M A Hossain,
The announcement that Bangladesh has agreed in principle to allow a 'Humanitarian Corridor' into Myanmar’s Rakhine State under UN supervision should evoke more than polite nods from international observers. It ought to trigger a serious debate about the unintended consequences of well-meaning interventions, especially when geography, geopolitics, and internal instability intersect so precariously.
Bangladesh, long a reluctant host to over a million Rohingya refugees fleeing Myanmar’s military persecution, now finds itself in the eye of yet another humanitarian cyclone. This time, however, it risks shifting from passive recipient to active conduit. And that transition—however noble it might appear—carries layers of risk that Dhaka must confront with eyes wide open.
To begin with, the corridor isn’t just a road to deliver aid. It is, by design or default, a channel of political signal and strategic influence. The argument for the corridor is steeped in immediate humanitarian need: famine-like conditions in Rakhine, the collapse of local economic structures, and the prospect of a fresh wave of refugees pouring into Bangladesh. The United Nations and various rights groups have painted a grim picture—one where food is scarce, access blocked, and despair growing. Under such urgency, the call for humanitarian corridors often becomes irresistible. But history tells us that these corridors rarely remain confined to their original mandate.
Consider Grozny in Chechnya, Aleppo in Syria, or Donbas in Ukraine. Humanitarian corridors in these conflict zones were not insulated highways for aid but rather became contested spaces—rife with manipulation, militarization, and in some cases, covert arms trafficking. Even the most benevolent intentions are vulnerable to strategic abuse. Why would Bangladesh’s experience be any different?
Indeed, the geography alone should give policymakers in Dhaka sleepless nights. The corridor would traverse or abut areas controlled by the Arakan Army, a well-armed ethnic insurgent group currently fighting Myanmar’s junta. While they are not officially designated as terrorists, their record of human rights violations, including against Rohingya populations, is unsettling. Moreover, the military junta—still clinging to control in Naypyidaw—has shut off nearly every logistical artery to Rakhine, except the one potentially through Bangladesh. That exclusivity makes the corridor not just a humanitarian lifeline but a strategic artery in a regional power contest.
And here lies the rub. No corridor operates in a political vacuum. Bangladesh now risks being drawn—perhaps unwillingly—into a complex tripartite dynamic: between the Myanmar junta, the Arakan Army, and the civilian Rohingya population. Add to that the silent yet powerful interests of China and India—both of whom have strategic stakes in Rakhine—and suddenly, a humanitarian passageway begins to look a lot like a chessboard.
To complicate matters, there has been little domestic consensus within Bangladesh on the matter. According to several analysts and former diplomats, the proposal has not gone through comprehensive consultation within the government or with civil society. In fact, some key stakeholders involved in Rohingya policy reportedly learned of the decision through the media. Transparency, it seems, was sacrificed at the altar of expediency.
This is particularly troubling given that the corridor could become a long-term arrangement. If aid continues to flow, what mechanisms exist to monitor and guarantee that it reaches civilians and not combatants? How does Bangladesh plan to verify the end-use of the supplies? And who takes responsibility if the corridor is used as a cover for something far less benign—say, arms smuggling or narcotics trafficking?
Any proposed corridor, even if endorsed by the United Nations, must be placed firmly under Dhaka’s full operational control. Without such oversight, the risk of unforeseen and potentially destabilizing developments cannot be ruled out. The warning is both prudent and timely—yet, as is often the case in geopolitics, the most consequential challenges lie buried in the details, which remain troublingly opaque.
Further adding to the geopolitical anxiety is the broader regional context. China has long supported infrastructure projects through Rakhine, including the strategic Kyaukphyu port, which gives Beijing access to the Bay of Bengal. India, too, has economic interests in the region. The United States, meanwhile, has been quietly attempting to nudge Bangladesh into a more pro-Western posture, particularly as a hedge against growing Chinese influence. If this corridor becomes an entry point for Western humanitarian aid, it might inadvertently deepen regional fault lines.
And let’s not forget the one million-plus Rohingya already residing in camps in Cox’s Bazar. The corridor could, paradoxically, normalize their long-term displacement. If aid is seen flowing freely into Rakhine without any serious attempt to guarantee Rohingya repatriation, international urgency on the matter could dissipate. Worse, it might cement the idea that the crisis is being “managed,” rather than resolved.
There’s also the disturbing prospect that the corridor could become an incentive for more displacement. If fleeing civilians know aid flows better outside their borders, the corridor could unintentionally become a pipeline for new refugees. That’s not just speculation—UN reports already warn that famine and conflict may soon push more people toward Bangladesh’s borders.
To its credit, Dhaka has placed conditions on the corridor, but what those are remains undisclosed. Without public clarity, assurances ring hollow. “Where are the terms? Who are the implementing partners? What is the exit strategy?”. These are not minor administrative details—they are the essential safeguards for national sovereignty and regional stability.
So, what should Bangladesh do? First, it must insist on a multilateral framework that includes not just the UN but key regional powers—China, India, ASEAN—each with their own stakes in ensuring that the corridor does not spiral into a zone of armed logistics. Second, Dhaka should condition continued support on measurable benchmarks: transparency in aid distribution, third-party monitoring, and a viable repatriation mechanism for Rohingya refugees. Third, the Bangladeshi government must bring the conversation into the public sphere. Major security decisions taken behind closed doors tend to backfire when consequences unfold in full daylight.
Lastly—and most critically—Bangladesh must avoid being cast as a pawn in the larger geopolitical game. A humanitarian corridor may save lives, yes. But it must not cost a country its strategic autonomy.
Humanitarianism is not a weakness. But when entangled with geopolitics, it demands the steel of realism. Bangladesh, while commendably compassionate, must now also be calculating. A corridor may serve short-term relief, but it must not pave the road to long-term insecurity. Otherwise, today’s noble gesture may become tomorrow’s regrettable blunder.
M A Hossain, political and defense analyst based in Bangladesh. He can be reached at: writetomahossain@gmail.com
This article published at :
1. Asian Age, BD : 06 May, 25
2. Weekly blitz, BD : 05 May, 25
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