M. A. Hossain,
Thailand has a new prime minister, and with him, another chapter in the country’s endlessly looping political drama. On September 5, Anutin Charnvirakul took the oath of office, ending weeks of crisis that saw the collapse of Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s government. His rise was not the product of a sweeping electoral mandate or a decisive reform agenda. It was, instead, a triumph of opportunism — carefully timed, ruthlessly pragmatic, and deeply illustrative of the enduring patterns of Thai politics.
At 58, Anutin is no stranger to power. He is a seasoned insider, born into wealth, raised in proximity to politics, and skilled at maneuvering through the minefields of Thailand’s polarized landscape. For more than two decades, that landscape has been dominated by a bitter contest: on one side, the populist legacy of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, beloved by rural voters; on the other, the royalist-military establishment determined to keep that populism in check. Most politicians have been forced to choose sides. Anutin has repeatedly chosen both.
His career reads like a manual in political adaptation. He began in the 1990s, aligned himself with Thaksin in the early 2000s, survived the 2006 coup by retreating to business, returned as leader of the Bhumjaithai Party, and by 2019 was kingmaker to Prayuth Chan-ocha — Thaksin’s longtime adversary. By 2023, he was comfortably seated in a coalition led by Thaksin’s own party, serving as deputy prime minister and interior minister. Now, after a scandal forced Paetongtarn from office, Anutin has stepped into the top job. Each shift was not an ideological journey but a strategic calculation.
Thailand is hardly unique in rewarding such agility. History offers plenty of examples where survival demands political flexibility. Italy in the post-war era cycled through dozens of governments as parties formed and dissolved coalitions. Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party mastered internal factionalism as a form of continuity amid constant leadership changes. But Thailand’s volatility is distinctive for its fusion of formal democracy, informal military veto power, and a monarchy whose influence remains politically potent though constitutionally restrained.
The episode that brought Anutin to power underscores this volatility. Paetongtarn’s offhand comments in a phone call with Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen — later leaked — touched on border tensions and insulted a senior Thai general. Public fury followed. Constitutional judges moved swiftly, suspending and then dismissing her for ethical breaches. The coalition fractured. Anutin withdrew his party, resigned from the cabinet, and positioned himself as the only leader acceptable to rival factions. It was textbook Thai politics: no ideology, no new mandate, just a rearrangement of power among familiar players.
To understand what this means for Thailand’s future, it helps to recall the country’s persistent imbalance between civilian governance and military power. The armed forces have long claimed a guardianship role — sometimes openly, through coups, and at other times quietly, through institutional leverage. The 2025 border conflict with Cambodia only strengthened that hand. During the crisis, the military acted with autonomy in key decisions, often bypassing civilian oversight. Public opinion surveys show the military remains the most trusted institution in matters of security, a reflection not only of its capabilities but also of civilian governments’ chronic fragility.
Anutin is unlikely to challenge that arrangement. His own party is conservative, pro-monarchy, and deeply intertwined with regional patronage networks that rely on military goodwill. The current constitutional order (itself the product of post-coup engineering) structurally favors conservative and military-aligned elites. Civilian supremacy is, for now, aspirational rather than real. Under Anutin, civil-military relations will likely continue as they have: the generals shaping national security and foreign policy from behind the curtain while civilians administer day-to-day governance with limited authority.
The economic picture is no less complicated. The political crisis has rattled investor confidence, delayed the 2026 budget, and cast doubt on Thailand’s ability to pursue major trade negotiations, particularly with the United States. Analysts warn of slowed GDP growth, hesitant foreign investment, and policy paralysis as coalitions are patched together with more concern for survival than for reform. In this respect, Thailand risks joining a broader pattern visible in parts of Southeast Asia and beyond: governments consumed by tactical coalition-keeping rather than strategic nation-building.
Nor can one ignore the social consequences. The fall of Paetongtarn — daughter of Thaksin and once seen as the dynasty’s next standard-bearer — signals a possible ebb in the Shinawatra family’s long dominance. Yet it does not resolve the deeper cleavage between rural populism and urban conservatism, between demands for reform and the guardianship instincts of the old elite. If anything, it may sharpen them. The political center has not held in Thailand; it has merely shifted temporarily toward a man skilled at navigating its fault lines.
Mass protests remain the wildcard. Thai history teaches that popular mobilization can upend political calculations, but only if it divides or neutralizes the military. Research on civil resistance movements worldwide shows that broad, nonviolent, cross-class coalitions are more likely to succeed in forcing reform or transition. Fragmented, violent, or narrowly partisan protests, by contrast, tend to invite repression and entrench authoritarian reflexes. In Thailand, the military’s institutional interests favor stability over democratic experiments. Unless protests threaten cohesion within the armed forces or raise the cost of repression beyond tolerable limits, the status quo is likely to endure.
Anutin’s own record offers few clues that he intends to be a transformational leader. His signature policy achievement (the 2022 decriminalization of cannabis) was bold but poorly regulated, leaving the country scrambling to impose safeguards. His handling of COVID-19 was competent in some respects, lackluster in others, marred by sluggish vaccine procurement and defensive public remarks. Allegations of electoral manipulation and land-use improprieties around his party circle him like low clouds: not yet storms, but persistent signs of the murky political environment he inhabits comfortably.
Thailand, then, faces a paradox. It has a new prime minister who is arguably the most skilled dealmaker of his generation, yet whose skill lies in preserving a system rather than reforming it. The country remains caught between an electorate that desires both stability and change, a military that brooks no challenge to its prerogatives, and a monarchy that exerts gravitational pull over political imagination even when silent. In this environment, survival often masquerades as progress.
History suggests that such systems are sustainable — until they aren’t. The late Roman Republic maintained a veneer of constitutional politics even as power concentrated in fewer hands, until civil war rendered the old order obsolete. More recently, Pakistan has oscillated for decades between civilian governments and military interventions, each cycle eroding institutional trust while preserving the immediate interests of elites. Thailand risks a similar trajectory: chronic instability punctuated by moments of calm that are mistaken for consensus.
Anutin’s premiership could, in theory, chart a different path. By leveraging his cross-factional credibility, he could pursue incremental reforms — restoring public trust in governance, strengthening civilian oversight, and modernizing economic policy. He could treat his opportunism not merely as a means of personal advancement but as a platform for national renewal. Yet such choices require more than tactical brilliance. They require strategic courage — the willingness to risk power in order to use it well.
For now, Thailand’s politics remain what they have long been: pragmatic, personality-driven, and perpetually fluid. Anutin Charnvirakul is its latest custodian, not its disrupter. Whether that changes will depend less on his instincts than on the forces (social, economic, and military) that define the space within which any Thai leader must operate. Stability may hold for a while. But in a system built on deals rather than durable institutions, the next crisis is never far away.
M A Hossain, senior journalist, political and international affairs analyst based in Bangladesh. His articles are already featured in South China Morning Post, The Jakarta Post, Asian Age, The Korea Times, New Age, Modern Diplomacy, The Geopolitics, South Asia Monitor, The Daily Guardian, etc. He can be reached at: writetomahossain@gmail.com
This article published at :
1. Asia Times, HongKong : 06 Sep,25
2. The Nation, Pak : 09 Sep, 25
3. Asian Age, BD : 10 Sep, 25
4. Daily Lead Pakistan, Pak : 10 Sep, 25
5. Pakistan Today, Pak : 24 Sep, 25
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