uncle Joe.” Today, U.S. officials frame arms sales to Saudi Arabia as essential to “regional security,” while sidestepping the kingdom’s human rights record.
Such positioning is politically expedient but corrosive. When policymakers toggle between moralism and Machiavellianism, public trust suffers. Voters begin to view foreign policy not as a principled endeavor but as a shifting game of interests cloaked in selective outrage.
The fallout from these dynamics is not just political but operational. Allies become unpredictable, and former partners may morph into adversaries. The Afghan mujahideen, once seen as tools to resist Soviet expansion, eventually incubated al-Qaeda. Today, informal ties between Israel and Sunni Gulf monarchies serve as a hedge against Iran—but could become flashpoints if popular unrest over Palestine surges in Arab capitals.
Strategic Ambiguity as the New Normal
The shifting web of alliances also reflects the decline of rigid bloc politics. NATO, once the bedrock of collective defense, now grapples with divergent member interests. Turkey, while still a member, has purchased Russian missile systems and pursues independent mediation in the Ukraine conflict. India, courted by the U.S.-led Quad, also imports discounted Russian oil and resists full alignment with Western sanctions.
This kind of strategic ambiguity is increasingly common. It gives countries more autonomy—but also makes long-term coordination more difficult. In this fluid environment, alliances resemble transactions more than treaties.
Restoring Order Amid Flux
There is no simple remedy. Unholy alliances are often unavoidable, especially in moments of crisis. But they should be approached with transparency, limitations, and an awareness of their costs.
First, governments must be honest about the nature and scope of these partnerships. Vague objectives and open-ended arrangements invite failure. The U.S.-Taliban deal lacked enforceable conditions and offered no mechanism to manage noncompliance. That omission undermined both sides' ability to claim credibility.
Second, international institutions must adapt or fade. The WTO remains vital, but cannot function amid escalating trade wars and selective rule-following. If major powers do not invest in institutional legitimacy—even while competing—then the architecture of global order will continue to decay.
Third, security cooperation should be embedded in broader relationships. Economic and cultural ties are more resilient than tactical military pacts. The U.S.-Vietnam relationship has grown not because of shared ideology, but because of mutual interests in trade, regional stability, and balancing China.
Conclusion: A World of Contingency
The return of great power competition, the erosion of norms, and the proliferation of non-state threats have combined to create a world where alliances are fluid, interest-based, and often contradictory. Leaders must weigh short-term gains against long-term liabilities. Churchill understood that the alliance with Stalin was a means to an end—not a validation of Soviet methods.
Modern statesmen would do well to remember that lesson. In a world governed more by pragmatism than principle, alliances with enemies may be inevitable. But they should never be mistaken for friendships—or trusted beyond their expiration date.
M A Hossain, political and defense analyst based in Bangladesh. He can be reached at: writetomahossain@gmail.com
This article published at :
1. The Seoul Times, S Korea : 23 April, 25
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