M A Hossain,
In the world of international security, true surprises are rare. Yet Russia recently delivered one that deserves far more attention than it has received. On September 22, Vladimir Putin announced that Moscow is willing to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty(STRAT) for another year which is going to expire next February, 2026. This is the only treaty to control the US - Russia arms race. The proposal was made voluntarily and unilaterally with the intention that Kremlin will be strict to the treaty if Washington reacts reciprocally.
Western media remains silent on this issue. Perhaps, acknowledging it would be inconvenient to the narrative of Russia as reckless and unrestrained. Yet an ominous question is emerging - is the world entering a future where nuclear deterrence will function without rules, without limits, and without trust?
Barack Obama and Dmitri Medvedev signed this New START treaty in 2010 which was never perfect. But it was historic in its purpose. Both the countries agreed to limit their strategic nuclear arsenals to 1,550 deployed warheads and 700 launchers, alongside rigorous verification mechanisms. For over a decade, it has been serving as a bulwark to prevent from the U.S.- Russia into an unregulated arms race.
Russia, for its part, has consistently adhered to the treaty’s provisions. American inspectors were granted access. Data was exchanged. And Moscow refrained from major breaches. The same cannot be said for Washington. Successive U.S. administrations have shown a troubling pattern over the decades. George W. Bush withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, and Donald Trump pulled out of both the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty. These U.S. moves have pushed the world to the edge of new arms control races that were established after the Cold War.
The consequences have been corrosive. Verification has been weakened, dialogue narrowed, and trust hollowed out. With New START set to expire, the world risks drifting into an era with no enforceable constraints on nuclear arsenals whatsoever.
This is the backdrop for Putin’s announcement. At first glance, it may seem paradoxical: a leader often accused of nuclear brinkmanship volunteering to uphold arms control limits. But the move is less about benevolence than calculation. Russia has modernized more than 90 percent of its nuclear triad. It is confident in its deterrent. By signaling restraint, Putin can project responsibility while putting the burden of rejection squarely on Washington.
If the United States responds positively, then a narrow space for dialogue will remain open. But if it refuses, Russia can claim that it tried diplomatically. In either case, Moscow will position itself not as a spoiler but as a stakeholder in stability, and the message will resonate in parts of Europe, Asia, and the Global South.
The U.S. response was not strong enough. Moreover, the strained relations between Washington and the Kremlin after the stalemate of Ukraine negotiations have put the issue off the table. A demand is growing consistently to bring China into this agreement. In principle, this makes sense, because China is rapidly expanding its strategic arsenal. But in practice, the demand acts as a fig leaf to avoid the negotiation strategy. China has made clear it has no intention of joining a bilateral framework it views as a U.S.-Russia construct.
The risk here is obvious. By holding out for an unattainable multilateral treaty, Washington could let the existing bilateral one collapse. That would not bring Beijing to the table. It would simply remove the last remaining limits on U.S. and Russian arsenals—an outcome that serves no one’s interest.
Predictably, many in Europe have misinterpreted Russia’s gesture as weakness. Some policymakers argue that continued pressure will yield further concessions from Moscow. This is a dangerous illusion. A nation that has spent years modernizing its entire nuclear arsenal isn’t exactly coming to the table from a position of vulnerability. And it certainly isn’t the sort of country that will bow easily under the weight of sanctions or diplomatic isolation.
It’s not a strategy that guides Europe now, but straight into a security landscape more fragile, more dangerous, than anything seen since the Cold War. Back then, deterrence at least had rules. Today, those rules are fraying. Tomorrow, they may not exist at all.
The last century taught us in blood and fear. In 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world to the edge of a nuclear grave. For nearly two weeks, leaders hesitated, calculated, and sweated under the weight of history. Catastrophe was avoided not by chance alone, but by the grudging recognition that dialogue—even between enemies—was the only escape. Out of that narrow survival came a chain of treaties: SALT, START, and eventually New START, each an attempt to keep the abyss at arm’s length.
But lessons fade, and agreements can unravel. The collapse of the INF Treaty has already thrown Europe and Asia back into the reach of missiles that cut reaction time to minutes. That kind of pressure leaves no room for error, only for disaster. If New START follows the same path, the world will not simply drift into danger—it will lurch toward it, blind and hurried.
Without New START, the guardrails vanish. No limits, no ceilings, no rules—just two nuclear giants staring each other down. The inspections, the data swaps, the notifications that once provided a measure of reassurance? Gone. In their absence, planners on both sides will imagine the worst, and once they imagine it, they’ll prepare for it. That’s how buildups begin. That’s how risks multiply.
And the danger isn’t only in deliberate choices. Accidents happen. Wires get crossed. Misread signals can spiral out of control. A single mistake could ignite something no one ever intended. Russia has already scrapped its moratorium on intermediate- and short-range missiles, citing U.S. deployments in Europe and Asia. If New START collapses too, we won’t just see tension—we’ll see an arms race sprinting back into view, pulling everyone into a game where nobody wins.
Some will argue that extending New START for just one year is cosmetic—a temporary bandage on a festering wound. They are not wrong. But even a fragile framework is better than none. Predictability, however limited, is preferable to chaos. And a year’s extension buys something priceless in diplomacy: time.
Vladimir Putin’s proposal is not an expression of selfless generosity. It is a deliberate strategic gamble for Washington, and perhaps a last resort to save the arms control system from catastrophe. The question now is whether the United States will embrace it as a golden opportunity or dismiss the breakthrough as irrelevant. But this is the decision that will determine the course of global security for decades to come.
Time is running out. The current treaty is set to expire next February. Each month of delay brings us closer to an unregulated, uncertain future. If world leadership remains in stalemate, future generations will remember September 2025 as a wasted and regrettable opportunity.
M A Hossain, senior journalist and international affairs analyst based in Bangladesh. He can be reached at: writetomahossain@gmail.com
This article published at :
1. The Nation, Pak : 01 Oct, 25
No comments:
Post a Comment