M A Hossain,
Trade agreements are not signed in a vacuum. They are signed in moments—moments shaped by political uncertainty, economic pressure, and international maneuvering. And sometimes, history intervenes faster than diplomats anticipate.
On February 9, 2026, the recently departed interim administration led by Muhammad Yunus signed the United States–Bangladesh Agreement on Reciprocal Trade. It was presented as pragmatic statecraft: reciprocal tariffs reduced to 19%, preferential entry for American agricultural and industrial goods, regulatory commitments, digital trade alignment, and undertakings to expand purchases of U.S. aircraft, energy, and defense equipment. The Agreement was not merely a commercial arrangement. It was a geopolitical document. This could have been one of the most important strategic shifts in Bangladesh's modern history.
Seven days later, that government was gone.
On February 12, the voters of Bangladesh delivered its verdict. By mid-February, a new administration led by Tarique Rahman began assuming office. And then, on February 20, a decision from the Supreme Court of the United States fundamentally altered the terrain. In a 6–3 ruling, the Court struck down President Donald Trump’s sweeping tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, declaring that such measures lacked congressional authorization.
In less than two weeks, the legal foundation upon which the reciprocal trade agreement rested had cracked.
The sequence matters. The agreement was negotiated in the shadow of U.S. tariff escalation. Washington had invoked emergency powers to justify broad trade measures. Dhaka, facing export vulnerability (particularly in ready-made garments) sought relief. Concessions were traded for tariff reductions. It was a high-pressure environment. The interim government framed the pact as damage control.
But when the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the tariff architecture underpinning that pressure, the strategic calculus shifted overnight.
Bangladesh’s Commerce Secretary has since indicated that the agreement, still unratified, may lose its legal basis if tied directly to now-invalidated tariff mechanisms. That observation is not procedural trivia. It is geopolitical oxygen. It restores maneuvering space.
This changes how we must read the Yunus-era agreement.
Originally, analysts argued that the pact embedded structural alignment beyond mere tariff reciprocity. Sectional provisions on export controls, digital trade, defense procurement, and energy sourcing signaled long-term geopolitical tilt. Bangladesh appeared to be binding itself to American strategic priorities—particularly in an Indo-Pacific climate defined by the U.S.–China competition.
Those concerns remain valid in principle. But law and leverage are dynamic.
The Supreme Court’s decision has introduced asymmetry in reverse. If Washington’s tariff regime exceeded statutory authority, then the reciprocal concessions extracted under its shadow deserve scrutiny. Agreements are negotiated between sovereign equals, not under legal uncertainty. When the initiating measure is ruled unlawful, downstream commitments warrant review.
President Trump, in response to the Court’s ruling, announced a temporary 10% global tariff under Section 122 authority for 150 days. That move, narrower and time-bound, is qualitatively different from the broad emergency-based tariffs that preceded it. The environment has moderated.
Bangladesh is no longer negotiating under maximalist pressure.
This distinction is critical for three reasons. First, the tariff baseline has shifted. If U.S. duties stand at 10% rather than 19 or higher, the economic urgency behind Bangladesh’s concessions weakens. The original bargain—reduced tariffs in exchange for regulatory alignment and procurement undertakings—must be recalibrated against current realities. Trade diplomacy must be responsive to present conditions, not frozen in past anxieties.
Second, the agreement remains unratified. That is not a technical footnote. It means the new government retains sovereign discretion. Parliament is not bound by interim commitments. Inter-ministerial review is not obstructionism; it is constitutional prudence.
Third, the broader strategic environment demands balance. Bangladesh’s foreign policy tradition has been one of diversification. Engagement with China under infrastructure initiatives. Energy cooperation with Russia at Rooppur. Defense sourcing from multiple partners. Robust trade ties with the European Union and India. This multi-vector approach has insulated the country from overdependence.
The Yunus agreement, as structured, risked narrowing that bandwidth. Provisions relating to complementary restrictive measures, export control alignment, digital trade conformity, and defense procurement orientation implied gradual integration into a U.S.-anchored framework.
Now, the question is no longer whether Bangladesh must accept that trajectory as fait accompli. The question is whether it should renegotiate from improved leverage.
The ready-made garment sector—over $3 billion annually in exports to the United States—remains central. No responsible government can gamble recklessly with that lifeline. But protection does not require capitulation. It requires intelligent sequencing.
The new administration should undertake three immediate steps.
First, conduct a comprehensive legal and economic audit of the February 9 agreement. Identify which provisions are directly tethered to invalidated U.S. tariff authorities and which stand independently. Assess procurement commitments—such as aircraft and LNG imports—against current market forecasts and foreign exchange projections. Transparency here strengthens negotiating credibility.
Second, reopen bilateral consultations with Washington. The Supreme Court ruling provides diplomatic cover for recalibration. A 10% temporary tariff regime is a different negotiating landscape. Bangladesh can seek tariff stabilization without embedding expansive security and digital clauses that constrain long-term autonomy.
Third, diversify markets while negotiating. The European Union’s GSP+ framework, emerging Asian markets, and regional trade corridors must be expanded. Diversification strengthens bargaining power; dependence weakens it.
None of this implies hostility toward the United States. Strategic partnership with Washington remains valuable. American markets matter. Technology cooperation can be beneficial. Defense dialogue can enhance professionalism. But partnership must rest on mutual respect and legal clarity.
The interim government may argue that it acted under exigency. Perhaps it did. Economic headwinds were real. Global trade fragmentation is intensifying. Yet transitional administrations should exercise restraint when embedding long-term strategic commitments. That principle is not partisan; it is constitutional.
The irony is instructive. What appeared to be a strategic lock-in may now become a strategic reopening.
History offers lessons. Smaller states survive great-power competition by preserving optionality. They sign agreements, yes—but they also revisit them when circumstances change. Law intervenes. Courts rule. Elections reshape mandates. Diplomacy adapts.
The February 20 Supreme Court decision was not about Bangladesh. It was about the limits of executive power in the United States. Yet its ripple effects have reached Dhaka. International agreements do not exist in isolation from domestic constitutional structures. When one pillar shifts, the architecture above must be re-evaluated.
Bangladesh today stands at a quieter but significant inflection point. It can ratify the February 9 framework unchanged, arguing continuity. Or it can review, renegotiate, and recalibrate—anchoring trade policy to present legal and economic realities rather than to a dissolved government’s emergency calculations.
Stability is valuable. But so is sovereignty.
The path forward need not be confrontational. It should be deliberate. Careful review, stakeholder consultation, parliamentary scrutiny, and measured diplomacy—these are the tools of a confident state.
Trade agreements shape decades. Court rulings can reshape weeks. Between those two timelines lies leadership.
The opportunity now before the new government is not to repudiate partnership, but to refine it. Not to retreat from engagement, but to ensure that engagement reflects both national interest and current law. Moments of recalibration are rare. Bangladesh has been handed one. The question is whether it will use it.
M A Hossain, political and defense analyst based in Bangladesh. He can be reached at: writetomahossain@gmail.com
This article published at :
1. New Delhi Post, India : 24 Feb, 26
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